Posted by
Gabrielle Cusumano on Wednesday, January 10, 2007 11:28:55 AM
" And then there are the nonstate actors that could well pose an even greater danger: al Qaeda, Hezbollah and other terror organizations. The CIA and other U.S. agencies have almost no knowledge of terrorists' intelligence practices here. " Enemies: How America's Foes Steal Our Vital Secrets -- And How We Let It Happen" (Bill Gertz, defense and national security reporter for The Washington Times, describes a growing threat posed by foreign agents and terrorists who exploit U.S. weaknesses in this second of three excerpts from his new book, "Enemies: How America's Foes Steal Our Vital Secrets -- And How We Let It Happen" (Crown Forum), out this week. )
(Read Part 1 here or below, it is dated September 18, 2006) Part III of Excerpts from Bill Gertz's
"Enemies: How America's Foes Steal Our Vital Secrets -- And How We Let It Happen" (Crown Forum) September 20, 2006 The FBI, the CIA and other intelligence agencies continue to struggle to plant agents in, or recruit them from, deadly Islamist terror organizations here and abroad.
The FBI, for example, did not have under way a single active investigation this past spring of al Qaeda or any Islamist group anywhere in the United States.
Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network is not alone in posing a threat of new attacks. The FBI believes that Lebanon-based Hezbollah has set up terrorist cells in at least 10 U.S. cities. The Iranian government has backed Hezbollah to the tune of $100 million. FBI officials worry that Iran could activate a network of Hezbollah terrorists here if the international community acts to stop the Islamic regime's nuclear program.
President Bush expects the FBI to help counter such terror threats through its new National Security Branch (NSB), a major reform he announced over internal opposition in summer 2005.
"The focus of what we're doing has changed over our history," said Gary M. Bald, the 28-year FBI veteran chosen to direct the NSB, which combined counterterrorism, counterintelligence and intelligence-analysis divisions. "This is the most significant [change], no doubt. But it's just the latest.
"It's not the embracing or the understanding of the need to do it," Bald said in an interview. "It's getting us efficient at something that we've not had a long experience at doing."
The FBI and the rest of the U.S. intelligence community was woefully unprepared after September 11 to track down terrorists by penetrating the dark world of al Qaeda.
The nation had extremely limited capabilities in human intelligence-gathering -- the real stuff of spying. These shortcomings remain five years later.
Rep. Peter Hoekstra, Michigan Republican and chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, argues that many problems facing U.S. intelligence are a legacy of the Clinton administration.
"It's ineffective in 2006 because it was gutted in 1996," Mr. Hoekstra said, pointing to the severe depletion of human spying capabilities in the 1990s.
Left largely unsaid in this year's debate about the president's authorizing the National Security Agency to intercept suspected terrorists' communications: The administration might not have needed to rely on the program so heavily, and risk infringing on civil liberties, were American counterintelligence not so weak.
The government needed to take extraordinary measures to track down al Qaeda cells. And despite the terrorist surveillance program and stepped-up FBI activity, U.S. intelligence has not found any al Qaeda cells inside this country.
'Work in progress' A presidential commission organized in 2004 revealed the FBI's ineptness in conducting counterintelligence and counterterrorism programs.
The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (commonly referred to as the WMD commission) examined how and why the intelligence community failed to properly assess Iraq's nuclear, chemical, biological and missile weapons programs.
The WMD commission, headed by federal appeals Judge Laurence Silberman and former Sen. Charles S. Robb, Virginia Democrat, also explored the overall capabilities of U.S. spy agencies.
A section on "intelligence at home," included in the panel's report issued in March 2005, said the FBI had made strides in collecting and analyzing intelligence but had "a long way to go." The bureau, it said, acknowledged that domestic intelligence gathering "will be a work in progress until at least 2010."
The biggest challenge, the report found, was integrating FBI operations into a command structure that is subject to orders from the director of national intelligence, John D. Negroponte, whose recently created job is to oversee the nation's 15 spy agencies.
The commission called for creation of a National Security Service to manage, direct and control all FBI resources used in countering terrorists, spies and other threats to national security.
The panel said the FBI needed to move past decades of bitter rivalry with the CIA that prevented the agencies from complementing each other's efforts in the war on terror.
A bigger-picture problem remained, the WMD commission noted: an FBI culture that resisted reform.
"Past efforts to build a strong intelligence capability within the FBI have foundered on this resistance," the report said. "In 1998 and 1999, similar reforms failed in quick succession as a result of strong resistance from the FBI's operational divisions and an intelligence architecture that could not defend itself inside the bureaucracy."
Law-enforcement investigators did not want to become spies. And bin Laden, they argued, "is never going to Des Moines."
'More capable' Mr. Bush overruled internal opposition and announced creation of a national-security section within the FBI on June 29, 2005, and chose to highlight the change during a July 11 speech at the FBI Academy in Quantico.
The president said the reform, among 70 recommendations from the WMD commission that he backed, would make the FBI "more capable to stop the terrorist acts before they happen."
The next month, FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III appointed Bald, a career law-enforcement investigator with little experience in intelligence, as director of the redubbed National Security Branch.
Although Bald was the FBI executive for counterterrorism and counterintelligence, close observers saw his selection as a clear sign that the bureau would continue to oppose building an aggressive counterterrorism and counterspy capability.
Bald, though, bristles at the suggestion that the FBI had a cultural aversion to improving intelligence-gathering.
"It's a culture of complete dedication to our mission, working around the clock, being called in on weekends and nights and not getting paid extra, and really doing everything you can to protect our nation," Bald said.
He said a substantial number of 12,000 special agents work for his new branch, although the actual number is classified. All of the bureau's 1,720 intelligence analysts are part of the NSB.
The FBI hasn't found it easy to change an institutional viewpoint of being its own "primary customer of information," Bald said. He said he worries that leaks of sensitive information could wrongly damage the reputations of those under investigation.
"Now what we're in is a realization that not only are there other services that benefit from our intelligence, but other services can provide value to our investigations as well," Bald said. "We understand that. The challenge is developing the processes that make that efficient."
'Safe from scrutiny' Even as adversaries and friends alike ramp up intelligence activities against the United States, the WMD commission's final report warned, "our counterintelligence efforts remain fractured, myopic and marginally effective."
The report stated bluntly: "Our counterintelligence philosophy and practices need dramatic change, starting with centralizing counterintelligence leadership, bringing order to bureaucratic disarray and taking [the CIA's] counterintelligence fight overseas to adversaries currently safe from scrutiny."
Counterintelligence, the panel concluded, remains a "second-class citizen in the intelligence profession."
Since the 1970s, some 15 agencies have been severely restricted in trying to stop foreign spies and, increasingly, terrorists. Multiple special commissions and reports, many before September 11, identified the problems.
Taking advantage of these severe deficiencies, spies -- among them John A. Walker, Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanssen, Ana Montes and Katrina Leung -- have significantly weakened U.S. intelligence and defense capabilities.
China and Russia have stolen sensitive technology on a massive scale. Enemies have penetrated every single U.S. national-security agency except the Coast Guard. They have purloined nuclear weapons data, cryptographic codes and procedures, intelligence sources and methods, war plans and more.
The continuing threats include Cuba and North Korea as well as the traditional intelligence powers, China and Russia, which use official and nonofficial cover officers to target American interests.
And then there are the nonstate actors that could well pose an even greater danger: al Qaeda, Hezbollah and other terror organizations. The CIA and other U.S. agencies have almost no knowledge of terrorists' intelligence practices here.
Attack first Richard Haver, former special assistant for intelligence to Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, helped assess the damage in major spy cases since the 1980s. He points to widespread resistance within government to making the necessary reforms.
"We do the things that are easy, we do the things that are cosmetically appealing, that make the system feel better," Haver said in an interview, "and that perhaps satiate the critics in Congress and placate the media and make it look as though we're really changing."
Haver argues that true reforms are not about more money or agency-wiring diagrams.
"They have to do with culture," he said. "They have to do with the way these bureaucracies view themselves, the way they work with each other."
In the infamous case of Hanssen, the spy for Moscow, the FBI was unwilling even to look for a spy in its midst, and so he operated for years without being caught.
"The best defense is a good offense," Haver said. "If you are sitting back, waiting for the enemy to attack you, it will happen. If you want effective counterintelligence, the principal element of that is the capability of your system to attack the adversary intelligence service before they attack you."
http://www.washingtontimes.com/functions/print.php?StoryID=20060920-123737-3755rCopyright © 2007 News World Communications, Inc. All rights reserved.
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Part II of Excerpts from Bill Gertz's "Enemies: How America's Foes Steal Our Vital Secrets -- And How We Let It Happen" (Crown Forum), FBI agents found the typewritten letter in a search of the office of the suspected spy for North Korea.
"It would be preferable," it said, "that you find a student inside the church."
The letter, from one of the spy's North Korean handlers, used "church" as code for "Washington, D.C."
It was December 1997. The following March, the FBI intercepted a fax in which their suspect, Korean-American businessman John Joungwoong Yai, gave a progress report on his main goal -- recruiting a subagent who could join the U.S. government and obtain top-secret information for the communist regime in Pyongyang.
Possible employment stops for the "disciple" that Yai discussed with an associate: the Library of Congress, the FBI, even a news reporting job in Washington.
Yai, of Santa Monica, Calif., had planned to recruit someone "for a long time and anguished over it," he wrote to his North Korean contacts.
"There are two or three persons whom I have been working on for a while. In [my] opinion, the person has to possess a high quality presence; at least or higher than a U.S. university education, absolutely fluent in English and Korean, young with clear ideology, and has potential to work in the church."
Yai concluded his fax with good news. "I have successfully found an excellent, young high quality person who lacks nothing for becoming a student who has potential for a long range plan."
FBI documents in the case of John Joungwoong Yai provide a rare glimpse into the secret world of North Korean spying within the United States.
North Korea today epitomizes the term "rogue state."
Under absolute leader Kim Jong-il, who has ruled as an iron-fisted demigod since his father's death in 1994, the communist regime has demonstrated that it can starve and brutalize its own people as well as fire long-range ballistic missiles to threaten other nations.
Kim fulfilled the goal of his father, Kim Il-sung, by covertly developing a nuclear weapons arsenal in part to ensure that the regime stays in power.
Kim exploits the organs of the Workers' Party of Korea as a combination of intelligence and security services. This vast, secret network of political police, modeled on the Soviet Union's KGB, conducts operations abroad as well as squelches the slightest internal dissent.
A U.S. government counterintelligence report produced in 2004, "Intelligence Threat Handbook," highlights North Korea's efforts to infiltrate the United States. The report notes that operations here remain limited, but some are among the most threatening because they focus on "acquiring nuclear weapons technology."
A classified government report in 1999 said Kim's "aggressive intelligence programs ... place a priority on science and technology collection."
Keeping tabs The FBI compiled exhaustive evidence that Yai conducted what U.S. officials called "low-level intelligence services" for Pyongyang over at least seven years, until his arrest Feb. 4, 2003.
Yai faced up to 20 years in prison if convicted on charges of failing to register as an agent of Kim's government.
"During the period of the ... surveillance, the FBI found no evidence that Yai was employed by any entity other than the North Korean government," FBI counterintelligence agent James G. Chang said in an affidavit.
The FBI investigation concluded that Yai was a spy who traveled to North Korea, China, Austria, the Czech Republic and other countries to meet North Korean security officials.
But Yai ended up being sentenced to two years after pleading guilty to lesser felony charges related to not declaring $18,179 in cash to customs officials at Los Angeles International Airport as he and his wife returned from a trip to Prague in April 2000.
Yai, a shopkeeper and restaurateur born in South Korea in 1943, became a U.S. citizen in 1981.
Agents intercepted Yai's telephone and fax communications; hid microphones in his office, house and car to monitor conversations; and secretly searched his residence with authorization from a court in Washington under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
The FBI found that Yai was sending reports to North Korea through China that were based on information from public sources, including newspapers, magazines, TV and radio. He embellished information to make it sound more valuable to his handlers, the affidavit said.
The bureau traced Yai's calls to the North Korean Embassy in Beijing and to Shenyang, China, close to the border with North Korea.
In May 2000, Yai began corresponding with the North Koreans in Beijing via e-mail. Chang said in the affidavit that the North Koreans turned to China in communicating with agents because of extremely limited e-mail access in North Korea at the time. Only a few high-ranking government officials, Kim among them, were permitted to use the Internet.
Yai's lawyer, William Genego, argued in court that Yai sent newspaper clippings to North Korea simply to compensate for the lack of free media and Internet access.
'Mr. Kang' regrets
An FBI search of Yai's Santa Monica house April 8, 1998, found "code charts" for secret communications.
Base words and phrases included "the White House," "the State Department," "the Pentagon," "secret operation," "military," "human target," "covert surveillance," "top secret," "recruitment," "CIA," "FBI," "nuclear facility" and "invasion."
Code words included Yai's cover names -- "Won," "Doe," "Adams" and "Paul" -- as well as multiple substitutions for the word "headquarters" such as "Kang," "Peter" and "James."
Intercepted communications and physical searches revealed Yai was meeting with North Korean contacts overseas and receiving thousands of dollars at a time. On March 15, 1998, for example, the FBI intercepted a fax to Yai from "Peter Kang."
The fax stated: "I received your itinerary fine. It would be preferable that Mr. Kang greet you, but in due concern for the health [code for 'safety'], we have decided not to."
The fax specified local telephone numbers at which to "ask for Kim Chol-yong" and "inform him of your location," numbers that were for the North Korean Embassy in Vienna, Austria.
A search of Yai's office April 8 produced an envelope with the address of a Vienna hotel, containing $8,500 in cash. According to the FBI affidavit, a stamp in Yai's passport showed he was in Austria on April 4.
Pastoral visit Over several days in March 1998, Yai had sent two more faxes to his North Korean handlers to provide details on his young recruit in America, identified only as Person C in the FBI affidavit. Yai wanted the recruit to visit headquarters, which he referred to as "pastor Peter."
"It is better to have the pastor give him the blessing himself, and then give him directions," Yai wrote.
In another fax, he told the North Koreans that his "new student" was born in Seoul in 1969, spoke English well, was skilled in use of computers and had an ideology that "is beneficial and reliable to our causes."
In May 1998, hidden FBI microphones picked up a conversation between Yai and a female associate, whom the affidavit identifies as Person L.
Yai explained that "the long-term plan is to hook [Person C] up with his friends in Washington, D.C., who are going to school there."
Person L asked whether the recruit could get a job as a reporter in Washington, to which Yai replied, "Historically for spies, if the head leaders fall, everyone falls also."
He did not explain this cryptic remark, but it indicates Yai saw himself as a spymaster.
His young recruit eventually did visit North Korea. On July 20, 1998, Yai faxed headquarters to report Person C's reaction.
"He indicated it was a valuable experience, although a nervous one," Yai wrote. "Disciple will do well."
Eye on Washington The FBI said Yai helped his unidentified coworker, Person L, get a job with the Los Angeles district attorney's office as a steppingstone toward other employment -- at the FBI.
"They need Chinese speakers and people like me who can speak Korean," Person L told Yai, in a conversation overheard by the FBI. "I heard people wait up to five years to be hired by the federal government. So I think I should apply to places in Washington, D.C., as soon as possible."
Person L said she was trying to get a job at the Library of Congress as a researcher in Korean-American crime.
"The office I am working for right now is a law-enforcement office," she said. "So I heard it is very easy for me to get hired by another law-enforcement agency later on."
The North Koreans clearly indicated a focus on obtaining top-secret information from inside the U.S. government.
On May 5, 1997, a handler sent a fax to Yai saying that the "company president" thought Yai "has made too many proposals about medicine that is already well known, and the types of goods are not varied enough." ("Medicine" was code for "source," in the sense of "basis of information.")
His contacts wanted newer and better "medicines," specifically ones that were "a little more interesting and inexpensive" -- codes for "undisclosed [not sold to the public]" and "top secret," respectively.
Other 1997 faxes to Yai from North Korean headquarters made similar suggestions about what sort of "medical proposals" and "items" would be "accepted." Yai apparently took the message to heart.
In his office, the FBI found these notes, handwritten in Korean: "Do not send anything that has been revealed in the newspaper or radio. (Engage in a lot of conversation with people above [in rank], and things that we do not see in homeland.)"
The FBI said it overheard Yai telling Person L that the North Koreans "are looking for things that are not public."
"They want about 100 or 150 reports a year," he told her. "I finished about 160 last year."
http://www.washtimes.com/functions/print.php?StoryID=20060919-122106-4692rCopyright © 2007 News World Communications, Inc. All rights reserved. _____________________________________________________________________________________
Part I of Excerpts from Bill Gertz's
"Enemies: How America's Foes Steal Our Vital Secrets -- And How We Let It Happen" (Crown Forum), Tai Wang Mak dialed a phone number in Guangzhou, China.
The man who answered, Pu Pei-liang, was a researcher at the Chinese Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Zhongshan University, known to U.S. intelligence officials as CAPS.
"I'm with Red Flower of North America," said Mak, a Chinese national working as an engineer in Los Angeles for Hong Kong-based Phoenix Television.
Mak said he would arrive in China in nine days. Pu instructed him to use a calling card to phone from the airport in Guangzhou so that he could be picked up.
The call from California to China, placed Oct. 19, 2005, was intercepted by the long electronic ears of the U.S. National Security Agency.
Mak's reference to Red Flower of North America brought a breakthrough in a yearlong investigation into one of the most damaging losses of defense technology in American history.
Chinese spies used those code words to authenticate themselves when making contact with communist China's intelligence bureaus. Other often-used code words include Winter Chrysanthemum and Autumn Orchid.
U.S. intelligence knew that CAPS received funding from the People's Liberation Army and conducted operational research for the Chinese military. The phone call revealed that CAPS had one of its most valuable spies inside the U.S. defense industrial system.
Mak and Pu, investigators say, were undercover military intelligence officers with the Second Department of the People's Liberation Army, the spy service well-known to U.S. counterspies as 2 PLA.
Investigators say Tai Mak's brother, Chi Mak, headed a family spy ring in Los Angeles. After his Oct. 28 arrest by the FBI, Chi Mak, a naturalized citizen and electrical engineer with a major American defense contractor, told investigators that he had supplied sensitive Navy weapons secrets to the Chinese since 1983.
The fact that the spy ring went undetected for two decades was a major counterintelligence failure. Worse, the U.S. government would go on to bungle the case.
Picking pockets R. James Woolsey, the former CIA director, has called the Constitution one of the best recruiting tools for intelligence services. His point is that those living under oppressive, dictatorial regimes sometimes will take incredible risks to step forward and secretly help in the battle for freedom and democracy.
In fall 2004, the CIA recruited just such a source from China, a person within the military and security establishment. One of the first questions the CIA poses, in the jargon of the intelligence business, is "Who is picking our pockets?"
The new source identified the spy ring in Los Angeles that investigators said was run by Chi Mak, an electrical engineer with the defense firm Power Paragon, a subsidiary of the Fortune 500 company known as L-3.
The source said the Chinese military was gaining sensitive technology and information on Navy warships. What's more, China was buying ostensibly commercial goods and diverting them to the military.
Under pressure to adopt a counterintelligence culture instead of a "cop" mentality, the FBI hoped to play the spy ring and see where it led.
Counterintelligence is part art, part science, a discipline aimed at identifying and exploiting or stopping foreign spies. Law enforcement is easier: You identify the bad guys and arrest them.
But the government mishandled the case. One problem was that the FBI and the CIA had conflicting goals. The CIA was afraid to lose its prized source, the Chinese recruit. The agency did not want the FBI to make arrests immediately, since swift action would alert the Chinese to a mole.
Investigators said Tai Mak, who worked for a producer of Chinese-language programming, served as a handler and courier for the spy ring. The investigation continued for about a year, until the NSA intercepted his "Red Flower" phone call in October 2005.
Days later, on Oct. 28, the FBI arrested Chi Mak, 66, and his wife, Rebecca Laiwah Chiu, 63.
Agents also arrested Tai Mak, 57, and his wife, F. Heung Li, 49, at Los Angeles International Airport as they prepared to travel to China.
He was carrying disks on which were hidden encrypted files containing sensitive data on Navy technology. Many documents were labeled "proprietary" and "restricted," meaning they could not be exported.
'At serious risk' An FBI affidavit made a case for applying maximum charges against the four suspects -- conspiracy to steal U.S. military information on restricted Navy warship technology, smuggling information to China in violation of export laws and theft of government property.
"Chi Mak said that he knew that Mr. Pu was providing the information to members of the Chinese government's science and technology community," the affidavit said.
The FBI produced the affidavit to secure arrest warrants for the Mak brothers and their wives, as well as search warrants for their homes, workplaces and vehicles. Having spent a year conducting electronic surveillance, investigators believed the searches would uncover classified data and other information that would lead to more serious espionage charges.
Judges underscored the seriousness of the charges by denying bail for the Mak brothers. One judge told Chi Mak's lawyer: "You're talking about billions of dollars of technology that puts our country at serious risk."
Chi Mak, a specialist in electrical power, received a secret-level security clearance in 1996.
The document trail led investigators to conclude that he passed information that will allow Beijing to track the Pentagon's new Virginia class-attack submarine, which uses L-3 technology. The compromised technology also will enable the Chinese to develop countermeasures against the submarine and to copy its electronic systems.
Investigators believe he gave China schematics and design information on the latest generation of Aegis weapons systems, which L-3 helped to develop. Aegis -- meaning shield -- is being upgraded to become America's most advanced and mobile anti-missile system for use on guided-missile cruisers, guided-missile destroyers, Sea Wolf-class submarines and aircraft carriers.
Chi Mak worked on four classified Navy contracts related to Aegis. Investigators believe his spy ring was the main supplier of Aegis technology to China and, one U.S. defense official says, the Chinese quickly incorporated it into their Luyang II guided-missile destroyer.
Lesser charges By the time formal indictments were issued Nov. 15, the most serious charges against Chi Mak and the three others had been dropped. Tai Mak's wife was excluded altogether, though she was charged separately with running an illegal marriage-fraud network that helped immigrants gain entry into the United States.
The three remaining suspects were indicted on relatively minor charges of failing to register as foreign agents. The initial charges could have resulted in prison terms of up to 25 years, but the lesser charges carried maximum sentences of 10 years. Chi Mak, his wife and Tai Mak all pleaded not guilty.
So what changed? U.S. government sources say that petty squabbling between prosecutors and investigators jeopardized the case.
The more serious charges were dropped because the FBI counterintelligence team that conducted the investigation got into a dispute with the U.S. attorneys in Los Angeles who were in charge of the prosecution.
The FBI fully expected that search warrants would unearth classified data, so prosecutors balked when much of what was found was not officially classified as secret.
"Nothing I passed [to China] was classified," Chi Mak told investigators shortly after his arrest.
He was right. Investigators say the lack of classified documents revealed that the spies had done their homework.
Chinese intelligence-gathering services exploited the fact that Navy officials underclassified some of the most sensitive information about weapons systems to make it easier for private defense contractors to use the data.
"There is no question that this case has caused serious damage to U.S. national security," one investigator said.
'More subtle' Espionage laws are so difficult to apply that prosecutors almost need a confession to be able to make their case.
The current statute, enacted in 1917, requires prosecutors to prove "intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation."
This standard often forces the release of intelligence or defense information to prove national security was harmed.
David Szady, head of FBI counterintelligence until this year, said loss of sensitive-yet-unclassified information can do real harm to national security.
The technology passed to China in the Mak case was proprietary corporate trade secrets or export-controlled, but did not carry the "secret" or "top-secret" label. Chi Mak had access to Connecticut-based submarine manufacturer Electric Boat, for example, as if he were one of their own employees, Szady said.
The case "probably murdered the Navy" because of the loss of technology, he said.
Obtaining contract documents not only will allow Beijing to build its own version of one of the Navy's developmental warships, the DD(X) destroyer, but possibly to "sell it in competition to us," Szady said.
The Chinese, he said, are good at positioning agents who can obtain advanced technology in the developmental stage, before it is classified.
"The [spy] business is getting more complex, more subtle," Szady said. "It's smarter business than the old cloak-and-dagger."
http://www.washingtontimes.com/functions/print.php?StoryID=20060918-124646-8530rCopyright © 2007 News World Communications, Inc. All rights reserved._____________________________________________________________________________________
- (Rush Limbaugh) My Conversation With Bill Gretz
Source: The Limbaugh Letter, July 1999
Published: July, 1999 Author: Rush Limbaugh
This intrepid Washington Times reporter's new book, Betrayal: How the Clinton Administration Undermined American Security (Regnery) is a must-read.
RUSH: I'm really glad to speak to you, Bill, because I want to do as much as I can to get your book into as many people's hands as possible. Now, when Betrayal first came out, there was a report that the Justice Department was considering prosecuting you for the "harm" you had done to national security -- by publishing all these secrets. Have they made a move on you?
GERTZ: Not that I know of. And they're unlikely to, although I'm flattered. As I've said, if they want to help me sell a lot of books they can put me in jail. But as I got all of this material -- and it did include sensitive documents, including an Executive Order signed by the President -- I took the trouble to present the list that we planned to publish to the CIA.
We have almost unlimited freedom as reporters, but I think it comes with a certain responsibility -- so I gave them a chance to weigh in. They obviously weren't too happy about this, but they only objected to about six pages of material, which the publisher decided to withhold. I didn't have any objection because the meat of those documents was actually explained in the chapter on Russia selling missle technology to Iran.
RUSH: So readers really don't miss anything?
GERTZ: No, other than seeing a Top Secret NSA intercept.
RUSH: Are you aware of any effort made on the part of the government to try to find out who your sources are and lean on them?
GERTZ: I can tell you that in the past, and I'll speak generically, there have been efforts to go after sources -- specifically people who are believed to be my sources. In fact, the President himself a number of years ago sent a secret memorandum to all government departments -- obviously, it leaked to me -- that called on agency and department heads to go after, take administrative action, or even prosecute people who were leaking classified information.
I called up Mike McCurry, the White House spokesman, and asked, "What's this all about?" He said, "It's based on some pretty amazing reporting from one Bill Gertz." I said, "I'm flattered, but do you really think you're going to get anywhere with this?" He said, "No, we have no illusions. Going after leakers is a fool's errand." But they were making an effort to do that.
A similar thing happened at the Pentagon a couple of years ago, when Defense Secretary Bill Perry issued a memorandum about this problem. After Perry left office, I asked him if it made any difference. He said, "No, but we wanted to try."
RUSH: It is clear that you have the ability to get more information out of classified areas than anybody working today. I'm glad you're on the case. And I am curious to know wheter any intimidation might actually be effective.
GERTZ: These witch hunts go on periodically, where they try to find sources. As one of my editors here once said when the FBI was investigating a leak, "We wish the FBI well in whatever endeavor it chooses."
RUSH: Do you think if your work were published in, say, The Washington Post or New York Times that you and your information would be reacted to and treated differently?
GERTZ: It's a little bit frustrating sometimes to see major stories ignored because they come from The Washington Times, but on more than a few occassions we have triggered major news storiews that have forced the other papers and news organizations to follow us. It's obvious to me they don't like to do that, but when the story is too big to ignore, they will do it. There does seem to be a tendency to downplay or ignore a lot of our exclusives, although we do get quite a few wire pickups and follow-ups from other media. But I attribute that in part to the Administration's incredible capability of manipulating the press. They have ways, subtle and not-so-subtle, of intimidating reporters and news organizations into not pursuing stories they don't like. I've seen it happen on a number of occassions.
RUSH: Can you give us an illustration?
GERTZ: Sure. Last year we reported that 13 of China's 18 long-range missiles are targeted at U.S. cities. This was contained in the CIA's premier intelligence publication called the National Intelligence Daily. This is one of those big stories for us, because we've been following President Clinton saying over 100 times: "There are no missiles pointed at the children of America." Here you have a clear case where his intelligence community has concluded in its most important document that there are in fact Chinese missiles pointed at U.S. cities.
When that story broke -- and I heard this both from officials and from other reporters -- the Administration tried to put out the word that, well, the warheads on those missiles aren't really mounted on those Chinese boosters. I checked with my sources and they said that's not true. They have no way of knowing whether the warheads are mounted or not. Besides, that's not where the targeting is done. The targeting mechanism is separate from the warheads. So this is one example of how they try to spin the news they don't want. That allowed them to say, "Don't follow this Gertz story because here's our take on it."
RUSH: It's safe to say that if you were working for, say The Post or The New York Times or The Boston Blobe or The L.A. Times, much of your current stuff would have been spiked anyway.
GERTZ: That's right. I probably wouldn't have lasted very long working there. They're so extremely politically correct these days. One thing about The Washington Times is that we pride ourselves on being politically incorrect.
RUSH: And yor are. You open Betrayal with four chapters on Russian expionage, terrorism, and the danger that the former Soviet Union's military represents for America. But America thinks that's over with, that the Russians are our buddies, that we've neutralized their threat. Would you say the Russian threat as comprised today is more dire than that of China?
GERTZ: Yes, just in terms of sheer TNT power or megatonnage. The Russian nuclear arsenal represents the real strategic threat to the United States, although I wouldn't minimize the Chinese threat in any way. I highlight this in the chapter on nuclear nightmare, which goes into the crumbling control over the Russian nuclear arsenal.
This is a real untold story under the Clinton Administration. I first learned about it years ago from a senior official in the Energy Department, who explained that politically motivated officials basically killed off his entire program -- an intelligence program that focused completely on how the Russians were not controlling their nuclear arsenal. This was definitely bad news for a people like Strobe Talbot and others who wanted to adopt a conciliatory approach to Moscow and to Boris Yeltsin. So they immediately disbanded this entire program, and put in officials who were more pliable and would go along with the ploitical leanings of their intelligence assessment.
I was fortunate enough to get a number of classified CIA reports which revealed how dangerous the situation is. Even those reports appeared to me and to other outside observers to play down the danger of an unauthorized Russian nuclear missile launch. They kept saying that even though there are problems, the prospect of an unsanctioned use is low.
Well, as they say, one nuclear missile can ruin your whole day. Even if there's a remote possibility that some rogue general could get hold of a nuclear command post and press the button, it's truly alarming. But the Administration publicly adopted the exact opposite approach. They had almost a mantra: "There's no problem with the Russian nuclear control over its missiles. Everything's fine. Don't worry about it."
RUSH: Would that primarily be Strobe Talbot? He's got some, to me, inexplicable love affair with Russia and has since his youth.
GERTZ: Yes, he is clearly a liberal arms control proponent. Did nothing but criticize the Reagan Administration, did nothing but criticize the Strategic Defense Initiative.
Certainly missile defense is probably the most important issue right now in terms of national security. Yet his perspective, and that of Clinton and his other advisors, is that arms control is the most important element of the U.S. relationship with Russia. They want to send diplomats to Geneva to sit down over long documents and argue whether they should use the word "shall" or "may" -- and try to conclude agreements that in the end the U.S. will adhere to and the Russians will probably not adhere to.
They've made arms control the centerpiece. I remember a briefing at the Pentagon three or four years ago, a snowy day here in Washington, a Friday, when there's a low newscycle turnout. No one was there. The Secretary of Defense got up and said: Our first line of defense against missiles is arms control; then it's deterrence; and last would be actually building missile defense.
Strobe Talbot has been the driving force on Russia policy; Al Gore as well. He's had this bi-national commission with the Russians -- which is done entirely in secret. It has seemed to be a mutual admiration society with whatever prime minister was in there, first Chernomydin, then Primakov, now they've got a new guy, Stepashin.
RUSH: Has Gore got egg on his face, given the Russian move in Kosovo? He was highlighted by Clinton as the guy who's making sure the Russians are kept happy. Now the Russians moved in and we're all suprised and stunned.
GERTZ: This is a debacle. They're doing major spin control -- you need a Dramamine patch just to make it through the doorway over there. Gore said he had "personal assurances" from the foreign minister. He said explicitly the Russians promised that they wouldn't go in. Look what happened. They went in ahead of NATO. They've created a huge problem -- not just militarily but strategically. Imagine this scenario. Suppose the Serbs suddenly decided, now that the Russians are inside Kosovo, that they didn't want to pull out their forces. Would that mean the United States wouldn't bomb those forces because of the Russians? You have the prospect that they're operating outside of NATO's chain of command. There have already been a couple of run-ins around the Pristina airport. This is a major problem that is not getting the attention it should.
RUSH: What's in store for us, in light of what you said about the rogue interests in Russia and the nukes, now that they've moved into Kosovo? How do you read that? What are the Russians trying to do?
GERTZ: You have to put this is context. I've been writing about this for the paper over the last couple of weeks. Beginning with the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, the Russians immediately pulled back from any contacts with the West. There was a report out of Moscow by the defense attache`, Brigadier General Keith Dayton -- this was a private back-channel cable that went to the Pentagon -- who said that the Russians are cutting off all contacts with Western military attache`s in Moscow. Dayton described it as "a return to the Cold War." This is very serious. The Russians also pulled out their officer, whom we had invited to come into NATO headquarters as part of the operation in Bosnia.
Right away you had questions about what the Russians were doing in Bosnia. They had a battalion of troops in Bosnia as part of the peacekeeping operations there. But now they've clearly taken anti-NATO steps. Another sign was the fact that they sent two intelligence-gathering ships to spy on the NATO operation in the Balkans. Were they just collecting intelligence for themselves, or were they supplying it to the Serbs? I know from other intelligence reports that I've reported on that they have been spying on behalf of the Serbs and using international organizations in the Balkans as cover.
They have a cultural affinity with the Serbs. They're both Slavs, and they're basically aligned themselves with the Serbs. This creates huge problems for peacekeeping if they're going to have to settle the differences between the Kosovar Albanians and the Serbs. Clearly it's going to be very difficult to get the Albanians back into Kosovo if the Russians have a strong say. They want their own sector to do peacekeeping in, and they want to be outside the NATO command. Those are two demands that NATO is not going to give up.
RUSH: I'll bet they do. I'll bet they do, while spinning that they haven't. The words will be different from the reality. But why the airport? With the airport, you control who gets in -- and who gets out. It's the "who gets out" that's interesting to me. If you control the airport, maybe you can see to it that some indicted war criminals find their way out of the country.
GERTZ: Sure. Pristina is the regional capital, and the airport was where Lieutenant General Michael Jackson, the British commander in the whole region, was going to have his headquarters. Now the Russians have moved in and won't get out. After this broke and the Administration was sitting there with egg on its face, we got yet another lie from the Russian foreign minister who said, "Oh, it's a mistake. They're going to be pulled out." Then we find out, "Oh, actually Boris Yeltsin approved this deployment."
It raises serious questions about whether the Russians have control over their military -- and I don't think they do. This goes right to the heart of strategic nuclear command and control. One thing could escalate to another and then the so-called "de-targeting agreement" that Clinton made with Yeltsin a number of years back could go right out the window.
RUSH: By the way, where is the China story now?
GERTZ: It seems to have gone off the radar screen.
RUSH: It really does, except for you. Do you have a theory as to why?
GERTZ: I don't know the reason. The Republicans have been taking steps in Congress, they passed some legislation to try to tighten up security. But this is a story that the Administration doesn't want out -- and as a result, most of the major media have been ignoring it.
RUSH: Rep. Curt Weldon said that while the Administration was ostensibly "reviewing" the Cox Report to determine what would be declassified, they were actually preparing their spin operation. So the question arises, is this Administration at all concerned with the national security implications of this story? Or, are they just concerned about their own political standing at the end of the day?
GERTZ: Yes, I think that's it.
RUSH: Really? They are not concerned with national security?
GERTZ: I think they have made national security take a back seat to doing business with China at all costs. And that's had devestating consequences. Their response was to blame the Republicans. But it was not the Republicans who stole these nuclear secrets or acquired the technology, it was the Chinese. Yet there was not a single word of criticism about the Chinese. Not one.
If you search all the statements by Administration officials, we heard, "Well, everybody spies," and, "Isn't it too bad that the Republicans didn't do anything; we're doing something about it." Then Clinton turned around and offered to renew most favored trade status with China.
RUSH: Plus, we learned that former Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary, not wanting to hurt anybody's feelings, scrapped the practice of requiring color-coded IDs in all the nuclear labs. We didn't want to discriminate and hurt people's feelings by having it known that certain people were not allowed access to these very important places. Then we learned that it was O'Leary herself who leaked the design of the W-87 to U.S. News & World Report, which published a diagram of the weapon in the July 31, 1995 issue.
In your book you quote a government official close to the Cox Committee saying that the Administration "circumvented the law and they knew what they were doing." So was this a systematic dismantling of our security on purpose? Or is this just a liberal naivete that does not accept the Chinese as a threat?
GERTZ: I think it's a little of both. In the case of the Energy Department and Hazel O'Leary, she brought in a group of people who could only be described as virulent antinuclear activists, and they took a slash-and-burn approach to security.
They knew that they only had a short period of time, and they were out to do as much damage to the Energy Department's role in U.S. nuclear weapons as they could. They did this under the guise of declassification. Instead of protecting secrets, their main concern was: How much can we declassify? In a number of cases we reported that they started declassifying en masse, and before anyone knew it information about nuclear weapons was leaking out.
They had to scrap the whole program. Just recently Congress passed a law that said,"No more bulk declassification of nuclear material." It has to be reviewed carefully so we don't give terrorists or other rogue states the ability to develop nuclear weapons.
They adopted this naive approach to world affairs, that there are no more threats in the world, that the only real threat is the United States. As Jeane Kirkpatrick said, it's the blame-America-first crowd. These are people who believe fundamentally, philosophically, that the major cause of the problems in the world is not Russia or China but it's the United States, and the more that can be done to limit the assertiveness and strength of the United States in the world the better off the world will be.
RUSH: I've been quoting Madeline Albright who said in April 1998: "We very much don't want to be out there by ourselves as the organizer and the only superpower. People don't believe that. They think we just want to be king of the hill, but we do not." These people have always felt that the focus of evil in the world is the U.S. military. Yfor're saying what I've often said myself, but to hear you say it, as close as you are to all this, is chilling. They actually believe the world will be safer if they can balance the nuclear threat by giving a whole bunch of nations access to it.
GERTZ: Right. I heard a speech by Frank Wisner, the U.S.ambassador to India. He was a senior Pentagon official when they denied armor to the commanders in Somalia, which led to the big disaster there. Wisner showed the Indians how we knew about their nuclear tests so the Indians could hide it from us when they finally did one. In his recent speech I remember him saying, "Oh, the balance of power is a very complex thing." I thought, "What is he talkiang about? There is no 'balance of power' in the world today. We are the sole superpower." But they think in terms of power balancing, and for them that means taking power from the United States and giving it to countries like Russia and China.
RUSH: They actually think the world is being made safer by doing this.
GERTZ: Yes, they think that's fundamental.
RUSH: There's no moral difference between a Communist government in China and the democratic United States of America in their minds.
GERTZ: Right. Yes. Have you ever once heard any Clinton Administration official even say that the Chinese government is a Communist government/
RUSH: No. They never have.
GERTZ: That says it all right there. They are working very hard to pretend there are no foreign threats. An intelligence official once told me: "For the Clinton Administration there are no foreign threats, only foreign capabilities." He was expressing his frustration at how politicized the intelligence community had become, that they were not allowed to use terms that highlight the dangers in the world, which they've been doing for decades.
RUSH: I read an interview with you on WorldNetDaily.com by Jon E.Dougherty. You're quoted as having told him: "The Chinese are engaged in a pretty serious strategic and conventional military buildbu. The alarming part of that is that it doesn't appear as though they're building up forces just for a regional conflict. It appears as though they're developing forces [strictly] to oppose the United States." What specifically do you mean?
GERTZ: They're not building three types of strategic nuclear missiles in order to confront the Philippines. They're doing it to confront the United States. Their goal is to push the United States out of Asia, and they're doing everything they can to achieve that goal. And these are people who follow Sun Tzu and his Art of War, who said: "The acme of skill is defeating your enemy without firing a shot."
They know they can't match the United States missile for missile, warhead for warhead, ship for ship. So they're engaged in what they call "asymmetrical warfare." They've picked a few areas where they want to challange the United States' technological superiority, and that includes mobile ICBMs. We don't have any. These are missiles you can't find, as demonstrated in the Persian Gulf War. We had a terrible time trying to locate Iraqi SCUD missiles -- and those were just short-range missiles. The Chinese want to put these missiles in their country and be able to threaten the United States, so that if there is a confrontation over Taiwan -- and that's really the hotspot -- they'll be able to have these missiles.
They're also developing some more exotic weapons. They're doing information warfare. This is among the most closely guarded secrets, but they're actually looking at ways they can take down an entire country through computers. The joint staff, the military, did an exercise last year. It was called "Eligible Receiver," and just using tools from the internet, just software and things, this group of NSA specialists literally could have turned the lights out in large portions of the United States. They could have. They got into the power grid and could have shut down the power.
This is one area where the Chinese are working. Another is anti-satellite weapons. Huge amounts of data, whether it's military or commercial information, travels by satellite, and those satellites are extremely vulnerable. The Chinese have tested anti-satellite weapons. The military did a test last year, where they fired a low-powered laser at a satellite and caused damage to the sensors. This means they could basically shut down our communications and satellite information networks with laser satellite weapons, which they're working on.
RUSH: Speaking of satellites, given the fact that they've tested the W-88, our most advanced warhead, is there any chance for the Strategic-Defense Initiative, SDI?
GERTZ: This is, as I mentioned, the most serious national security issue facing the country. Clinton has made it clear he's been flexible on almost every issue except missile defense; he's committed to having none on his watch. Again this goes back to the arms control relationship with Russia. They believe that having these negotiations is more important.
The Rumsfield Commission which Congress organized last year burst the balloon on the Administration's idea that there were no missiles pointed at the children of America. They highlighted the emerging threat of long-range missiles. Their bottom-line conclusion was that a long-range missile threat to the United States could emerge with little or no warning.
This means that whoever we have an arms control agreement with regarding missile defense is going to be meaningless if the Chinese aren't part of it, if the North Koreans aren't part of it, if the Iranians aren't part of it and other states that wish us ill. If you don't defend the country against the greatest strategic threat, then it makes it very, very difficult for the defense leaders to argue defending it against the lesser threats, whether that's terrorism or regional conflicts. And that's precisely what the administration had done. They've wished away the long-range missile threat and just focused on these lesser threats, which are much more difficult to counter.
RUSH: You've said that China is playing the Russia Card. What do you mean?
GERTZ: During the Cold War, we made a quasi-alliance with the Chinese against the Soviet Union, which was an expansionist, Communist power. We even had electronic eavesdropping post in China that were spying on the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War, however, all that changed.
Now China is emerging as the new regional and potentially global superpower, and they recognize that in order for them to gain position over us they're going to have to weaken us. So they've launched an anti-hegemonism campaign. Theyre blaming us as the great hegemonic power in the world. In order to balance power, they've made common cause with Russia. They have a semi-alliance. They recently concluded a border agreement which allowed China to pull thousands of troops and tanks off its border with Russia and those troops are now being used for repression in Xian-Xiong, where you have Muslim separatists and also in Tibet, where the Buddhists are seeking independence. And they've also begun purchasing large amounts of hig-technology weaponry, including ships with SSN22 Sunburn missiles.
RUSH: From whom?
GERTZ: From Russia. The Chinese are Buying these Ships. Now, these Sunburn missiles were designed specifically to kill U.S. ships. The Russians built them for one purpose and that is to sink our aircraft carriers and our destroyers and crusiers. So, clearly, this is another indication that they're preparing forces not to fight regional conflicts but to confront the United States.
RUSH: Bill Richardson says that the lab security problems have all been remedied. They've been solved. Is that true?
GERTZ: False, totally false. This is another case where the Administration has been saying loudly and repeatedly that they've made vast improvements in laboratory security. How? First, they signed a Presidential Directive, I think it was PDD61. The most notable feature of this directive is that it's currently secret. I went to the White House and I said: "If you want to make your case that you've improved security, why not release this directive?"
"Oh, no, we can't do that," they said. I talked to people who have seen the directive and they said that it doesn't do anything to improve security. Basically it brings in FBI people to fire the Energy Department security and intelligence officials; second, it institutes a system of polygraphs or lie detector tests -- which have been shown, especially by the Chinaese, to be very easily defeatable. There is the case of Larry Wu Tai Chin, a spy in the '80s, who worked for the CIA as a mole for China for decades and underwent a number of polygraph tests that he obviously passed without any problem. They haven't really improved security. Also, according to the Cox Report, it's almost certain that Chinese espionage is continuing today. I interviewed the head of Los Alamos National Laboratory, John Brown, and the question I put to him was: "How many Chinaese nationals currently are working at Los Alamos?" He said about 100. These aren't Chinese Americans. These are people who hold People's Republic of China passports. They don't have access to secrets, but they have access to the people who have secrets. I thought: "If you have a Chinese espionage problem, it seems to me that the first thing you would do would be to try to limit the access of people from the PRC who might be involved in that espionage." The Administration has said they have no plans to change that policy.
(Continued in my comments)
In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes.
RUSH: The more the American people are not paying attention to this, the more the Administration thinks they can be lax with this so-called strategic partnership and ruffle as few feathers in China as possible.
GERTZ: But it doesn't look like there's going to be a strategic partnership with China. Even those in the Pentagon who are in charge of trying to build that relationship are starting to recognize it. A big monkey wrency was the errant bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia. As I reported in the paper, the Chinese are convinced that that bombing was deliberate and intentional.
RUSH: They really believe that?
GERTZ: Yes. And that it was part of conspiracy to try to drag China into the Balkans conflict. The reason they believe this -- and this is based on intelligence reports -- is that when the bombs struck that embassy building, the JDAM missiles, as they're called, homed in on the defense attache`'s office and a secure communications room. So that convinced the Chinese this wasn't accidental. We're sending an envoy to China this week to again apologize for it.
RUSH: Pickering. What do you think?
GERTZ: I've looked into this. I went to the CIA and asked my friends there. I said, Look, if you had a mole in the CIA who wanted to screw up U.S. relations with China or any other country, is it possible you could feed in the false coordinates for the Chinese embassy in Belgrade? The answer I got -- and I tend to believe it -- is that you couldn't aorchestrate the number of screwups that took place in order for that errant bombing to take place. Obviously it was based, first of all, on a wrong map. But then there were at least five different places along the way by five different agencies, including the CIA, that were supposed to validate that the target they were aiming at was actually a Serbian military supply depot. And it wasn't.
We haven't had all the answers on it, but I tend to believe that it was a mistake. I can't see any benefit for the Administration to try and provoke the Chinese. Right now you've got a billion and a half people angry at you. It's not a good situation.
RUSH: One final question, in light of these resent developments coupled with this Administration's approach to matters military vis a` vis China. What would happen if China invaded Taiwan while Bill Clinton is President?
GERTZ: That's a good question.
RUSH: I'm afraid we'd do nothing. I think we'd huff and puff but I don't think we could afford to do anything.
GERTZ: We do have some indication that they would respond. I think it would be vitally important that we fulfilled the commitment under the Taiwan Relations Act, which states that the U.S. would not allow Taiwan to be overrun militarily. That's the bottom line. The Administration has tried to obscure that commitment to defend Taiwan by saying that it's "ambiguous." But think about the repercussions in Asia, if the United States did not. I can tell you talking to the U.S. Pacific Command that we do have contingency plans for a conflict with China over Taiwan. They do planning for all kinds of things, but there are war plans should the Chinese try to take Taiwan militarily. They have not disavowed the use of force against in Taiwan. It's a flashpoint.
In the book I talk about the case of General Xiong Guangkai, a senior official in the People's Liberation Army. I've met him several times. He speaks English very well, very polished. He had an exchange with a former Pentagon official back in 1995 when the Chinese were conducting war games near Taiwan, with the intent to intimidate the Taiwanese. He explained to this former offical, Charles Freeman, that during the Korean War the United States had an overwhelming nuclear advantage over China, but General Xiong said that's not the case today. China has made strides, and he said the United States would not intervene in a conflict with Taiwan "because it cares more about Los Angeles than Taipei," the Taiwanese capital.
I talked to Charles Freeman, who felt it was enough of a threat that he notified the White House national security advisor at the time, Anthony Lake. Freeman recognized it for a nuclear threat. I talked to General Xiong about this, who would just smile and tell me I was a friend of China.
RUSH: Bill, thanks for your time. I really appreciate it. Continued good luck with the book and congradulations on your work.
GERTZ: Thanks. Keep up the good work on your end, too.
RUSH: I'll do my best.
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Treachery
By Bill Gertz
Washington Times | September 24, 2004
The following excerpts are from Bill Gertz's new book, Treachery
Part I: How the French Armed Saddam
The United States stood by for years as supposed allies helped its enemies obtain the world's most dangerous weapons, reveals Bill Gertz, defense and national security reporter for The Washington Times, in the new book Treachery (Crown Forum). In this excerpt, he details France's persistence in arming Saddam Hussein.
New intelligence revealing how long France continued to supply and arm Saddam Hussein's regime infuriated U.S. officials as the nation prepared for military action against Iraq.
The intelligence reports showing French assistance to Saddam ongoing in the late winter of 2002 helped explain why France refused to deal harshly with Iraq and blocked U.S. moves at the United Nations.
"No wonder the French are opposing us," one U.S. intelligence official remarked after illegal sales to Iraq of military and dual-use parts, originating in France, were discovered early last year before the war began.
That official was careful to stipulate that intelligence reports did not indicate whether the French government had sanctioned or knew about the parts transfers. The French company at the beginning of the pipeline remained unidentified in the reports.
France's government tightly controls its aerospace and defense firms, however, so it would be difficult to believe that the illegal transfers of equipment parts took place without the knowledge of at least some government officials.
Iraq's Mirage F-1 fighter jets were made by France's Dassault Aviation. Its Gazelle attack helicopters were made by Aerospatiale, which became part of a consortium of European defense companies.
"It is well-known that the Iraqis use front companies to try to obtain a number of prohibited items," a senior Bush administration official said before the war, refusing to discuss Iraq's purchase of French warplane and helicopter parts.
The State Department confirmed intelligence indicating the French had given support to Iraq's military.
"U.N. sanctions prohibit the transfer to Iraq of arms and materiel of all types, including military aircraft and spare parts," State Department spokeswoman Jo-Anne Prokopowicz said. "We take illicit transfers to Iraq very seriously and work closely with our allies to prevent Iraq from acquiring sensitive.
Sen. Ted Stevens, Alaska Republican and chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, declared that France's selling of military equipment to Iraq was "international treason" as well as a violation of a U.N. resolution.
"As a pilot and a former war pilot, this disturbs me greatly that the French would allow in any way parts for the Mirage to be exported so the Iraqis could continue to use those planes," Stevens said.
"The French, unfortunately, are becoming less trustworthy than the Russians," said Rep. Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Republican and vice chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. "It's outrageous they would allow technology to support the jets of Saddam Hussein to be transferred."
The U.S. military was about to go to war with Iraq, and thanks to the French, the Iraqi air force had become more dangerous.
The pipeline
French aid to Iraq goes back decades and includes transfers of advanced conventional arms and components for weapons of mass destruction.
The central figure in these weapons ties is French President Jacques Chirac. His relationship with Saddam dates to 1975, when, as prime minister, the French politician rolled out the red carpet when the Iraqi strongman visited Paris.
"I welcome you as my personal friend," Chirac told Saddam, then vice president of Iraq.
The French put Saddam up at the Hotel Marigny, an annex to the presidential palace, and gave him the trappings of a head of state. The French wanted Iraqi oil, and by establishing this friendship, Chirac would help France replace the Soviet Union as Iraq's leading supplier of weapons and military goods.
In fact, Chirac helped sell Saddam the two nuclear reactors that started Baghdad on the path to nuclear weapons capability.
France's corrupt dealings with Saddam flourished throughout the 1990s, despite the strict arms embargo against Iraq imposed by the United Nations after the Persian Gulf war.
By 2000, France had become Iraq's largest supplier of military and dual-use equipment, according to a senior member of Congress who declined to be identified.
Saddam developed networks for illegal supplies to get around the U.N. arms embargo and achieve a military buildup in the years before U.S. forces launched a second assault on Iraq.
One spare-parts pipeline flowed from a French company to Al Tamoor Trading Co. in the United Arab Emirates. Tamoor then sent the parts by truck through Turkey, and into Iraq. The Iraqis obtained spare parts for their French-made Mirage F-1 jets and Gazelle attack helicopters through this pipeline.
A huge debt
U.S. intelligence would not discover the pipeline until the eve of war last year; sensitive intelligence indicated that parts had been smuggled to Iraq as recently as that January.
"A thriving gray-arms market and porous borders have allowed Baghdad to acquire smaller arms and components for larger arms, such as spare parts for aircraft, air-defense systems and armored vehicles," the CIA said in a report to Congress made public that month.
U.S. intelligence agencies later came under fire over questions about prewar estimates of Iraq's stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. But intelligence on Iraq's hidden procurement networks was confirmed.
An initial accounting by the Pentagon in the months after the fall of Baghdad revealed that Saddam covertly acquired between 650,000 and 1 million tons of conventional weapons from foreign sources. The main suppliers were Russia, China and France.
By contrast, the U.S. arsenal is between 1.6 million and 1.8 million tons.
As of last year, Iraq owed France an estimated $4 billion for arms and infrastructure projects, according to French government estimates. U.S. officials thought this massive debt was one reason France opposed a military operation to oust Saddam.
The fact that illegal deals continued even as war loomed indicated France viewed Saddam's regime as a future source of income.
Telltale chemical
Just days before U.S. and coalition forces launched their military campaign against Iraq, more evidence of French treachery emerged.
In mid-March 2003, U.S. intelligence and defense officials confirmed that exporters in France had conspired with China to provide Iraq with chemicals used in making solid fuel for long-range missiles. The sanctions-busting operation occurred in August 2002, the U.S. National Security Agency discovered through electronic intercepts.
The chemical transferred to Iraq was a transparent liquid rubber called hydroxy terminated polybutadiene, or HTPB, according to intelligence reports.
U.S. intelligence traced the sale to China's Qilu Chemicals, "the largest manufacturer of HTPB in China," one official says.
A French company, CIS Paris, helped broker the sale of 20 tons of HTPB, a controlled export that was shipped from China to the Syrian port of Tartus. The chemical solution was sent by truck from Syria into Iraq, to a missile-manufacturing plant. The Iraqi company that purchased the shipment was in charge of making solid fuel for long-range missiles.
HTPB technically is a dual-use chemical, because it also can be used for commercial purposes such as space launches. However, Iraq often disguised military purchases as commercial ones, as documents found later in Iraq would confirm.
In a report to Congress, the CIA said Iraq had constructed two "mixing" buildings for solid-propellant fuels at a plant known as al-Mamoun. The facility originally was built to produce the Badr-2000, a solid-propellant missile also known as the Condor.
The new buildings "appear especially suited to house large, U.N.-prohibited mixers of the type acquired for the Badr-2000 program," the CIA report stated.
French denials
Despite controversy over prewar intelligence on Iraq, the CIA said its estimates of Iraqi missiles were on target.
Representatives of the French and Chinese governments went on the attack when The Washington Times asked about the chemical sale.
Chinese Embassy spokesman Xie Feng did not address the specifics, but said "irresponsible accusations" about China's exports had been made in the past.
"These accusations are devoid of all foundation," French Foreign Ministry spokesman Francois Rivasseau declared. "In line with the rules currently in force, France has neither delivered, nor authorized, the delivery of such materials, either directly or indirectly."
By that point, many in the U.S. government were fed up with French denials.
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz called in the French ambassador to the United States, Jean-David Levitte, to complain about France's covert and overt support for Saddam's regime.
"Twelve years of waiting was too costly in terms of the growing threat from Baghdad," Wolfowitz told the ambassador, according to a U.S. official who was present.
Made in France
The war in Iraq, which began March 19, 2003, provided disturbing evidence that France's treacherous dealings come at a steep cost to the United States.
On April 8 came the downing of Air Force Maj. Jim Ewald's A-10 Thunderbolt fighter over Baghdad and the discovery that it was a French-made Roland missile that brought down the American pilot and destroyed a $13 million aircraft. Ewald, one of the first U.S. pilots shot down in the war, was rescued by members of the Army's 54th Engineer Battalion who saw him parachute to earth not far from the wreckage.
Army intelligence concluded that the French had sold the missile to the Iraqis within the past year, despite French denials.
A week after Ewald's A-10 was downed, an Army team searching Iraqi weapons depots at the Baghdad airport discovered caches of French-made missiles. One anti-aircraft missile, among a cache of 51 Roland-2s from a French-German manufacturing partnership, bore a label indicating that the batch was produced just months earlier.
In May, Army intelligence found a stack of blank French passports in an Iraqi ministry, confirming what U.S. intelligence already had determined: The French had helped Iraqi war criminals escape from coalition forces — and therefore justice.
Then, there were French-made trucks and radios and the deadly grenade launchers, known as RPGs, with French-made night sights. Saddam loyalists used them to kill American soldiers long after the toppling of the dictator's regime.
The intelligence team sent to find Iraqi weapons also discovered documents outlining covert Iraqi weapons procurement leading up to the war. The CIA, however, refused to make public the documents on assistance provided by France or by other so-called allies of the United States.
The clandestine arms-procurement network, disclosed late last year by the Los Angeles Times, put a Syrian trading company in a pivotal role. Documents showed the company, SES International Corp., was the conduit for millions of dollars' worth of weapons purchased internationally, including from France. Al Bashair Trading Co. in Baghdad was the major front used by Saddam to buy arms abroad.
A Defense Department-sponsored report produced in February identified France as one of the top three suppliers of Iraq's conventional arms, after Russia and China. The report revealed that France supplied 12 types of armaments and a total of 115,005 pieces.
A major reason Iraqi militants posed a threat to U.S. forces for so many months was that they had access to weapons that Saddam stockpiled in violation of U.N. resolutions.
A close call
One of the most frightening examples of how the militants put French weapons to use against the Americans came Oct. 26, 2003. That morning, at about 6 o'clock, they bombarded the Rashid Hotel in Baghdad with French missiles.
The French rockets nearly killed Wolfowitz, whom Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld has called "the brains" of the Pentagon.
The deputy defense secretary had just gotten dressed in his room that Sunday morning when a car stopped several hundred yards from the hotel. It dropped off what appeared to be one of the blue electrical generators that were common in the power-starved Iraqi capital. The driver stayed just long enough to open a panel on the end of the metal box that was pointing upward toward the hotel.
The car sped off. Minutes later, a pod of 40 artillery rockets set off by remote control began firing at the hotel, their trails leaving sparks as they flew. The rockets hit one floor below where Wolfowitz and about a dozen aides and reporters were staying.
One rocket slammed into the room of Army Lt. Col. Charles H. Buehring, a public-affairs officer. The explosion hit Buehring, 40, in the head. A reporter discovered him and tried to help, but the Fayetteville, N.C., resident died a short time later.
In all, between eight and 10 missiles hit the hotel. The casualties might have been higher, and included Wolfowitz, if the improvised rocket launcher had fired all the missiles.
Because of a malfunction, 11 failed to go off.
Playing defense
Half the missiles fired at Wolfowitz's hotel were French-made Matra SNEB 68-millimeter rockets, with a range of two to three miles. The others were Russian in origin.
The French missiles were "pristine," Navy SEAL commandos reported.
"They were either new or kept in very good condition," said one SEAL who inspected the rocket tubes.
The rockets were thought to have been taken from Iraq's French-made Alouette or Gazelle attack helicopters.
The fact that new French missiles were showing up in the hands of Saddam loyalists months after the fall of Baghdad made Wolfowitz and his close aides livid. Still, others in the U.S. government worked to defend the French.
The CIA, to avoid upsetting ties with French intelligence, played down the French role in helping Saddam. The agency had a weak human intelligence?gathering capability, and France, because of its history of ties to Iraq, was much better at penetrating Saddam's regime.
The State Department's response was not surprising. Asked about French support for Iraq while on a fence-mending mission to Paris in May 2003, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell had said: "We're not going to paper over it and pretend it didn't occur. It did occur. But we're going to work through that."
Powell, the retired four-star general and former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was too inexperienced in the ways of diplomacy. As a result, he largely had turned over control of State Department policy-making to the Foreign Service.
The problem with the Foreign Service is its culture. It trains diplomats to "get along" with the foreign governments they are sent to work with. Not insignificantly, Paris is among the most coveted postings in the world.
Backing down
Pentagon hard-liners on France, led by Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, carried the day early in the war, but accommodationists within the upper councils of the Bush administration took control as the conflict went on.
Among those who took a softer position on France was National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, the former Stanford provost who surrounded herself with State Department officials and Foreign Service officers.
Rumsfeld drew a great deal of attention on Jan. 22, 2003 — and created a backlash within the State Department — when he let fly a verbal salvo against France and Germany for not siding with the United States, describing them as "old Europe" during a meeting with foreign reporters.
Rumsfeld also criticized French and German political leaders for making policy based not on "their honest conviction as to what their country ought to do" but on opinion polls that reflected ever-shifting public sentiments.
As the accommodationists in the Bush administration gained the upper hand, Rumsfeld and others were ordered to tone down the anti-Europe rhetoric. By late last year, the defense secretary's critics within the Foreign Service were crowing that Rumsfeld had been "tamed."
Just a day after the Iraqi attack on Wolfowitz's hotel in Baghdad, in an interview with The Washington Times, Rumsfeld took an even softer approach toward the French.
"People tend to look at what's taking place today and opine that it is something distinctive," Rumsfeld said of the turbulence in Franco-American relations. "I don't find it distinctive. I find it an old record that gets replayed about every five or seven years."
The public soft-policy line was, in many ways, a great victory for France. Even as new evidence poured in that the French had betrayed the United States and cost the lives of American troops, the government backed down from a confrontation with its erstwhile ally.
http://www.frontpagemag.com/articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=15237
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