Posted by
Gabrielle Cusumano on Tuesday, May 22, 2007 6:01:30 PM
"One in four" of U.S. Muslims under 30 "say suicide bombings to defend their religion are acceptable at least in some circumstances" and "Only 40 percent said they believe Arab men carried out the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001."
May 22, 2007
Tiny Minority of Extremists Alert. "Some US Muslims justify suicide attacks," by Alan Fram for the Associated Press:
WASHINGTON - One in four younger U.S. Muslims say suicide bombings to defend their religion are acceptable at least in some circumstances, though most Muslim Americans overwhelmingly reject the tactic and are critical of Islamic extremism and al-Qaida, a poll says.
But what was their definition of "extremism?" The vagueness surrounding that question may explain much of the apparent contradiction between the numbers who support suicide bombings in some or many cases, the roughly 25 percent described below who "did not express an opinion" about al-Qaeda, and those who are "critical of Islamic extremism."
The survey by the Pew Research Center, one of the most exhaustive ever of the country's Muslims, revealed a community that in many ways blends comfortably into society. Its largely mainstream members express nearly as much happiness with their lives and communities as the general public does, show a broad willingness to adopt American customs, and have income and education levels similar to others in the U.S.
Even so, the survey revealed noteworthy pockets of discontent.
While nearly 80 percent of U.S. Muslims say suicide bombings of civilians to defend Islam can not be justified, 13 percent say they can be, at least rarely.
That sentiment is strongest among those younger than 30. Two percent of them say it can often be justified, 13 percent say sometimes and 11 percent say rarely.
"It is a hair-raising number," said Radwan Masmoudi, president of the Washington-based Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, which promotes the compatibility of Islam with democracy.
He said most supporters of the attacks likely assumed the context was a fight against occupation — a term Muslims often use to describe the conflict with Israel.
U.S. Muslims have growing Internet and television access to extreme ideologies, he said, adding: "People, especially younger people, are susceptible to these ideas."
Federal officials have warned that the U.S. must be on guard against homegrown terrorism, as the British suffered with the London transit bombings of 2005.
Even so, U.S. Muslims are far less accepting of suicide attacks than Muslims in many other nations. In surveys Pew conducted last year, support in some Muslim countries exceeded 50 percent, while it was considered justifiable by about one in four Muslims in Britain and Spain, and one in three in France.
Tiny Minority of "Crazies" Alert:
"We have crazies just like other faiths have them," said Eide Alawan, who directs interfaith outreach at the Islamic Center of America in Dearborn, Mich., one of the nation's largest mosques. He said killing innocent people contradicts Islam.
Andrew Kohut, Pew director, said in an interview that support for the attacks represented "one of the few trouble spots" in the survey.
At a later news conference, he said much of that support could be attributed to age because the findings were consistent with numerous other surveys showing young people more inclined to violence and to support wars.
The poll briefly describes the rationales for and against "suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets" and then asks, "Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?"
The question did not specify where a suicide attack might occur, who might carry it out or what was meant by using a bombing to "defend Islam."
In other findings:
- Only 5 percent of U.S. Muslims expressed favorable views of the terrorist group al-Qaida, though about a fourth did not express an opinion.
- Six in 10 said they are concerned about a rise in Islamic extremism in the U.S., while three in four expressed similar worries about extremism around the world.
- Yet only one in four consider the U.S. war on terrorism a sincere attempt to curtail international terror. Only 40 percent said they believe Arab men carried out the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
- By six to one, they say the U.S. was wrong to invade Iraq, while a third say the same about Afghanistan — far deeper than the opposition expressed by the general U.S. public.
- Just over half said it has been harder being a U.S. Muslim since the 9/11 attacks, especially the better educated, higher income, more religious and young. Nearly a third of those who flew in the past year say they underwent extra screening because they are Muslim.
That statistic isn't very useful without a comparison to one gathered from a general sampling of the flying public. However, contradicting claims of 6 million or 8 million Muslims in America:
The survey estimates there are roughly 2.35 million Muslim Americans. It found that among adults, two-thirds are from abroad while a fifth are U.S.-born blacks.
Update: The full survey report can be found here (thanks to Cumulusnine).
Posted by Marisol at
01:02 PM http://www.jihadwatch.org/______________________________________________________________________________________
The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other
Europe's Muslims More Moderate
Released: 06.22.06
Navigate this report
Introduction and Summary
I. Muslims and the West - How Each Sees The Other
II. The Rift Between Muslims and the West: Causes and Consequences
III. Islam, Modernity and Terrorism
Voices from Countries
Methodological Appendix
Country Profiles
Questionnaire
Introduction and Summary
After a year marked by riots over cartoon portrayals of Muhammad, a major terrorist attack in London, and continuing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, most Muslims and Westerners are convinced that relations between them are generally bad these days. Many in the West see Muslims as fanatical, violent, and as lacking tolerance. Meanwhile, Muslims in the Middle East and Asia generally see Westerners as selfish, immoral and greedy - as well as violent and fanatical.
A rare point of agreement between Westerners and Muslims is that both believe that Muslim nations should be more economically prosperous than they are today. But they gauge the problem quite differently. Muslim publics have an aggrieved view of the West - they are much more likely than Americans or Western Europeans to blame Western policies for their own lack of prosperity. For their part, Western publics instead point to government corruption, lack of education and Islamic fundamentalism as the biggest obstacles to Muslim prosperity.
Nothing highlights the divide between Muslims and the West more clearly than their responses to the uproar this past winter over cartoon depictions of Muhammad. Most people in Jordan, Egypt, Indonesia and Turkey blame the controversy on Western nations' disrespect for the Islamic religion. In contrast, majorities of Americans and Western Europeans who have heard of the controversy say Muslims' intolerance to different points of view is more to blame.
The chasm between Muslims and the West is also seen in judgments about how the other civilization treats women. Western publics, by lopsided margins, do not think of Muslims as "respectful of women." But half or more in four of the five Muslim publics surveyed say the same thing about people in the West.
Yet despite the deep attitudinal divide between Western and Muslim publics, the latest Pew Global Attitudes survey also finds that the views of each toward the other are far from uniformly negative. For example, even in the wake of the tumultuous events of the past year, solid majorities in France, Great Britain and the U.S. retain overall favorable opinions of Muslims. However, positive opinions of Muslims have declined sharply in Spain over the past year (from 46% to 29%), and more modestly in Great Britain (from 72% to 63%).
For the most part, Muslim publics feel more embittered toward the West and its people than vice versa. Muslim opinions about the West and its people have worsened over the past year and by overwhelming margins, Muslims blame Westerners for the strained relationship between the two sides. But there are some positive indicators as well, including the fact that in most Muslim countries surveyed there has been a decline in support for terrorism.
The survey by the Pew Global Attitudes Project was conducted in 13 countries, including the United States, from March 31-May 14, 2006. It includes special oversamples of Muslim minorities living in Great Britain, France, Germany and Spain. In many ways, the views of Europe's Muslims represent a middle ground between the way Western publics and Muslims in the Middle East and Asia view each other.
While Europe's Muslim minorities are about as likely as Muslims elsewhere to see relations between Westerners and Muslims as generally bad, they more often associate positive attributes to Westerners - including tolerance, generosity, and respect for women. And in a number of respects Muslims in Europe are less inclined to see a clash of civilizations than are some of the general publics surveyed in Europe. Notably, they are less likely than non-Muslims in Europe to believe that there is a conflict between modernity and being a devout Muslim.
Solid majorities of the general publics in Germany and Spain say that there is a natural conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society. But most Muslims in both of those countries disagree. And in France, the scene of recent riots in heavily Muslim areas, large percentages of both the general public and the Muslim minority population feel there is no conflict in being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society.
The survey shows both hopeful and troubling signs with respect to Muslim support for terrorism and the viability of democracy in Muslim countries. In Jordan, Pakistan and Indonesia, there have been substantial declines in the percentages saying suicide bombings and other forms of violence against civilian targets can be justified to defend Islam against its enemies. The shift has been especially dramatic in Jordan, likely in response to the devastating terrorist attack in Amman last year; 29% of Jordanians view suicide attacks as often or sometimes justified, down from 57% in May 2005.
Confidence in Osama bin Laden also has fallen in most Muslim countries in recent years. This is especially the case in Jordan, where just 24% express at least some confidence in bin Laden now, compared with 60% a year ago. A sizable number of Pakistanis (38%) continue to say they have at least some confidence in the al Qaeda leader to do the right thing regarding world affairs, but significantly fewer do so now than in May 2005 (51%). However, Nigeria's Muslims represent a conspicuous exception to this trend; 61% of Nigeria's Muslims say they have at least some confidence in bin Laden, up from 44% in 2003.
The belief that terrorism is justifiable in the defense of Islam, while less extensive than in previous surveys, still has a sizable number of adherents. Among Nigeria's Muslim population, for instance, nearly half (46%) feel that suicide bombings can be justified often or sometimes in the defense of Islam. Even among Europe's Muslim minorities, roughly one-in-seven in France, Spain, and Great Britain feel that suicide bombings against civilian targets can at least sometimes be justified to defend Islam against its enemies.
Anti-Jewish sentiment remains overwhelming in predominantly Muslim countries. There also is considerable support for the Hamas Party, which recently was victorious in the Palestinian elections. Majorities in most Muslim countries say that the Hamas Party's victory will be helpful to a fair settlement between Israel and the Palestinians - a view that is roundly rejected by Western publics (see "America's Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns over Iran, Hamas," June 13, 2006).
In one of the survey's most striking findings, majorities in Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan say that they do not believe groups of Arabs carried out the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The percentage of Turks expressing disbelief that Arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks has increased from 43% in a 2002 Gallup survey to 59% currently. And this attitude is not limited to Muslims in predominantly Muslim countries - 56% of British Muslims say they do not believe Arabs carried out the terror attacks against the U.S., compared with just 17% who do.
But Muslim opinion on most issues is not monolithic, and there are some apparent anomalies in Muslims' views of the West and its people. While large percentages in nearly every Muslim country attribute several negative traits to Westerners - including violence, immorality and selfishness - solid majorities in Indonesia, Jordan and Nigeria express favorable opinions of Christians.
Moreover, there is enduring belief in democracy among Muslim publics, which contrasts sharply with the skepticism many Westerners express about whether democracy can take root in the Muslim world. Pluralities or majorities in every Muslim country surveyed say that democracy is not just for the West and can work in their countries. But Western publics are divided - majorities in Germany and Spain say democracy is a Western way of doing things that would not work in most Muslim countries. Most of the French and British, and about half of Americans, say democracy can work in Muslim countries.
Overall, the Germans and Spanish express much more negative views of both Muslims and Arabs than do the French, British or Americans. Just 36% in Germany, and 29% in Spain, express favorable opinions of Muslims; comparable numbers in the two countries have positive impressions of Arabs (39% and 33%, respectively). In France, Great Britain and the U.S., solid majorities say they have favorable opinions of Muslims, and about the same numbers have positive views of Arabs.
These differences are reflected as well in opinions about negative traits associated with Muslims. Roughly eight-in-ten Spanish (83%) and Germans (78%) say they associate Muslims with being fanatical. But that view is less prevalent in France (50%), Great Britain (48%) and the U.S. (43%).
In many ways, the views of Europe's Muslims are distinct from those of both Western publics and Muslims in the Middle East and Asia. Most European Muslims express favorable opinions of Christians, and while their views of Jews are less positive than those of Western publics, they are far more positive than those of Muslim publics. And in France, a large majority of Muslims (71%) say they have favorable opinions of Jews.
Moreover, while publics in largely Muslim countries generally view Westerners as violent and immoral, this view is not nearly as prevalent among Muslims in France, Spain and Germany. British Muslims however, are the most critical of the four minority publics studied - and they come closer to views of Muslims around the world in their opinions of Westerners.
Other Major Findings
- Concerns over Islamic extremism are widely shared in Western publics and Muslim publics alike. But an exception is China, where 59% express little or no concern over Islamic extremism.
- Muslims differ over whether there is a struggle in their country between Islamic fundamentalists and groups wanting to modernize society. But solid majorities of those who perceive such a struggle side with the modernizers.
- Fully 41% of the general public in Spain says most or many Muslims in their country support Islamic extremists. But just 12% of Spain's Muslims say most or many of the country's Muslims support extremists like al Qaeda.
- Nearly four-in-ten Germans (37%), and 29% of Americans, say there is a natural conflict between being a devout Christian and living in a modern society.
Roadmap to the Report
The first section of the report analyzes how people in predominantly Muslim countries and non-Muslim countries view each other. This section examines the positive and negative characteristics Muslims associate with Westerners - including Muslim minorities in four Western European countries - and the traits that non-Muslims associate with Muslims. Section II focuses on opinions about the state of relations between the West and Muslims. It also explores reasons people give for Muslim nations' lack of prosperity, attitudes to the recent controversy over cartoon depictions of Muhammad, and Muslim opinions on whether Arabs carried out the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Section III deals with the opinions of Muslim publics as to whether they see a struggle in their countries between modernizers and Islamic fundamentalists, the concerns that Muslims and non-Muslims alike share over the rise of Islamic extremism, and Muslim views on terrorism and Osama bin Laden.
The report includes excerpts from interviews conducted by the International Herald Tribune in selected countries to illustrate some of the themes covered by the survey. These interviews were conducted separately from the Pew Global Attitudes Project. The bulk of the interviews are with Muslims.
A description of the Pew Global Attitudes Project immediately follows. A summary of the methodology can be found at the end of this report, along with economic and demographic data on the countries surveyed, and complete topline results.
About the Pew Global Attitudes Project
The Pew Global Attitudes Project is a series of worldwide public opinion surveys encompassing a broad array of subjects ranging from people's assessments of their own lives to their views about the current state of the world and important issues of the day. The Pew Global Attitudes Project is co-chaired by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, currently principal, the Albright Group LLC, and by former Senator John C. Danforth, currently partner, Bryan Cave LLP. The project is directed by Andrew Kohut, president of the Pew Research Center, a nonpartisan "fact tank" in Washington, DC, that provides information on the issues, attitudes, and trends shaping America and the world. The Pew Global Attitudes Project is principally funded by The Pew Charitable Trusts. The surveys of European Muslims were conducted in partnership with the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, another project of the Pew Research Center, which works to promote a deeper understanding of issues at the intersection of religion and public affairs.
Since its inception in 2001, the Pew Global Attitudes Project has released 14 major reports, as well as numerous commentaries and other releases, on topics including attitudes towards the U.S. and American foreign policy, globalization, terrorism, and democratization.
Findings from the project are also analyzed in America Against the World: How We Are Different and Why We Are Disliked, a recent book by Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes, a Pew Global Attitudes Project team member and international economics columnist at the >National Journal.
Pew Global Attitudes Project team members also include Mary McIntosh, president of Princeton Survey Research Associates International, and Wendy Sherman, principal at The Albright Group LLC. Contributors to the report and to the Pew Global Attitudes Project include Richard Wike, Carroll Doherty, Paul Taylor, Michael Dimock, Elizabeth Mueller Gross, Jodie T. Allen, and others of the Pew Research Center. The International Herald Tribune is the project's international newspaper partner. For this survey, the Pew Global Attitudes Project team consulted with survey and policy experts, regional and academic experts, and policymakers. Their expertise provided tremendous guidance in shaping the survey.
Following each release, the project also produces a series of in-depth analyses on specific topics covered in the survey, which will be found at pewglobal.org. The data are also made available on our website within two years of publication.
For further information, please contact:
Richard Wike
Senior Project Director
Pew Global Attitudes Project
202.419.4400
rwike@pewresearch.org
Navigate this report
Introduction and Summary
I. Muslims and the West - How Each Sees The Other
II. The Rift Between Muslims and the West: Causes and Consequences
III. Islam, Modernity and Terrorism
Voices from Countries
Methodological Appendix
Country Profiles
Questionnaire
______________________________________________________________________________________
The United States Institute of Peace promotes radical Islam with Muslim World Initiative and tax payer funding
June 5, 2006
The United States Institute of Peace aka the Ummah Shari'a Islamist Propagation Institute, is working together with radical Islamists promoting fundamentalism under the guise of their new 'Muslim World Initiative'.The USIP's new Saudi backed Islamist affiliates include CAIR, MPAC, ISNA and the CSID. Among the board members are CAIR's Nihad Awad, Ahmed Younes of MPAC, and the CSID's Radwan Masmoudi, as well as Imam Hassan Qazwini of the Islamic Center of America and Democratic Senator Larry Shaw a Muslim who is also a board member of CAIR. http://www.cair-net.org/default.asp?Page=articleView&id=1972&theType=NR
After infilitrating the USIP, Abdelsalem Mahgrouhi, the head of the Muslim World Initiative authored a USIP briefing coyly entitled: "What do Islamists really want? 'An Insiders discussion with Islamist leaders', in which he made the absurd claim that there were moderate Islamists:
An important distinction can be drawn between moderate and radical Islamists. Moderate refers to political parties and movements that use Islamist principles, Islamic law, and/or Islamic referents to participate peacefully in the political process. Radical, extremist, Wahhabists, Salafists, or Jihadists are terms for those who eschew nonviolence in the name of their Islamic beliefs....The most effective strategy to engage Islamists on normative democratic issues is to refer to Islam's progressive and humanistic traditions, not to Western liberal democracy.
MIM: In the Islamofacist weltaanschauung of Maghroui and the USIP's Muslim World Initiative:
Moderate Islamists support Hamas' right to resist occupation and consider its government democratic and legitimate.
Moderate Islamists therefore see no contradiction between Hamas being in charge of the Palestinian Authority and attacking Israel.
http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2006/0522_islamists.html (see complete briefing below)
The inclusion of Saudi funded terrorist tied groups under the aegis of the USIP, and the premise that there are radical and moderate terrorists, indicates that The United States Institute of Peace has morphed into the Ummah Shar'ia Islamist Propagation Institute. The federal government is now funding the spread of radical Islam. The USIP's Islamist leanings are nothing new, put the new addition of Saudi funded radical Islamist organisations with documented terrorist ties, demands that the public contact their elected officials and demand that they reassess and cut their government funding and political support to the USIP.
In 2004 then board member of the United States Institute of Peace, Dr. Daniel Pipes, wrote an article criticising the USIP's invitation of Islamists to the Institute called "The USIP Stumbles".
Investigative journalist Kenneth Timmerman of Insight magazine further highlighted the dangers of the USIP hosting terror tied groups, and echoed Dr. Pipes concerns in a piece entitled "Pipes Objects to the Fox in the Henhouse"and quoted Dr.Pipes' who told him that:
"I believe that President [George W.] Bush appointed me to the USIP board in part to serve as a watchdog against militant Islamic groups. Unfortunately the management of USIP is not listening to my advice. I cannot be associated with the event today which associates USIP with some of the very worst militant Islamic groups." http://www.danielpipes.org/article/1650 (see complete article below)
Both writers pointed out that the CSID, (The Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy) a Saudi funded Wahabbist enterprise, operating under the guise of a think tank, was promoted an Islamist agenda.
Dr.Pipes wrote that:
"...Most of CSID's Muslim personnel are radicals. I brought one such person in particular, Kamran Bokhari, to the attention of USIP's leadership. Mr. Bokhari is a fellow at CSID; as such, he is someone CSID's board of directors deems an expert "with high integrity and a good reputation." As a fellow, Mr. Bokhari may participate in the election of CSID's board of directors. He is, in short, integral to the CSID.
Mr. Bokhari also happens to have served for years as the North American spokesman for Al-Muhajiroun, perhaps the most extreme Islamist group operating in the West. For example, it celebrated the first anniversary of 9/11 with a conference titled," Towering Day in History." It celebrated the second anniversary by hailing "The Magnificent 19." Its Web site currently features a picture of the U.S. Capitol building exploding. (If the site changes, an archived copy is available.)
Nor is Al-Muhajiroun's evil restricted to words and pictures. Its London-based leader, Omar bin Bakri Muhammad, has acknowledged recruiting jihadists to fight in such hotspots as Kashmir, Afghanistan, and Chechnya. At least one Al-Muhajiroun member went to Israel to engage in suicide terrorism. Al-Muhajiroun appears to be connected to one of the 9/11 hijackers, Hani Hanjour.
USIP's indirect association with Al-Muhajiroun has many pernicious consequences. Perhaps the most consequential of these is the legitimacy USIP inadvertently confers on Mr. Bokhari and CSID, permitting radicals to pass themselves off as moderates. http://www.danielpipes.org/article/1659 (complete article below)
MIM: The USIP has now gone from '"inadvertently conferring legitmacy " on radical Islamists to actively aiding and abetting them.
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MIM: The peridiousness of having radical Islamists operating with the US goverment seal of approval via the taxpayer funded USIP is compounded by the way the Muslim World Initiative is disseminating disinformation about the Arab Israeli conflict using the USIP for legitimacy.
One example of the propaganda on offer is the study by the brother of PIJ head Fathi Shikaki, who was assassinated by the Mossad in 1995 Khalil Shikaki, whose January 2006 pseudo study pre election study entitled "Palestinian Public Opinion and the Peace Process" misled many in the U.S. government into believing Hamas would not stand a chance to win if allowed to participate in the elections.
Shikaki 'con'cluded that :
- Palestinian public opinion is not an impediment to progress in the peace process; to the contrary, over time the Palestinian public has become more moderate. Palestinian willingness to compromise is greater than it has been at any time since the start of the peace process. This increased willingness to compromise provides policymakers with greater room to maneuver.
- For the first time since the start of the peace process, a majority of Palestinians support a compromise settlement that is acceptable to a majority of Israelis.
The post-Arafat era shows more public optimism about the peace process and more willingness to compromise. Support for violence against Israelis, while still high, is declining.... http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr158.html
MIM: According to the Muslim World Initiative/USIP website :
The United States Institute of Peace's Project on Arab- Israeli Futures is a research effort designed to anticipate and assess obstacles and opportunities facing the peace process in the years ahead.
MIM: A picture under the heading "Arab -Israeli Relations' on the MWI site by the same name shows a 'departing Jewish settler' folding up the Israeli flag on the roof of his house , indicating that the 'Arab Israeli future' being propagated by the Muslim World Inititative is one that is Judenrein. The continued existence of Jews is a thorn in the side of the MWI/USIP who postulate that the dismantling of their communities has resulted in new "obstacles" to peace!
As Israel withdraws from the Gaza Strip and the northern West Bank, new opportunities have emerged for reviving the Middle East peace process—as well as new obstacles.Israeli disengagement poses a series of urgent policy questions for the United States and the international community. http://www.usip.org/muslimworld/arab_israeli.html
MIM: Form the 'Arab Israeli Relations' website homepage:
Caption: "A Jewish settler removes the Israeli flag from the roof of his house as he prepares to leave a settlement in the Gaza Strip on Aug. 9, 2005." (Courtesy AP/Wide World)
http://www.usip.org/muslimworld/arab_israeli.html
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MIM: The United States Institute of Peace and the radical Islamists of the Muslim World Initiative are actively endorsing terrorism outside their organisations by hosting forums in the US and abroad with radical Islamist speakers under the guise of "Engaging Muslim Communities in Europe"
The Muslim World Initiative (MWI) began to explore the possibility of engaging European Muslim communities and their youth as an effective strategy to fighting extremism. As part of this effort, the MWI recently co-sponsored a series of conferences and workshops in Europe.
.MIM: A USIP/MWI recent event in the UK was ironically entitled: 'Towards a community based approach to counter terrorism'. In an article on the USIP/MWI website Brandeis professor Jytte Klausen , apparently oblivious to the absurdity gushed about 'an interesting panel' in which 'salafists talked to extremists' to try to dissuade them from terrorism.
A particularly interesting panel was devoted to the discussion of faith-based counter-terrorism. A spokesperson for a salafist mosque described the mosque's efforts to engage in dialogue with the extremist and change their mind.
In the course of the discussions, "good theology against bad theology" emerged as the capsule description of community-based counter-terrorism. Not all participants agreed that the implied understanding of the nature of the threat was correct. http://www.usip.org/muslimworld/projects/muslim_youth/uk_report.html
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MIM: Information from the USIP/Muslim World Intiative website
About the Muslim World Initiative
http://www.usip.org/muslimworld/about.html
Drawing on USIP's unique combination of capabilities for scholarly research, policy analysis, and practical involvement in peacemaking, the Initiative has two overarching objectives:
- To enhance U.S. engagement with the Muslim world through informed policy guidance and public education efforts focused on the most pressing issues and challenges; and
- To promote peace and stability within the Muslim world through activities that directly contribute to the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict.
In pursuit of these goals, the Muslim World Initiative places particular emphasis on several cross-cutting themes:
- "Bridging the Divide" — explores and encourages efforts to diminish the sources of mistrust and misunderstanding that harm relations not only between the United States and parts of the Muslim world but also within many communities in the region;
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- "Mobilizing the Moderates" — supports activities designed to help give voice to and empower those who advocate cooperation and non-violent solutions to conflict in the Muslim world; and
- "Marginalizing the Militants" — promotes efforts to isolate and reduce the influence of extremists who advocate intolerance and violence.
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What Do Islamists Really Want?
An Insider's Discussion with Islamist Leaders
By Abdeslam Maghraoui
May 2006
Throughout the Muslim world, Islamist parties have emerged as major power brokers when allowed to compete in free elections. Yet their positions on many crucial governance issues remain unknown or ambiguous. Most debates on the potential to moderate and integrate Islamists in the democratic process have focused on Islam's compatibility with democracy or on debates over Islamists' normative commitment to democracy separately from the mechanics of achieving political power.
More from usip.org
Specialists: Political Islam
Publications: Muslim World
Events: Muslim World
Topics: Terrorism
As part of its "mobilizing the moderates" theme, the Muslim World Initiative of USIP organized an off-the-record roundtable discussion on May 5, 2006, on the viability of democratic politics within an Islamic framework. Specifically, the discussion focused on the Islamists' political strategies while in opposition and their commitment to democratic procedures and principles once in power. The meeting brought together the leaders of three moderate Islamist parties and movements from Arab countries as well as U.S. government officials, scholars, and independent policy analysts.
This USIPeace Briefing highlights the central themes and questions that emerged during the discussions. There is a great diversity among moderate "Islamist parties," and their strategies are the products of local power relations. Caution is thus in order in applying these general comments to various Islamist parties.
A Brief Note on Terminology:
For the purposes of this paper:
- Islamic refers to institutions, practices, beliefs, and so on, that have no specific ideological or political connotations. Thus: Islamic architecture, Islamic ceramics, Islamic philosophy, and so on.
- Islamist refers to political parties and movements that seek to legitimate or subvert a political order on the basis of their interpretation of Islamic principles. Though these movements go back to the 1940s and 1950s (in Egypt), the term became more commonly used in the 1980s, after the Khomeinist revolution of 1979.
- An important distinction can be drawn between moderate and radical Islamists. Moderate refers to political parties and movements that use Islamist principles, Islamic law, and/or Islamic referents to participate peacefully in the political process. Radical, extremist, Wahhabists, Salafists, or Jihadists are terms for those who eschew nonviolence in the name of their Islamic beliefs.
The Islamists' Positions
The three Islamist leaders made the following points during the short presentations and responses to questions during the meeting and in substantive discussions before and afterwards. They represent Islamists' views of themselves, or at least their self-representations before a critical, Western audience. In some instances, interviews, articles, and speeches by one or more Islamist panelists were consulted to have a better sense of their positions on key issues.
Rising Confidence in Democratic Participation and Procedures:
- Moderate Islamist parties see themselves as modern, credible, and reformist political actors, not traditional religious preachers with a moral agenda.
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- They portray themselves as pragmatic parties that can respond effectively to autocratic regimes, deteriorating social and economic conditions, and increasing extremism.
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- They seek power through peaceful means and, in many countries, are confident that they will win if free and fair elections are held.
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- As evidence of their political skills and willingness to work within the system, they boast broad and solid social support (including among youth, women, and professionals), vast national networks, good performance in local government, positive relations with entrepreneurs, and willingness to cooperate with secular parties and NGOs.
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- They are confident about the prospects for democratic reform and political change despite continuing institutional political constraints and, in some cases, clear repression.
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- They value the benefits of democratic participation, including competitive elections, legal opposition politics, and the alternation of power.
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- Islamists dismiss the fear that they might monopolize political power or religious authority if they win wide majorities.
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- They counter that existing centers of power (civil societies, ruling monarchies, powerful security and military institutions, or traditional religious establishments) prevent such a scenario.
Commitment to Democratic Norms, Compatible with Islam:
- Islamist leaders assert their commitment to democratic principles, including minority rights, religious tolerance, women's equality and participation, cultural diversity, and political pluralism.
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- They underline their commitment to popular sovereignty and qualify the meaning and importance of divine sovereignty.
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- Their objective is to make Islamic principles more responsive to modern, practical political needs.
- Moderate Islamists insist that their normative visions draw on Islamic principles such as justice, equality, accountability, and limits on the powers of rulers.
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- These principles, they argue, are compatible with Western democratic norms, but not necessarily with liberal values that privilege individual freedom over community rights.
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- The question of governance in Islam is open and has not been clearly delineated in Islamic texts.
- It is inaccurate, they say, to argue that Islamic political principles are incompatible with democratic norms.
- Some party leaders reject the "Islamist" label. They prefer to describe their party as a "party with an Islamic reference point."
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- The example moderate Islamists often use as a model for their case are Europe's Christian democratic parties.
Flexibility on Application of Sharia:
- On the question of applying sharia, or Islamic law, moderate Islamists show some flexibility.
- None of the panelists advocated the traditional application of sharia.
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- They all invoke the important role of ijtihad, reinterpretation of sacred texts, to adapt Muslim practices to modern needs.
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- They refer to liberal Islamic precedents concerning the positive treatment of religious minorities.
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- However, Islamist leaders don't discard sharia or see it as incompatible with modern democratic principles.
- They consider the application of Islamic law in some instances as a social necessity, not a fervent fulfillment of a religious duty.
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- They consider religious moral values and Islamic law effective deterrents against social deviance and political decay.
Cautious on Relations With the United States:
- In general, constructive but cautious engagement best describes how moderate Islamists envision their relations with the United States.
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- Notwithstanding major disagreements over U.S. foreign policy, moderate Islamists are conscious of the importance of America as a global superpower.
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- U.S. support for their integration into the political process is key to their strategy.
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- They also cite the role of religion in public life in America as an example of how religion and politics can coexist.
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- However, moderate Islamist parties prefer to engage the United States multilaterally and in the framework of international laws and conventions—rather than bilaterally.
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- Moderate Islamists don't seem to have any plans for bilateral cooperation on "big issues" such as combating terrorism, promoting democracy, or resolving pivotal conflicts (Iran, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Sudan).
- Islamists have strong reservations concerning most U.S. policies in the Middle East.
Attitude toward Hamas and Relations with Israel:
- Moderate Islamists support Hamas' right to resist occupation and consider its government democratic and legitimate.
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- Though not all moderate Islamists necessarily consider Hamas' electoral victory a triumph for democracy, they highlight the occupation's mitigating circumstances.
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- Moderate Islamists therefore see no contradiction between Hamas being in charge of the Palestinian Authority and attacking Israel.
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- They argue that Islamist-led governments would fully cooperate with Hamas and will help it shore up international support.
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- Moderate Islamists view Israel as a hostile occupying force that oppresses Palestinians. But they embrace a two-state solution.
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- They do not foresee playing a moderating role between Israel and Hamas or normalizing relations with Israel in the near future.
Major Concerns
During the meeting, a number of participants raised questions about the Islamist commitment to democracy and noted a number of tensions between what Islamist leaders say and what they actually do or might do if they achieve power. Some participants sent follow-up questions and comments after the meeting. What follows covers the range of issues raised during and after the meeting.
Participation in the Democratic Process is Strategically Motivated:
- Some participants expressed concern that Islamists are willing to participate in the democratic process because it favors them, not because they embrace democratic norms.
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- These participants worry that there are no guarantees that Islamists will abide by the rules of the game if they come to power.
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- They also fear that Islamists can find religious justifications to exercise absolute power once in office.
- It is not clear, they said, whether moderate Islamists could maintain their popularity and credibility if they participate in a constrained political framework imposed by the regimes.
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- Nor is it clear how moderate leaders would deal with more conservative party rank-and-file on key issues such as pre-negotiating a political outcome with governments, building coalitions, and moderating their views on key issues such as the application of Islamic law.
Contradictory Commitments to Democratic Norms:
Among the questions these skeptics had about Islamist parties, a number focused on their apparent inconsistencies regarding democratic norms.
- Some participants wondered whether moderate Islamists are truly committed to democratic norms, including fundamental civil and political liberties, and if so, then what then makes their parties Islamic.
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- They questioned how Islamists' verbal commitment to the full range of civil and political rights would play out in the real world.
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- They observed that while Islamist leaders qualify the relevance of "divine sovereignty" and emphasize the role of elected rulers, that does not necessarily guarantee that they will respect modern democratic rights. Anti-democratic norms and restrictions can be imposed in the name of a conservative majority that believes ultimate sovereignty rests with God.
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- Islamist leaders, they said, are not clear about whom they represent: "The people" as a whole? A moral majority? Or constituencies with the usual social demands and political priorities?
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- Some Islamic principles may well be compatible with modern democratic norms, they argued, but the proof of the pudding will be in how Muslims choose to apply them.
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- The possibility exists that different, even contradictory, interpretations of Islamic principles can arise and, in the absence of institutionalized religious authority accepted by all, lead to the subversion of democratic norms.
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Ambiguities Surrounding Application of Sharia:
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- Given that the most important characteristic of legitimate "Islamic government" is implementation of Islamic law, where, asked some participants, do moderate Islamists exactly draw the line?
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- Moderate Islamists, they said, fail to address in specific terms what portions of sharia, if any, are "dispensable" and what portions are both binding and adaptable to modern needs.
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- If elected Islamists legislated on matters of public morality and modesty (which could cover a wide range of issues including the hijab, freedom of speech, and alcohol consumption), they would be acting both as modern legislators and as religious scholars and jurists.
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- This accumulation of religious authority and political power subverts both democratic norms and the separation of powers essential to the functioning of a democracy.
Implications for U.S. Policies
On the basis of these discussions it becomes clear that moderate Islamists need to sort out several tensions and make some hard choices. A key concern, their professed commitment to modernize and democratize Muslim polities within the context of their religious identity, may take some time to resolve. Yet, the Islamists' ultimate objective of ousting ruling autocrats through free and transparent elections is real and cannot be dismissed as a political ploy. This is also, ironically, a major U.S. objective but in the consensus opinion of the participants, the United States has as yet no clear policy on engaging Islamists.
In the final part of the meeting, participants offered their thoughts on how the United States should proceed.
Should the United States Engage with Islamists and Support Their Bid for Democratic Politics?
- It remains unclear whether moderate Islamist parties would respect democratic rules and norms once elected to office. Experiments with Islamists in the democratic process are too rare, recent, or the product of exceptional circumstances to withstand generalization.
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- Yet, given the Islamists' popular appeal, efficient organization, and political potential, the United States cannot afford to ignore them.
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- The professed U.S. democracy promotion strategy is neither credible nor likely to succeed without the cooperation and participation of Islamists.
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- In addition to reinforcing secular NGOs and political parties, the United States should support and train Islamist parties, invite their influential figures to Washington, and expand exchange programs with the next generation Islamist leaders.
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- Rather than imposing external political conditions on engaging Islamists, the United States would be in a better strategic position if it appears "neutral" among competing political visions.
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- The United States should let local political actors negotiate the incentives, constraint mechanisms, and red lines to ensure a successful and sustainable democratic outcome.
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- U.S. democracy programs should support programs to foster internal debates between conservatives and moderates within the Islamist parties; dialogue between Islamists and secular parties and NGOs; and a constructive negotiation framework between governments and Islamist opposition groups.
Should the United States Engage Islamists on Normative and Religious Issues?
- The consensus view among U.S. policymakers now is that the United States cannot and should not pursue policies that involve normative/theological issues.
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- Proponents of this view argue that the United States would be violating the separation between state and religion and would get bogged down in "esoteric" discussions with no clear end results.
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- Others argue that many U.S. programs (such as the revision of textbooks, the modernization of education, and the empowerment of women) already involve normative issues.
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- They contend that relying on procedural mechanisms alone to mitigate the Islamists' monopoly of political power is not enough and actually involves some serious risks.
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- Taking Islamists on in the cultural and normative dimensions is especially important because those are the fields in which Islamists have their greatest influence.
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- One reason why Islamists are so influential in these domains is that procedural constraints may bar Islamists from changing a country's constitution, civil and criminal laws, or even its civil-military relations; but Islamists can control sensitive cabinets such as education, culture, the media, and social services. These cabinets are not crucial to the immediate survival of authoritarian regimes and thus they might more easily relinquish them. But Islamists can use these portfolios to exert tremendous ideological influence.
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- Another concern is that institutional constraints might be used by authoritarian regimes to forestall meaningful democratization. These constraints could de-legitimize moderate Islamist parties, and benefit radical groups who reject the democratic process altogether.
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- For these reasons, the consensus view of the participants—regardless of their degree of skepticism toward moderate Islamists—was clear: the best long-term strategy for the United States, if it seeks to bring peaceful democratic change to the Middle East, is to engage Islamists on normative grounds.
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- The most effective strategy to engage Islamists on normative democratic issues is to refer to Islam's progressive and humanistic traditions, not to Western liberal democracy.
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http://www.danielpipes.org/article/1650
Pipes Objects to Fox in the Henhouse
by Kenneth R. Timmerman
Insight Magazine
March 19, 2004
The congressionally funded United States Institute of Peace will host an event today in Washington on reforming Islam, with a guest panelist who has threatened the United States and openly supported terrorist groups, Insight has learned.
Among the guests in this afternoon's panel discussion is Muzammil Siddiqi, who until November 2001 was president of the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), a leading Wahhabi front organization in the United States. Wahhabism is a radical form of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia and advocated by al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and his terrorist leaders.
Siddiqi has accompanied visiting Saudi officials from the Muslim World League on fund-raising tours across America, and is listed on its Website as the organization's official representative in the United States. Offices of the Muslim World League in Herndon, Va., were raided by a federal antiterrorism task force in March 2002 because of suspected ties to al-Qaeda.
During an anti-Israel rally outside the White House on Oct. 28, 2000, Siddiqi openly threatened the United States with violence if it continued its support of Israel. "America has to learn ... if you remain on the side of injustice, the wrath of God will come. Please, all Americans. Do you remember that? ... If you continue doing injustice, and tolerate injustice, the wrath of God will come." By "injustice," he meant U.S. support for Israel.
Siddiqi also has called for a wider application of sharia law in the United States, and in a 1995 speech praised suicide bombers. "Those who die on the part of justice are alive, and their place is with the Lord, and they receive the highest position, because this is the highest honor," he was quoted as saying by the Kansas City Star on Jan. 28, 1995.
A Bush appointee to the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) says he must distance himself from today's event because it associates the USIP with groups "on the wrong side in the war on terrorism." USIP board member Daniel Pipes tells Insight that, in addition to his objection to Siddiqi, he has warned the USIP about the presence of the U.S. spokesman of al-Muhajiroun, a London-based group that claims to be recruiting jihadis for a worldwide "Mohammed's army" faithful to bin Laden.
Pipes tells Insight: "I believe that President [George W.] Bush appointed me to the USIP board in part to serve as a watchdog against militant Islamic groups. Unfortunately the management of USIP is not listening to my advice. I cannot be associated with the event today which associates USIP with some of the very worst militant Islamic groups."
Kay King, a spokesperson for USIP Chairman Richard Solomon, said USIP was "not aware of the allegations about Siddiqi, and we will look into them." However, she pointed out that Siddiqi "has attended Bush administration events with the president, and was invited to lead a prayer" at the national prayer breakfast following the September 11 attacks.
The March 19 event is cohosted by USIP and the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy (CSID), a U.S.-based group that was created by board members and former staff of the American Muslim Council (AMC), a radical pro-Saudi group that largely ceased operations after its former chairman, Abdulrahman Alamoudi, was jailed last October on terrorist-related charges.
Pipes raised his concerns with USIP Chairman Chester Crocker and President Richard Solomon over the "extremist nature of CSID itself" starting last November. In addition to board members and an executive director who shifted over to the new group from AMC, Pipes pointed out that CSID fellow Kamran Bokhari has ties to al-Muhajiroun, an al-Qaeda support group. Until last year, Bokhari was the self-acknowledged North American spokesman for al-Muhajiroun.
Insight reported on the group's first anniversary "celebration" of the 9/11 attacks, held at the radical Finsbury mosque in London, where al-Muhajiroun showed off a poster that portrayed a burning World Trade Center under attack and called September 11 "a towering day in history."
At the group's second anniversary 9/11 "celebration," its members distributed a poster with photographs of all 19 hijackers, calling them "the magnificent 19."
CSID "fellows" are not research assistants, but integral members of the leadership of the organization. According to a copy of the CSID bylaws Insight has obtained, CSID fellows are responsible for electing the group's board of directors. All board members must first be fellows.
Bokhari has issued a statement denouncing political violence and al-Qaeda, and referred to himself as a "former Islamist activist." But given his leadership role with al-Muhajiroun, Pipes says, such statements were "deeply insufficient to rehabilitate him ... or make him someone suitable to be associated with USIP."
Pipes first raised concerns over the planned event in November, when the USIP initially had invited Taha Jaber Al-Alwani to speak on a panel to discuss reforming Islam. Al-Alwani was publicly identified in an affidavit by U.S. Customs special agent David Kane, unsealed just weeks earlier, as a director of "Safa Group companies including International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), FIQH council of North America, Graduate School of Islamic & Social Sciences ... and Heritage Education Trust."
The IIIT offices were raided in March 2002 as part of Operation Greenquest, a joint federal antiterrorism task force. IIIT has received money and sponsorship from the government of Saudi Arabia, and according to the affidavit had sponsored Basheer Nafi, "an active directing member of [Palestinian Islamic Jihad] front organizations" in the United States.
Following Pipes' objection, the USIP postponed the initial event and canceled its invitation to Al-Alwani to join the panel discussion, but continued to work with CSID despite Pipes' claims that the group included among its leadership individuals who were on the "wrong side" in the war on terror.
USIP spokesperson Kay King says the institute has "done due diligence" on CSID and found the group to be "moderate" and "responsible."
"We know that CSID has gotten grants form the State Department and from the National Endowment for Democracy," she said. "They are an organization that has been found appropriate by U.S. government agencies."
CSID showcases moderate Muslim thinkers such as professor Abdulaziz Sachedina of the University of Virginia. However, many board members have either led or worked for groups that were targets of a federal antiterrorist task force raid in March 2002.
CSID founding board member Jamal Barzinji headed the "500 Grove Street" charities in Herndon, Va., that were the target of the Greenquest task force. He left the CSID board in April 2003.
Another CSID founding board member, Louay M. Safi , is director of research at IIIT, according to the biography posted on the CSID Website. He is reported previously to have worked at an IIIT offshoot in Malaysia.
The CSID board also includes Muslim leaders who are former or current board members of the American Muslim Council, starting with CSID chairman Ali A. Mazrui. "CSID is part of the militant Islamist lobby," Pipes tells Insight. "It is well-disguised, and has brought in all the Islamist trends, giving them a patent of respectability."
The group's executive director in 2002 was Abdulwahab Alkebsi, a former AMC staff member. Alkebsi also is reported to have worked for the Islamic Institute in Washington, and now runs democracy programs in Iraq for the National Endowment for Democracy that have promoted, among others, the Iraqi Communist Party.
Kenneth R. Timmerman is a senior writer for Insight.
http://www.militantislammonitor.org/article/id/1969