About Me

Name: Gabrielle Cusumano
Biography
Loading...

Create Your Own Blog Find Other Townhall Blogs

Comments

Dateline: 12/05/06 "The state of anarchy and lawlessness in the West Bank and Gaza Strip." Could Peace and Prosperity Have Come to The Palestinians Had Arafat Honored the Oslo Accords?

Arafat's Commitments: A letter on key issues of the PLO and Israel, addressed to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, was signed by Yasser Arafat on September 9, 1993. The letter says specifically that:
  • The PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security.
  • The PLO accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 (U.N. Resolution 338, adopted after the Yom Kippur War calls for all sides to implement 242)
  • The PLO commits itself to the Middle East peace process... all outstanding issues ... will be resolved through negotiations
  • ... the PLO renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators
  • ... the PLO undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist.

September 13, 1993  Oslo Peace Accords


December 5, 2006    ( Main Article)

Palestinian crime rises 50 percent

The state of anarchy and lawlessness in the West Bank and Gaza Strip has claimed the lives of more than 300 Palestinians since the beginning of 2006, according to statistics published Monday by the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens' Rights.

According to the figures, 332 Palestinians were killed in Palestinian Authority-controlled areas in the first 11 months of 2006 - a 50 percent increase compared to last year.

Most of this year's victims were from the Gaza Strip (236).

In 2005, 176 Palestinians were killed in internal disputes and crime, while 93 were killed in 2004.

Regarding this year's victims, the group said 41 murders were politically motivated and 88 were due to clan feuds. The remaining victims were killed under various circumstances ranging from armed robbery to personal vengeance and misuse of weapons.

An average of 26 Palestinians died each month in internal disputes and crime this year, as opposed to a monthly average of 15 in 2005, the group said.

The number of Palestinian women slain by relatives in "honor killings" slightly increased in 2006, with 27 cases reported so far, compared to 26 last year.

Palestinian children have also fallen victim to the anarchy and lawlessness, the group said. In the first 11 months of 2006, 33 children were killed, up from 28 last year.

The group noted that 95% of the killings were carried out by gunfire or explosives.

The group also documented dozens of assaults on various institutions, including courts, universities and colleges, municipalities and media organizations.

http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1164881816551&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull


Polls Taken of Palestinians in 2006     (Background Article #1)

Near East Consulting (NEC) poll of Palestinians, Jan. 27-29, 2006

Hamas position calling for the elimination of Israel

Hamas should change its position: 63%

Hamas should maintain its position: 21%

“Even among those who voted for Hamas, only 37 percent support Hamas?x20AC;™ position that Israel does not have the right to exist.”

“[E]ighty percent support a peace agreement.”

JMCC poll (Jerusalem Media & Communication Center) poll of Palestinians, Feb. 8-12, 2006

Two-state solution: 58%

“A bi-national state on all of historic Palestine”: 22%

Islamic state (a volunteered response): 3%

Among those who said they voted for Hamas, the reason given:

Hamas “political agenda”: 12%

Hoped Hamas would end corruption: 43%

“The poll also found that 73% do not want [President] Abbas, a Fatah leader, to resign from the presidency.”



New York Post, February 18, 2003   (Background Article #3)

POLLS, PALESTINIANS
AND THE PATH TO PEACE

by Daniel Pipes

Why are Palestinians so angry at Israel? There are two possible reasons.

Political: They accept the existence of a Jewish state but are angry with this or that Israeli policy.

Rejectionist: They abominate the very existence of Israel and want to destroy it.

Which is correct has many implications. If Palestinians only want changes in what Israel is doing (such as building towns on the West Bank), then it is reasonable to ask Israel to alter those actions - and the main burden of resolving the conflict falls on Israel.

But if Israel's existence remains at issue, then it follows that the conflict will end only when the Palestinians finally and irrevocably accept the Jewish state. Seen this way, the main burden falls on the Palestinians.

If it's a routine political dispute, diplomacy and compromise are the way to make progress. But if the Palestinians reject Israel's very existence, diplomacy is useless, even counterproductive, and Israel needs to convince Palestinians to give up on their aggressive intentions. More bluntly, Israel would then need to defeat the Palestinians.

Which interpretation is correct?

In a spring 2002 poll of residents in the West Bank and Gaza conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, a Palestinian organization, 43 percent of respondents called for a Palestinian state only in the West Bank and Gaza and 51 percent insisted on the state in "all of historic Palestine," code words for the destruction of Israel.

Thus, Palestinian rejectionism flourishes. But the outside world averts its collective eyes from this fact. Those institutions and individuals with a megaphone - in both Israel and America, not to speak of the United Nations, the left and those in diplomatic, journalistic, artistic and academic circles worldwide - generally assert that Palestinian acceptance of Israel has occurred and focus instead on Israel's need to "take risks for peace."

In contrast, only a small number of conservatives in Israel and the United States point out the continued power of Palestinian rejectionism.

Given this backdrop of mostly wishful thinking, it is remarkable to see how realistically the Israeli and American electorates view Palestinian intentions. The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at Tel Aviv University found in fall 2002 that 18 percent of Israeli Jews believe the Palestinians have accepted Israel's existence and 71 percent think the opposite.

To learn American views on this issue, the Middle East Forum recently sponsored a poll asking a national cross-section of 1,000 likely voters, "Do you believe that the goal of Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority is to have a small state living in peace alongside Israel, or is its goal the eventual destruction of Israel?"

The response was clear. Nineteen percent of respondents said Arafat seeks a small state living in peace alongside Israel; 61 percent said he seeks the eventual destruction of Israel.

(Technical aside: The other 20 percent didn't know or refused to reply. This poll, conducted on Feb. 11-12 by the New York polling firm McLaughlin & Associates, has an accuracy of +/- 3.1% at the 95 percent confidence interval.)

Not only are the Israeli and U.S. numbers strikingly similar but even more noteworthy is how the U.S. electorate ignores the overwhelming consensus of authoritative voices and, by a more than 3-to-1 ratio, understands that Palestinian rejectionism lies at the heart of the conflict.

This insight testifies to the wisdom of a free and informed people. It also has great potential significance for U.S. policy, signaling to the Bush administration to heed its own electorate and recognize that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict persists because Israel is, not what it does.

This means abandoning the habit of pressing Israel to make further concessions to the Palestinians and instead aiming to convince the Palestinians that Israel is here to stay. This might entail such steps as:

* Discouraging Palestinian anti-Semitism and other forms of incitement against Israel;

* Reassessing antiquated U.S. policies that help keep the Palestinian "refugees" in limbo;

* Endorsing tough but necessary Israeli actions to end Palestinian violence; and

* Moving the American embassy to Jerusalem.

The sooner Palestinians, leaders and public alike, come to terms with the unalterable reality of Israel's existence, the better it will be for all concerned.




(The Olso Peace Accords are described in detail the next article, Background Article # 5)


The Sleepwalkers by Charles Krauthammer  (Background Article #4)

WHAT DOES it take to make the dreamers admit, if only to themselves, that the Oslo peace process was a mirage?

The lynching of Israeli soldiers by a Palestinian mob in Ramallah, their bloodied bodies thrown onto the street from a second-story window?

Half a million Moroccans, for 50 years the friendliest of all Arab peoples to Jews, taking to the streets to vilify Israel, burn Israeli flags, and wave Palestinian and even Iraqi flags?

Palestinians desecrating, burning and destroying brick by brick the Jewish shrine at Joseph's Tomb? (Jews are now barred from it. There are reports that a mosque is to be built on the site.)

Yasser Arafat contemptuously rejecting every entreaty of a "frustrated" President Clinton to utter a word to his people to stop the rioting, the shooting, the firebombing? Indeed, throughout the little war he started, his state-controlled TV, radio and newspapers have urged his people to ever greater frenzies of blood and martyrdom.

There were people who remained loyal to Stalin and the Communist idea through the show trials of the 1930s, the Hitler-Stalin pact, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the Prague spring of 1968, even the publication of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's "Gulag Archipelago." Nothing could shake them. They died as they lived--bankrupt, bereft and with blood on their hands.

Today there remain people--indeed, the people running the foreign policies of the United States and Israel--equally reluctant to give up their dream, in this case of Palestinian peacefulness and acceptance of Israel. No reality can shake them.

"Administration officials, who acknowledge that they have had trouble really understanding Mr. Arafat, say that in the last several months, they have been unable to read him at all," reports the New York Times.

Good God. What does it take? The man is an open book. Within months of the great White House Handshake of 1993, Arafat gave a speech in South Africa promising jihad for Jerusalem. Back home, he repeatedly threatened to abandon "peace" and return to intifada. His state-controlled media not only denied Israel's legitimacy but conducted a seven-year campaign of incitement and vilification. Then-Prime Minister Shimon Peres, architect of the Oslo peace process, dismissed this rather compelling evidence that he might have misjudged the intentions of his "peace partner" as mere words.

Now the words have turned to rocks and bullets and Molotov cocktails. These are harder to ignore.

What does it take? At Camp David, Ehud Barak offered the Palestinians an astonishingly generous peace with dignity and statehood. Arafat not only turned it down, he refused even to make a counter offer!

Instead, he went around the world trying to get international support for a unilateral declaration of independence and a complete abolition of the Oslo peace process. When he didn't get it, he decided to abolish Oslo and get his state his way--through blood. Why, days before Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount, the pretext for this war, Arafat met with the tanzim, the armed militia, and told them to "be ready."

President Clinton finds all this puzzling. After all, he has invested much in Arafat. Arafat, the man who in 1973 authorized the cold-blooded execution of the American ambassador in Khartoum, has been invited by the president to the White House more times than any other leader in the world.

Clinton's reward? First, Arafat humiliated him at Camp David. Then he started a war which has brought out anti-American mobs in a dozen capitals, undoubtedly inspired the suicide attack on an American destroyer at port in Yemen, and threatens to bury American interests in a wider Middle East war.

The president's aides are not just surprised but confused. "In Paris last week, Mr. Arafat was opaque and then angry, storming out of a meeting and forcing Dr. Albright to run after him," writes the New York Times.

Opaque? Only to those laboring under the illusion that Arafat has the slightest commitment to the nonviolence he pledged in the 1993 Oslo accords. And the image of the secretary of state of the world's superpower running "awkwardly in heels" after the leader of a squalid police state to plead for peace would be comical were it not so appalling.

What does it take? At what point does one realize that Israel's concessions and withdrawals, far from satisfying its enemies, have, as in every appeasement, emboldened them?

For some dreamers, Arafat's starting a war when peace was offered him broke the spell. "If they can call their children to fight, there is no peace process," reasoned one disillusioned Israeli peace activist. "Maybe we're really at war and it's only us stupid jerks on the left who don't know it."

Lenin called them "useful idiots."
http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/krauthammer101600.asp

The Oslo Accords: From Madrid to the Second Intifada 
(What Happened To The Peace?)   (Background Article #5)

In brief:
The Oslo Accords were based around the concept that Israel would recognize the PLO and that the PLO would eschew violence against Israel. All issues such as Israeli settlements, Palestinian statehood, refugees, and Jerusalem were to be negotiated without precondition. A series of interim agreements attempted to move the process forward and give the Palestinians governing control over the areas in which the majority of their population lived. Although Israel withdrew from most of these areas, there has never been a concerted campaign by the Palestinian Authority to stop terror attacks and dismantle terrorist organizations. In addition, anti-Semitism and incitement against Jews continues to permeate Palestinian media and culture. The Oslo Era effectively ended when Yassir Arafat launched the second Intifada after rejecting Israeli proposals at Camp David. Though the end of 2005, 1,367 people have been killed by Palestinian terror attacks since the signing of Oslo.

In Detail: The following is based on palestinefacts.org.

On September 13, 1993 representatives of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) signed the "Declaration of Principles On Interim Self-Government Arrangements", a document also known as the "Oslo Accords". They were signed at a Washington ceremony hosted by US President Bill Clinton on September 13, 1993, during which Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin ended decades as sworn enemies with an uneasy handshake.

The Oslo Accords contain a set of mutually agreed-upon general principles regarding a five year interim period of Palestinian self-rule. So-called "permanent status issues" are deferred to later negotiations, to begin no later than the third year of the interim period. The permanent status negotiations were intended to lead to an agreement that would be implemented to take effect at the end of the interim period.

The main points of the Oslo Accords

Transfer of Powers to the Palestinians

An agreement in principle regarding a transfer of power and responsibilities to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, so they may have control over their own affairs. Israel complied with this provision so that over 90 percent of all Palestinians live in areas under the control of the Palestinian Authority.

The deferment of all permanent status issues, such as Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements and border.

An agreement that Israel will remain responsible for security along the international borders and the crossing points to Egypt and Jordan. Israel will also retain responsibility for and the overall security of Israelis in the West Bank and Gaza, the Israeli settlements in those areas, and freedom of movement on roads.

Arafat's Commitments

A letter on key issues of the PLO and Israel, addressed to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, was signed by Yasser Arafat on September 9, 1993. The letter says specifically that:
  • The PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security.
  • The PLO accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 (U.N. Resolution 338, adopted after the Yom Kippur War calls for all sides to implement 242)
  • The PLO commits itself to the Middle East peace process... all outstanding issues ... will be resolved through negotiations
  • ... the PLO renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators
  • ... the PLO undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist.
Despite these pledges, Arafat not only did nothing to curtail the activities of terror groups, but he openly incited Palestinians to attack Israeli targets. In fact, Arafat's government was directly implicated in the financial support of terror activities.

Sources:
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements
UN Resolution 338

http://www.honestreporting.com/a/treaties.asp

 The Oslo Accords are analyzed also at http://www.mideastweb.org/oslofailed.htm
Email ItEmail It | Print ItPrint It | CommentsComments (0) | TrackbacksTrackbacks (0) | Flag as offensiveFlag as Offensive

Multiculturalism, Immigration and Liberal Tolerance: "Liberal tolerance was interpreted as respect not for the rights of individuals, but of groups, some of whom were themselves intolerant."

Dutch MPs back immigrant amnesty
By Geraldine Coughlan
BBC News, The Hague

Rally for amnesty outside Dutch parliament, 4 Nov 06
Protesters urged an amnesty for asylum seekers before the election
The newly-elected Dutch parliament has approved a motion demanding a general pardon for thousands of failed asylum seekers who arrived before 2001.

The vote is seen as a reprimand to the outgoing centre-right government, which had ordered them to be expelled.

It is a sign of the shift in Dutch politics from the right to the centre.

Political parties in the Netherlands are still trying to form a governing coalition, after elections last week failed to produce an outright winner.

The slim majority - 75 in favour of a general pardon and 74 against - came in the parliament's first session since the 22 November general elections.

The outgoing government had ordered the expulsion of 26,000 rejected asylum seekers.

Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende's Christian Democrats won the most seats in the elections and he is expected to form a new government.

But his coalition with the Liberal Party does not have enough support for its tough immigration policies.

Immigration Minister Rita Verdonk said allowing rejected asylum seekers to stay would be an invitation for immigrants to come to the Netherlands.

The outgoing cabinet faces an unusual political dilemma. If the right-wing immigration minister snubs the motion for an amnesty she could face a no-confidence motion from the left.



http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6198320.stm



Dutch Muslims seek a fresh start
By Sam Wilson
BBC News, Amsterdam

Mohammed Farjani
Mohammed Farjani is proud of his integration into Dutch society
Mohammed Farjani says that since his arrival in the Netherlands 38 years ago he has wanted nothing more than to be integrated.

Living among many other Moroccan immigrants in Slotervaart, Amsterdam, he became concerned that the groups of dark-skinned youths sometimes congregating on street corners would intimidate native Dutch.

"We created an association to work for children in order to help them be like Dutch children, not different," he says.

He and other members of his group, the Buurtvaders (neighbourhood fathers), would patrol the streets, trying to persuade the boys to go to school or back to their homes at night.

His organisation has been copied in other Dutch cities, and has been held up as a model of good citizenship.

Mr Farjani proudly shows off photos of himself hosting the mayor of Amsterdam and accepting a European Union award.

Racism is a big problem here in Amsterdam. Ten or 15 years ago the city was tolerant, but not any more
Hassan
Moroccan-born taxi driver
The Buurtvaders have arranged a meeting ahead of Wednesday's general election for local people to put questions to local candidates.

The room is full of Moroccan men, many of them elderly. The only two women are from the political organisations. Much of the meeting is conducted in Moroccan Arabic.

It seems clear that while many of these men want to be active members of Dutch society, they are still very much a Moroccan community. They are examples of both integration and multiculturalism.

Strict regime

In the Netherlands - where about 10% of the population has "non-Western" roots - some see this as a contradiction, as in many parts of Western Europe.

Murdered film-maker Theo van Gogh (left) and ex-Dutch MP Ayaan Hirsi Ali
Theo van Gogh (left) and Ayaan Hirsi Ali provoked controversy
The argument is also raging within the ethnic minority communities.

Tensions over integration came to a head with the case of Ayaan Hirsi Ali, the Somali-born Muslim-turned-atheist MP, who advocated a hard line to bring Muslim communities into line with Dutch norms.

Those views earned her death threats from Islamists, and she eventually left parliament and the country after it was discovered she had immigrated under false pretences.

Since film-maker Theo van Gogh was murdered by a Dutch-born Islamist extremist in 2004, there has been a political drive to replace the Netherlands' traditional multiculturalism with integrationist policies, and to stop fresh immigration in its tracks.

"We have been much stricter than previous governments," says Hans Van Baalen, an MP for the VVD (Liberal) Party. It is the second party in the governing coalition and has initiated the new hard line.

He cites the introduction of language tests for newcomers and for those applying for citizenship, and age limits and wealth checks on brides being brought into the country from Turkey and Morocco - what he calls "a fresh wave of unintegrated people".

He fully backs the cabinet's announcement last week that the government intends to ban Muslim women from wearing the all-over covering, the burqa.

"Everyone should be able to be identified," he says.

"But perhaps more importantly, the burqa makes it impossible to really communicate - it's contrary to the idea of an open society."

Alienation

They are views reflected by Irma, the native Dutch manager of a fitness club near the Buurtvaders' hall, who believes the Muslim headscarf is OK, but not the burqa.

PvdA candidate Ahmed Larouz
There is alienation because the discussion we have is all the time talking about Islam, so of course Muslims are targeted
Ahmed Larouz
PvdA candidate
"I have to show my face when I get on a bus, so should they - it's an issue of security," she says.

Hassan, a Moroccan-born taxi driver, says the burqa is "too much - we don't live in the mountains".

Hassan adds: "But that's not the problem [for ethnic-minority Muslims]. The problem is you finish schools and can't get jobs.

"Racism is a big problem here in Amsterdam. Ten or 15 years ago the city was tolerant, but not any more."

One of the candidates campaigning in Slotervaart, PvdA (Labour) Party hopeful Ahmed Larouz, also believes the burqa issue is a distraction. (The number who actually wear it in the Netherlands is thought to be in the dozens.)

His concern, he says, is people's willingness to make such matters hugely divisive, and the feeling this engenders among ethnic minorities.

"Of course there is alienation - because the discussion we have is all the time talking about Islam, so of course Muslims are targeted.

"If we talk about crime we always focus on the religion, which is Islam, or the ethnicity, which is Moroccan, or Turkish, rather than on the social problem that we have to solve.

"When Theo van Gogh was killed, one of the [VVD] ministers said 'there is a war now' - between who? 'Between Muslims and non-Muslims' - and that's the wrong dialogue."

Common ground?

Mr Larouz, a 35-year-old in a smart suit and car, arrived from Morocco 17 years ago and became a high-flying businessman. He started a group, Towards a New Start, which aims to unite Muslim businessmen and provide an example to that community, and is now running for parliament.

Women wearing burqas
The governing coalition approved a burqa ban last week
He is relentlessly positive, but he has a problem, and he knows it.

Some people do not know his story. They know the one about Mohammed Bouyeri - the killer of Theo van Gogh - about the burqa, and about the large numbers of Moroccans and Turks in the country's jails.

AW Symons, another taxi driver, has clear views on the matter.

"They come here and they don't mingle, they don't learn the language and so they don't get good jobs," he says of Muslim immigrants.

"They don't make the effort."

"It will never work, because our values and Muslim values have nothing in common."
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6169398.stm


 A Year of Living Dangerously
Remember Theo van Gogh, and shudder for the future.

BY FRANCIS FUKUYAMA
Wednesday, November 2, 2005 12:01 a.m. EST

One year ago today, the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh had his throat ritually slit by Mohamed Bouyeri, a Muslim born in Holland who spoke fluent Dutch. This event has totally transformed Dutch politics, leading to stepped-up police controls that have now virtually shut off new immigration there. Together with the July 7 bombings in London (also perpetrated by second generation Muslims who were British citizens), this event should also change dramatically our view of the nature of the threat from radical Islamism.

We have tended to see jihadist terrorism as something produced in dysfunctional parts of the world, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan or the Middle East, and exported to Western countries. Protecting ourselves is a matter either of walling ourselves off, or, for the Bush administration, going "over there" and trying to fix the problem at its source by promoting democracy.

There is good reason for thinking, however, that a critical source of contemporary radical Islamism lies not in the Middle East, but in Western Europe. In addition to Bouyeri and the London bombers, the March 11 Madrid bombers and ringleaders of the September 11 attacks such as Mohamed Atta were radicalized in Europe. In the Netherlands, where upwards of 6% of the population is Muslim, there is plenty of radicalism despite the fact that Holland is both modern and democratic. And there exists no option for walling the Netherlands off from this problem.

We profoundly misunderstand contemporary Islamist ideology when we see it as an assertion of traditional Muslim values or culture. In a traditional Muslim country, your religious identity is not a matter of choice; you receive it, along with your social status, customs and habits, even your future marriage partner, from your social environment. In such a society there is no confusion as to who you are, since your identity is given to you and sanctioned by all of the society's institutions, from the family to the mosque to the state.

The same is not true for a Muslim who lives as an immigrant in a suburb of Amsterdam or Paris. All of a sudden, your identity is up for grabs; you have seemingly infinite choices in deciding how far you want to try to integrate into the surrounding, non-Muslim society. In his book "Globalized Islam" (2004), the French scholar Olivier Roy argues persuasively that contemporary radicalism is precisely the product of the "deterritorialization" of Islam, which strips Muslim identity of all of the social supports it receives in a traditional Muslim society.

The identity problem is particularly severe for second- and third-generation children of immigrants. They grow up outside the traditional culture of their parents, but unlike most newcomers to the United States, few feel truly accepted by the surrounding society.

Contemporary Europeans downplay national identity in favor of an open, tolerant, "post-national" Europeanness. But the Dutch, Germans, French and others all retain a strong sense of their national identity, and, to differing degrees, it is one that is not accessible to people coming from Turkey, Morocco or Pakistan. Integration is further inhibited by the fact that rigid European labor laws have made low-skill jobs hard to find for recent immigrants or their children. A significant proportion of immigrants are on welfare, meaning that they do not have the dignity of contributing through their labor to the surrounding society. They and their children understand themselves as outsiders.

It is in this context that someone like Osama bin Laden appears, offering young converts a universalistic, pure version of Islam that has been stripped of its local saints, customs and traditions. Radical Islamism tells them exactly who they are--respected members of a global Muslim umma to which they can belong despite their lives in lands of unbelief. Religion is no longer supported, as in a true Muslim society, through conformity to a host of external social customs and observances; rather it is more a question of inward belief. Hence Mr. Roy's comparison of modern Islamism to the Protestant Reformation, which similarly turned religion inward and stripped it of its external rituals and social supports.

If this is in fact an accurate description of an important source of radicalism, several conclusions follow. First, the challenge that Islamism represents is not a strange and unfamiliar one. Rapid transition to modernity has long spawned radicalization; we have seen the exact same forms of alienation among those young people who in earlier generations became anarchists, Bolsheviks, fascists or members of the Bader-Meinhof gang. The ideology changes but the underlying psychology does not.

Further, radical Islamism is as much a product of modernization and globalization as it is a religious phenomenon; it would not be nearly as intense if Muslims could not travel, surf the Web, or become otherwise disconnected from their culture. This means that "fixing" the Middle East by bringing modernization and democracy to countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia will not solve the terrorism problem, but may in the short run make the problem worse. Democracy and modernization in the Muslim world are desirable for their own sake, but we will continue to have a big problem with terrorism in Europe regardless of what happens there.

The real challenge for democracy lies in Europe, where the problem is an internal one of integrating large numbers of angry young Muslims and doing so in a way that does not provoke an even angrier backlash from right-wing populists. Two things need to happen: First, countries like Holland and Britain need to reverse the counterproductive multiculturalist policies that sheltered radicalism, and crack down on extremists. But second, they also need to reformulate their definitions of national identity to be more accepting of people from non-Western backgrounds.

The first has already begun to happen. In recent months, both the Dutch and British have in fact come to an overdue recognition that the old version of multiculturalism they formerly practiced was dangerous and counterproductive. Liberal tolerance was interpreted as respect not for the rights of individuals, but of groups, some of whom were themselves intolerant (by, for example, dictating whom their daughters could befriend or marry). Out of a misplaced sense of respect for other cultures, Muslims minorities were left to regulate their own behavior, an attitude which dovetailed with a traditional European corporatist approaches to social organization. In Holland, where the state supports separate Catholic, Protestant and socialist schools, it was easy enough to add a Muslim "pillar" that quickly turned into a ghetto disconnected from the surrounding society.

New policies to reduce the separateness of the Muslim community, like laws discouraging the importation of brides from the Middle East, have been put in place in the Netherlands. The Dutch and British police have been given new powers to monitor, detain and expel inflammatory clerics. But the much more difficult problem remains of fashioning a national identity that will connect citizens of all religions and ethnicities in a common democratic culture, as the American creed has served to unite new immigrants to the United States.

Since van Gogh's murder, the Dutch have embarked on a vigorous and often impolitic debate on what it means to be Dutch, with some demanding of immigrants not just an ability to speak Dutch, but a detailed knowledge of Dutch history and culture that many Dutch people do not have themselves. But national identity has to be a source of inclusion, not exclusion; nor can it be based, contrary to the assertion of the gay Dutch politician Pym Fortuyn who was assassinated in 2003, on endless tolerance and valuelessness. The Dutch have at least broken through the stifling barrier of political correctness that has prevented most other European countries from even beginning a discussion of the interconnected issues of identity, culture and immigration. But getting the national identity question right is a delicate and elusive task.

Many Europeans assert that the American melting pot cannot be transported to European soil. Identity there remains rooted in blood, soil and ancient shared memory. This may be true, but if so, democracy in Europe will be in big trouble in the future as Muslims become an ever larger percentage of the population. And since Europe is today one of the main battlegrounds of the war on terrorism, this reality will matter for the rest of us as well.

Mr. Fukuyama is professor of international political economy at Johns Hopkins and chairman of the editorial board of The American Interest.

http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110007491

Email ItEmail It | Print ItPrint It | CommentsComments (0) | TrackbacksTrackbacks (0) | Flag as offensiveFlag as Offensive

Europe Must Find its Roots in America

 "What puzzles me is why the Americans, who are originally Europeans, are not infected by this mentality? When I read the book I get the impression that the cube for you is also a metaphor of Europe, while the cathedral, or the society with God still in a prominent place, can be seen as a metaphor of America. This is strange because the cube is the more modern building and the cathedral is a mediaeval building. So you might even argue that America is a more mediaeval culture than Europe."

 
George Weigel, : "Well, I did not intend it that way, because there are elements of the cube and the cathedral in both the United States and in Western Europe.

"Why has America not gone so far on this road? Because America was not founded against biblical religion. America was founded from biblical religion. America’s experience of democracy is democracy as the product of Christian culture. However, that is changing here too. If you read The New York Times and The Washington Post, the liberal media in general, or if you listen to Senate Democrats interrogating John Roberts for the Supreme Court you know that Europe is in America. The idea that the only public space safe for democracy, the only public space capable of civility, is a thorougly secularized public space, this idea is present in the United States as well. But it is not dominant in the United States."

"What has happened in Western Europe since 1968 is that secularization has been transformed from a sociological datum to an ideology. This ideology was most manifestly clear in the bizarre argument over whether the preamble to the European Constitutional Treaty should acknowledge the Christian roots of European civilization."

Paul Belien: "One can also see the book as a metaphor of what is nowadays called the “red” versus the “blue” America. The “red” stands for the conservative, faith centered American culture and the “blue” is basically the more “European” America. You focus your book on Europe and you say that what happens in Europe is the logical result of secularization. The subtitle is Europe, America, and Politics Without God, so is the book also a warning for Americans?     From : Europe, America, and Politics Without God     http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/359


Europe Must Find its Roots in America by Paul Belien


When the Emperor Romulus Augustulus was deposed in 476 the Roman Empire ceased to exist. The dark ages descended upon Europe. Christian civilisation in the West collapsed. The second christening began about one hundred years later from an area that had itself been christened by Roman missionaries but had geographically never been part of the Empire because it was situated across the sea, even more to the west than the Western outskirts of the Empire had been. From here the Saints Columba and Aidan and other holy men travelled east to bring the ancient heritage back to the lands where they had originally come from.

History never repeats itself, and yet similarities are often so striking that in a way there is nothing new under the sun. In the 17th and 18th centuries North America was colonised by freedom loving people who brought the political institutions and traditions from Europe to a new continent across the sea. Many of them had left Europe because they wanted the freedom to live according to their own conscience instead of the conscience of the centralist absolutist rulers of the new age that was sweeping across Europe from the 16th century onwards.

Their traditions were rooted in the decentralised traditions of the late Middle Ages and the Aristotelian philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas. Europe’s Middle Ages had been characterised by an absence of central power, while man was bound to multiple legal systems: the legal order of his city, that of the land, that of his guild, that of the church. There was not one monopolistic ruler, as in China or in the Muslim world, but many, which guaranteed greater freedom for the individual. The philosophy of Aquinas, moreover, was centered on the individual. God had called man to be free from sin, but in order to be free from sin he had to be virtuous, and in order for virtue to have any value it had to be voluntary, implying that the virtuous man had to be free in every aspect of his life including, as Aquinas’ followers later pointed out, his economic activities.

Hence the paradox came about that the civil society developing in the new continent was in a sense older than the new Modern Age of the absolutist monarchs governing Europe. When the Americans rebelled in 1776 they rebelled against absolutism in order to keep their old freedoms. Theirs was a conservative revolution. Europe had its own series of revolutions from 1789 onwards, but these were revolutions of a different sort. They toppled the ruling absolutists to replace them by absolutists of an even extremer form: totalitarians. These were not satisfied with controlling their subjects’ political and economic lives but also wished to control their minds and souls, i.e. to become their god.

The different historical evolution of Americans and Europeans has greatly influenced them. American society is a society whose culture and view of mankind resembles that of the old mediaeval Europe from which it organically evolved. It puts man before the state because it accepts that man should come to God as a free being. Europe, having lived through the perversions of the Modern Age, has absorbed much of the absolutist and totalitarian spirit. Though the state was rendered democratic in the second half of the 20th century – an event, moreover, that would not have been possible without American assistance – it has in fact developed into a totalitarian democracy. Europeans still tend to put the state before man, still see the government as a god (a benefactor who feeds and supports his people), while the real God – He who wants people to come to Him freely because otherwise their “choice” for Him is no choice at all – has almost totally disappeared from present-day European society.

Americans have never lost the vital understanding that freedom has to be indivisible in order that man may lead a virtuous life. Democracy and freedom of expression represent only the political and moral-cultural fields of life. There is a third important field of social life: economics. In this field the Americans have adopted a system that allows citizens the greatest possible economic freedom and severely restricts the power of the government. It is called capitalism, which to most Americans is something positive, while to most Europeans it appears deeply repulsive.

The strength of America's political system lies in the fact that ordinary Americans have never underestimated the supra-economic function of their economic liberty. One way or another, consciously or unconsciously, ordinary Americans have always felt economic liberty to be an indispensable guarantee of their democracy and freedom. Most ordinary West Europeans do not. In “welfare state” Europe, capitalism is a dirty word, as despicable as communism. Its euphemistic equivalent is “free-market liberalism.” But many West Europeans aren't even in favour of that. Economic freedom in Western Europe is severely restricted by a multitude of regulations and laws. Although these are designed to protect the citizen against risks, they discourage him from taking risks altogether and thwart his prosperity.

Hence Western Europe's economy stagnates while America’s keeps growing. This causes jealousy, which reinforces the political frustration Western Europe already has towards its Atlantic partner. Many Europeans compensate for their frustration by feeling culturally and morally superior to the Americans, whom they regard as backward. Though the Americans live in the so-called new continent, they represent the old, pre-modern Europe: They believe in God, they refuse to realise that the state can be a benevolent institution and subsequently distrust it. Large parts of the West European population consider Americans to be naive, simple, unsophisticated, even dumb – a nation without any real culture or significant history. Such views are held not only by ordinary West Europeans (who get their political education in state run schools and from state run and/or state controlled media), but also by many intellectuals who ought to know better.

Europe, however, is being overrun by barbarians. Its populations are dwindling, its welfare systems are collapsing and its old religion, Christianity, which the Europeans had cast aside, is being replaced by another one: Islam. If Europe is to be saved it must return to its old heritage which has survived in the land across the Ocean. We need to bring America’s values to Europe. These values are our own lost heritage. To survive as Europeans we have to become Americans. It is time to save ourselves by establishing a Society for American Values in Europe.

http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/32

Email ItEmail It | Print ItPrint It | CommentsComments (0) | TrackbacksTrackbacks (0) | Flag as offensiveFlag as Offensive

Politics Without God?: Reflections on Europe and America ( George Weigel Analysis)

What accounts for disturbing currents of irrationality in contemporary European politics? Why did one of every five Germans (and one-third of those under 30) believe that the United States was responsible for 9/11, while some 300,000 French men and women made a best seller out of L'Effroyable Imposture [The Appalling Fraud], in which the author, Thierry Meyssan, argued that the twin towers of the World Trade Center were destroyed by the U.S. military, using remote-controlled airliners?

Why did the voters of Spain give a de facto victory to appeasement in their March 2004 elections, held days after Al-Qaeda operatives killed hundreds and wounded thousands by bombing a Madrid train station?

Why is Europe retreating from democracy and binding itself ever tighter in the cords of bureaucracy? Why do European states find it virtually impossible to make hard domestic political decisions as on the length of the workweek or the funding of pensions? Why is Europe on the way to what French political philosopher Pierre Manent calls "depoliticization?" Why does Manent have "the impression today that the greatest ambition of Europeans is to become the inspectors of American prisons"?





Politics Without God?: Reflections on Europe and America  
by  GEORGE WEIGEL

At the far western end of the axis that traverses Paris from the Louvre down the Champs Elysées and through the Arc de Triomphe is the Great Arch of La Défense. Designed by a sternly modernist Danish architect, the Great Arch is a colossal open cube: almost 40 stories tall, faced in glass and 2.47 acres of white Carrara marble.

Notre-Dame Cathedral

Great Arch of La Défense

Its rooftop terrace offers an unparalleled view of the French capital, past the Tuilleries to the Ile de la Cité, Sante Chapelle, and Notre-Dame.

The arch's three-story high roof also houses the International Foundation for Human Rights. For President François Mitterrand planned the Great Arch as a human rights monument, something suitably gigantic to mark the bicentenary of the French Revolution and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. Thus, in one guidebook, the Great Arch was dubbed "Fraternity Arch." That same guidebook, like every other one I consulted, emphasized that the entire Cathedral of Notre-Dame would fit comfortably inside the Great Arch.

All of which raised some questions, as I walked along that terrace in 1997. Which culture would better protect human rights and secure the moral foundations of democracy? The culture that built this rational, geometrically precise, but essentially featureless cube? Or the culture that produced the gargoyles and flying buttresses, the asymmetries and holy "unsameness" of Notre-Dame and the other great Gothic cathedrals of Europe?

Those questions have come back to me, if in different forms, as I've tried to understand Europe in recent years. How, for example, should one understand the fierce argument in Europe over whether a new constitutional treaty for the European Union should include a reference to the Christian sources of European civilization? Why did so many European intellectuals and political leaders deem any reference to the Christian sources of contemporary Europe civilization a threat to human rights and democracy?

Was there some connection between this internal European debate over Europe's constitution-making and the portrait in the European press of Americans (and especially an American president) as religious fanatics intent on shooting up the world? Was there a further connection between this debate and the fate of Rocco Buttiglione's candidacy for the post of Commissioner of Justice on the European Commission?

Understanding these phenomena requires something more than a conventional political analysis. Nor can political answers explain the reasons behind perhaps the most urgent issue confronting Europe today the fact that Western Europe is committing demographic suicide, its far-below-replacement-level birthrates creating enormous pressures on the European welfare state and a demographic vacuum into which Islamic immigrants are flowing in increasing numbers, often becoming radicalized in the process.

My proposal is that Europe is experiencing a crisis of cultural and civilizational morale whose roots are also taking hold in some parts quarters of American society and culture. Understanding and addressing this crisis means confronting the question posed sharply, if unintentionally, by those guidebooks that boast about the alleged superiority of the Great Arch to Notre-Dame: the question of the cube and the cathedral, and their relationship to both the meaning of freedom and the future of democracy.

To suggest that Europe is living through a "crisis of civilizational morale" is a very broad description. Let me raise some specific issues that point toward that conclusion and to the necessity of a cultural, indeed theological, analysis of Europe's situation today.
Why, in the aftermath of 1989, did Europeans fail to condemn communism as a moral and political monstrosity? Why was the only politically acceptable judgment on communism the rather banal observation that it "didn't work"?

Why, as historian John Keegan puts it, do Europeans often espouse "a philosophy of international action that actually rejected action and took refuge in the belief that all conflicts of interest were to be settled by consultation, conciliation, and the intervention of international agencies"?

What accounts for disturbing currents of irrationality in contemporary European politics? Why did one of every five Germans (and one-third of those under 30) believe that the United States was responsible for 9/11, while some 300,000 French men and women made a best seller out of L'Effroyable Imposture [The Appalling Fraud], in which the author, Thierry Meyssan, argued that the twin towers of the World Trade Center were destroyed by the U.S. military, using remote-controlled airliners?

Why did the voters of Spain give a de facto victory to appeasement in their March 2004 elections, held days after Al-Qaeda operatives killed hundreds and wounded thousands by bombing a Madrid train station?

Why is Europe retreating from democracy and binding itself ever tighter in the cords of bureaucracy? Why do European states find it virtually impossible to make hard domestic political decisions as on the length of the workweek or the funding of pensions? Why is Europe on the way to what French political philosopher Pierre Manent calls "depoliticization?" Why does Manent have "the impression today that the greatest ambition of Europeans is to become the inspectors of American prisons"?

Why are so many European public intellectuals "Christophobic," as international legal scholar J.H.H. Weiler (himself an observant Jew) puts it? Why is European high culture so contemptuous of both religious and secular tradition, as French philosopher Rémi Brague has pointed out?

Why do certain parts of Europe exhibit a curious, even bizarre, approach to death? Why did so many of the French prefer to continue their summer vacations during the European heat wave of 2003, leaving their parents unburied and warehoused in refrigerated lockers? Why is death increasingly anonymous in Germany, with no death notice in the newspapers, no church funeral ceremony, no secular memorial service "as though," as Richard John Neuhaus observed, "the deceased did not exist"?

Above all, why is Europe committing demographic suicide, systematically depopulating itself in what British historian Niall Ferguson calls the greatest "sustained reduction in European population since the Black Death of the 14th century"?

Why do 18 European countries report "negative natural increase" (i.e., more deaths than births)?

Why does no Western European country have a replacement-level birthrate?

Why is Germany likely to lose the equivalent of the population of the former East Germany in the first half of the 21st century?

Why will Spain's population decline from 40 million to 31 million by 2050?

Why will 42% of Italians be over 60 by 2050 at which point, on present trends, almost 60% of the Italian people will have no brothers, sisters, cousins, aunts, or uncles?

What is happening when an entire continent, wealthier and healthier than ever before, declines to create the human future in the most elemental sense, by creating a next generation? ...
Probing to the deeper roots of Europe's crisis of civilizational morale is important for understanding Europe today and for discerning whatever promising paths of European renewal there may be. Getting at the roots of "Europe's problem" is also important for understanding a set of problems Americans may face in the not-too-distant future. And that means that both Europeans and Americans must learn to think in new ways about the dynamics of history.

During 13 years of research and teaching in east central Europe, I've been impressed by what might be called the Slavic view of history. You can find it in a great thinker who lived in the borderland between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, Vladimir Soloviev, who challenged the fashionable nihilism and materialism of the late 19th century.

You can find it in 19th-century Polish novelists, poets and playwrights, who, breaking with the Jacobin conviction that "revolution" meant a complete rupture with the past, insisted that genuine "revolution" meant the recovery of lost spiritual and moral values. You can find it in such intellectual leaders of the anti-communist resistance in east central Europe as Karol Wojtyla, Václav Havel and Václav Benda, who all argued that "living in the truth" could change what seemed unchangeable in history.


..."history" is driven by culture by what men and women honor, cherish, and worship; by what societies deem to be true and good and noble; by the expressions they give to those convictions in language, literature and the arts; by what individuals and societies are willing to stake their lives on.


The common thread among these disparate thinkers is the conviction that the deepest currents of "history" are spiritual and cultural, rather than political and economic. "History" is not simply the byproduct of the contest for power in the world although power plays an important role in history. And "history" is certainly not the exhaust fumes produced by the means of production, as the Marxists taught.

Rather, "history" is driven by culture by what men and women honor, cherish, and worship; by what societies deem to be true and good and noble; by the expressions they give to those convictions in language, literature and the arts; by what individuals and societies are willing to stake their lives on.

Poland is one embodiment of this way of thinking, which Poles believe has been vindicated empirically by their own modern history. For 123 years, from 1795 to 1918, the Polish state was erased from Europe. Yet during that century and a quarter the Polish nation survived with such vigor that it could give birth to a new Polish state in 1918. And despite the fact that the revived Polish state was then beset for 50 years by the plagues of Nazism and communism, the Polish nation proved strong enough to give a new birth of freedom to east central Europe in the Revolution of 1989.

How did this happen? Poland survived better, Poland prevailed because of culture: a culture formed by a distinctive language, by a unique literature, and by an intense Catholic faith (which, an its noblest and deepest expressions, was ecumenical and tolerant, not xenophobic, as so many stereotypes have it). Poles know in their bones that culture is what drives history over the long haul.

This "Slavic view of history" is really a classically Christian way of thinking about history, whose roots can be traced back at least as far as St. Augustine and The City of God. Yet, it is the Slavs who have been, in our time, the most powerful exponents of this "culture-first" understanding of the dynamics of the world's story. ...

World War I, the Great War, was the product of a crisis of civilizational morality, a failure of moral reason in a culture that had given the world the very concept of "moral reason." That crisis of moral reason led to a crisis of civilizational morale that is much with us today.

This latter crisis has only become visible since the end of the Cold War. Its effects were first masked by the illusory peace between World War I and World War II; then by the rise of totalitarianism and the Great Depression; then by World War II itself; and then by the Cold War. It was only after 1991, when the 77-year-long political-military crisis that began in 1914 had ended, that the long-term effects of Europe's "rage of self-mutilation" could come to the surface of history and be seen for what they were and for what they are.

The damage done to the fabric of European culture and civilization in the Great War could only been seen clearly when the Great War's political effects had been cleared from the board in 1991. Recognizing that damage for what it is brings into sharper focus the contemporary European cultural and political situation and its lessons for the United States.

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's insight into the meaning of the Great War reinforces the intuition that we should look to the realm of culture for a deeper explanation of the currents of history. So let us take a first step in reading history the old-fashioned way St. Augustine's way through lenses ground by the tools of theology. And that brings us to another Christian analyst of modern European history.

Henri de Lubac was one of 20th-century Catholicism's most distinguished theologians. Like other Europeans who had witnessed the Continent's travail during the first four and a half decades of the century, Father de Lubac was haunted by the question, "What happened?" Or, perhaps more to the point, "Why had what happened, happened?"

Henri de Lubac
(1896-1991)

Father de Lubac was fascinated by the history of ideas, which he knew to be fraught with "real world" consequences. Thus, during the early 1940s, he turned his attention to some of the most influential intellectual figures in pre-20th century European culture. The result was a book, The Drama of Atheistic Humanism [Le Drame de l'humanisme athée], which argued that the civilizational crisis in which Europe found itself during World War II was the product of a deliberate rejection of the God of the Bible in the name of authentic human liberation.

This, de Lubac suggested, was a great reversal. In the classical world, the gods, or Fate, played games with men and women, often with lethal consequences. In the face of these experiences, the revelation of the God of the Bible the self-disclosure in history of the one God who was neither a willful tyrant (to be avoided) nor a carnivorous predator (to be appeased) nor a remote abstraction (to be safely ignored) was perceived as a great liberation. Human beings were neither the playthings of the gods nor the passive victims of Fate. Because they could have access to the one true God through prayer and worship, those who believed in the God of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and Jesus could bend history in a humane direction. History was thus an arena of responsibility and purpose.

Yet what biblical man had perceived as liberation, the proponents of atheistic humanism perceived as bondage. Human freedom could not co-exist with the God of Jews and Christians. Human greatness required rejecting the biblical God, according to atheistic humanism.

This, Father de Lubac argued, was something new. This was not the atheism of skeptical individuals. This was atheistic humanism atheism with a developed ideology and a program for remaking the world. As a historian of ideas, de Lubac knew that bad ideas can have lethal consequences. At the heart of the darkness inside the great mid-20th century tyrannies [of] communism, fascism, Nazism, Father de Lubac discerned the lethal effects of the marriage between modern technology and the ideas borne by atheistic humanism.

He summed up the results of this misbegotten union in these terms: "It is not true, as is sometimes said, that man cannot organize the world without God. What is true is that, without God, he can only organize it against man." That is what the tyrannies of the mid-20th century had proven ultramundane humanism is inevitably inhuman humanism. And inhuman humanism cannot neither sustain nor defend the democratic project. It can only undermine it or attack it. ...

The argument over acknowledging any Christian contribution to the democratic civilization of the 21st century may have clarified the understandings of "democracy" and "human rights" that shape contemporary European high culture and the political elite in the Brussels-Paris-Berlin axis, but it also raised serious questions about Europe's capacity to defend its democracy, morally and philosophically.

If democratic institutions and procedures are the expressions of a distinctive way of life based on specific moral commitments, then democratic citizenship must be more than a matter of following the procedures and abiding by the laws and regulations agreed upon by the institutions. A democratic citizen is someone who can give an account of his or her commitment to human rights, to the rule of law and equality before the law, to decision-making by the majority and protection of the rights of minorities. Democratic citizenship means being able to tell why one affirms "the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, democracy, equality, freedom and the rule of law," to cite the preamble to the European constitution. Who can give such an account?

Here is one of the richest ironies involved in the question of the cube and the cathedral. The original charge against Christians in the Roman empire was that they were "atheists": people who were "a-theos," people who had abandoned the gods of Rome and who were thus a threat to public life and public order. To be a-theos was to stand outside and over-against the political community.

The "Christophobia" of contemporary European high culture turns this indictment inside out and upside down: Christianity cannot be acknowledged as a source of European democracy because the only public space safe for pluralism, tolerance, civility, and democracy is a public space that is thoroughly a-theos.

It is all very strange. For the truth of the matter is that European Christians can likely give a more compelling account of their commitment to democratic values than their fellow Europeans who are a-theos who believe that "neutrality toward worldviews" must characterize democratic Europe. A postmodern or neo-Kantian "neutrality toward worldviews" cannot be truly tolerant; it can only be indifferent.

Absent convictions, there is no tolerance; there is only indifference. Absent some compelling notion of the truth that requires us to be tolerant of those who have a different understanding of the truth, there is only skepticism and relativism. And skepticism and relativism are very weak foundations on which to build and sustain a pluralistic democracy, for neither skepticism nor relativism, by their own logic, can "give an account" of why we should be tolerant and civil.



It is all very strange. For the truth of the matter is that European Christians can likely give a more compelling account of their commitment to democratic values than their fellow Europeans who are a-theos who believe that "neutrality toward worldviews" must characterize democratic Europe. A postmodern or neo-Kantian "neutrality toward worldviews" cannot be truly tolerant; it can only be indifferent.


In contrast to this thin account of tolerance we should be tolerant because it works better there is the argument for tolerance given by Pope John Paul II in his 1989 encyclical letter on Christian mission, Redemptoris Missio [The Mission of the Redeemer]. There the Pope taught that "The Church proposes; she imposes nothing." The Catholic Church respects the "other" as an "other" who is also a seeker of truth and goodness; the Church only asks that the believer and the "other" enter into a dialogue that leads to mutual enrichment rather than to a deeper skepticism about the possibility of grasping the truth of things.

The Catholic Church believes it to be the will of God that Christians be tolerant of those who have a different view of God's will, or no view of God's will. Thus Catholics (and other Christians who share this conviction) can "give an account" of their defense of the "other's" freedom, even if the "other," skeptical and relativist, finds it hard to "give an account" of the freedom of the Christian. That the Church did not always behave according to these convictions is obvious from history.

The point today is that the Church recognizes, publicly, that acts of coercion undertaken in its name were offenses against its own true doctrine. That is why, on March 12, 2000, Pope John Paul II led a "Day of Pardon" at St. Peter's Basilica. This was not an exercise in Catholic political correctness, nor was this pandering to approved victim groups. This was confession: an acknowledgment of sin and a plea for divine mercy that recommitted the Church to live the truth it professed about the freedom of the human person.

A community capable of such acts the community of the cathedral, if you will is a community capable of learning from the past, capable of a reformed life. A community capable of such acts of public repentance is a community that can give a compelling account of its commitments to freedom.

Can others? Can those who are a-theos can the people of the cube grapple with the dark passages on European history caused by radically secularist understandings of the human person, human community, and human destiny: the Reign of Terror, Nazism, and communism?

These concerns are not, let me repeat, the products of American Euro-phobia, nor are they the result of the sharp division between much of Europe and the United States over the Iraq War. Indeed, there is nothing very original in my reading of Europe's current condition: You can find the same points of concern in John Paul II's 2003 apostolic exhortation, Ecclesia in Europa. There, the Pope suggests that, within Europe itself, there is an intuition that a "Europe" of political, legal and economic structures alone is insufficient. Like John Paul II, thoughtful Europeans are asking whether a "Europe" that represents the continentwide triumph of bureaucratic regulation is all that might be hoped for.

The debate over the invocatio Dei in the new European constitution was also the present and the future, not just the past. Those who insisted that there be no overt recognition that Christianity played a decisive role in the formation of European civilization did not do so in the name of "tolerance," despite their claims to the contrary. They did so because they are committed to the proposition that there can be politics-without-God: that a Europe free, tolerant, civil, and pluralistic can only be built as a public space from which the God of the Bible has been excluded.

That this position is shared by more than a few American political, judicial, intellectual, and cultural leaders is obvious, and suggests that what has been unfolding in Europe in recent decades indeed, over the past two centuries could well be replicated in the United States (as it is already being replicated in Canada). To repeat, that is why "Europe's problem" is, from an American point of view, "our" problem, too.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

George Weigel. "Politics Without God?: Reflections on Europe and America." Zenit (December 24, 2004).

Above are excerpts from an address given by George Weigel at the Gregorian University in December.

THE AUTHOR

George Weigel, a Senior Fellow of the Ethics and Public Policy Center, is a Roman Catholic theologian and one of America's leading commentators on issues of religion and public life. Weigel is the author or editor of sixteen books, including The Cube and the Cathedral: Europe, America, and Politics Without God (2005), Letters to a Young Catholic: The Art of Mentoring (2004), The Courage to Be Catholic: Crisis, Reform, and the Future of the Church (2002), and The Truth of Catholicism: Ten Controversies Explored (2001). Copyright © 2005 George Weigel


Anti-Jihad Manifesto Misses the Point  (Background Article)



Preface:

Today twelve international authors, most of them (former) Muslims, such as Salman Rushdie and Ayaan Hirsi Ali, but also a couple of “French philosophers,” published a manifesto in the French satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo. An English version of the manifesto “Together facing the new totalitarianism” was posted yesterday evening on the website of the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten.


After having overcome fascism, Nazism, and Stalinism, the world now faces a new totalitarian global threat: Islamism. We, writers, journalists, intellectuals, call for resistance to religious totalitarianism and for the promotion of freedom, equal opportunity and secular values for all.

The recent events, which occurred after the publication of drawings of Muhammed in European newspapers, have revealed the necessity of the struggle for these universal values. This struggle will not be won by arms, but in the ideological field. It is not a clash of civilisations nor an antagonism of West and East that we are witnessing, but a global struggle that confronts democrats and theocrats.

The above paragraphs clearly display the manifesto’s defects. While Islamism can be considered the perversion of religion, the three scourges of the 20th century – Fascism, Nazism (National-Socialism) and Stalinism – were secular ideologies. Neither Adolf Hitler nor Joseph Stalin were theocrats. It takes “French intellectuals” to use mankind’s experience with National-Socialism and Stalinism as motivation for a rallying cry to oppose “religious totalitarianism” and a call for “secular values,” which they hold to be “universal values.”

There is no doubt that Islamism is a threat to freedom and human dignity. However, as we have warned before, some people – undoubtedly brave, but nevertheless mistaken – are prepared to destroy certain basic freedoms, such as freedom of education, in their fight against Islam and religion in general. The question has already been put here:

Is Islam dangerous because it is a religion? Do Muslim values differ from European values because the latter are rooted in Christianity or because they are secular? These questions are at the heart of the debate in Europe today.

In our opinion, man is a religious being. Secularism destroyed the Christian roots of Europe and, in doing so, created the religious vacuum that is now being filled by Islam. The manifesto warns against

battalions destined to impose a liberticidal and unegalitarian world. […] We must assure universal rights to oppressed or discriminated people.”

History in the past century, however, has clearly indicated that those fighting for an “egalitarian” world were the most “liberticidal” of all. Freedom is the right to live “unegalitarianly.” This is why The Brussels Journal defends the right of individuals – though not of the state – to “discriminate” (which, by the way, contrary to what the manifesto implies, is not the same as “oppress”). Indeed, it is no coincidence that the manifesto avoids referring to “Socialism” (and even “Communism”) among the scourges of the past century and prefers to speak of “Nazism” and Stalinism” instead. Half the manifesto’s signatories are probably Socialists, which explains why the manifesto obfuscates the secular, Socialist roots of these scourges.

While in America a cultural war is going on between “blue” (liberal) and “red” (conservative), the cultural war in Europe is a three-way war between the European equivalent of the American “blue” (socialist), the European equivalent of the American “red” (conservative, though Europeans often use the term “liberal”) and Muslims. I prefer to refer to the first group as “secularist” (although I realise this is a generalization and many Christians belong to these “secularists,” including – unfortunately – most of our bishops and priests) and to the second group as “Christian” (although many agnostics belong to it). The reason why I make this distinction is because the second group is prepared to acknowledge the importance of the cultural traditions of the West, rooted in the Judeo-Christian values without which classical-liberalism could never have evolved.

I cannot state this any better than Dr. Jos Verhulst, in his contribution to our Dutch-language section yesterday:

The great public secret behind the whole issue of the Danish cartoons is the following. Nowhere does the core text of the New Testament argue for censorship. There is not a single instance where the New Testament states that a non-Christian should be persecuted for his convictions or statements. With regard to those with whom it is not possible for Christians to co-exist, Christ simply preached secession: “And whosoever shall not receive you, nor hear your words, when ye depart out of that house or city, shake off the dust of your feet.” (Matthew, 10:14). On the other hand, Christ did not allow himself to be censored: He said what He had to say, He “insulted” and “offended” the pharisees, and for this He was persecuted and finally murdered. The core text of Islam is different. It explicitly calls for the persecution and submission through violence of all who hold other beliefs.

It is true that throughout history there have been Christians and Christian churches who, in contradiction with the Christian core text, have engaged in persecution and censorship, and that there have been Muslims who have pleaded for freedom of expression and thought. Even today there are instances where the Vatican calls for censorship (see the Osservatore Romano of 5 February) while Dyab Abu Jahjah calls for freedom. But the dynamics of the core texts that have shaped both civilisations through the centuries, are diametrically opposed. Freedom lovers had the support of the one core text but not of the other.

In the West the general development, against all the authorities, through all the turmoil and in spite of all the regressions, has continued to be towards increasing individualism, freedom of thought, development of science, abolition of slavery and the blossoming of the ideals of equal rights, democracy and radically free speech. The world of Islam, on the contrary, developed into a “close society” where the individual submits to the community.

And now he stands at the dawn of the 21st century: the maligned individual, unsteady on his own feet after executing the inner breach with every form of imposed authority, uncertain, blinking in the brightness of the only god he is willing to recognise – Truth itself, stretching out before him unfathomably deep – full of doubt but aware that he, called to non-submission, must seek the road to the transcendent, carrying as his only property, his most valuable heirloom from his turbulent past, that one gold piece that means the utmost to him, his precious ideal of complete freedom of thought, of speech and of scientific inquiry. That is the unique advance that he received to help him in his long and difficult quest.

Meanwhile he is being beleaguered and threatened on all sides; from out of the darkness voices call him to submit and retreat; they shout that the gold in his hands is worthless, while the brightness ahead of him still makes it almost impossible for him te see what lies in store. In short: what this contemporary individual needs most of all is courage, great courage. And the will to be free and to see, which is tantamount to the will to live.

This, in our humble opinion, is a far more appropriate “manifesto” than the one published in Charlie Hebdo today. The battle that is being waged today is a battle between those who defend the right of individuals against the right of collectivities.

The Islamists and the secularists (including the priests and bishops among them) have more in common than the Islamists and the Christians (including the agnostics among them), because the latter acknowledge that at the heart of Christianity is the individual with his individual responsibility before God. Without Christianity, individual responsibility would not have become the centre of European civilization. It was the French Revolution that jeopardized this tradition and that became the root of collectivism, with its socialist, fascist, national-socialist and communist excesses. From this perspective even Jihadism is more a child of secularism than of religion.

Preface to Article:

Today twelve international authors, most of them (former) Muslims, such as Salman Rushdie and Ayaan Hirsi Ali, but also a couple of “French philosophers,” published a manifesto in the French satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo. An English version of the manifesto “Together facing the new totalitarianism” was posted yesterday evening on the website of the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten.

Anti-Jihad Manifesto Misses the Point 
 
http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/869

Email ItEmail It | Print ItPrint It | CommentsComments (0) | TrackbacksTrackbacks (0) | Flag as offensiveFlag as Offensive

Terrorism In Europe: How Far Should Liberal Societies Tolerate The Intolerant? (Even Brigitte Bardot Opines On The Issue)

Europeans ponder how the tolerant can best deal with the intolerant"

Islamic terrorism in Europe
After Van Gogh

Nov 11th 2004 | AMSTERDAM, BERLIN, BRUSSELS AND PARIS
From The Economist print edition

Hollandse Hoogte

“THE jihad has come to the Netherlands.” That was the verdict of Jozias van Aartsen, parliamentary leader of the power-sharing Liberals (VVD), after the violence following last week's murder in Amsterdam of Theo van Gogh, a film-maker, by a Muslim radical. Attacks on mosques and Muslim schools were met by retaliatory attacks on churches. A raid on a terrorist cell in The Hague turned into a street battle featuring hand grenades and wounded policemen, before two suspects were arrested.

This sorry tale raises a big issue not just in the Netherlands, but across Europe: how far should liberal societies tolerate the intolerant? For 20 years the instinct of many has been to defend the rights and cultures of growing numbers of Muslim immigrants, even radicals. Any other approach, it was feared, would pander to racists. But both multiculturalism and tolerance are now under broad attack.

In the Netherlands, Pim Fortuyn, a gay maverick, popularised the argument that Muslim immigrants were promoting values inimical to Dutch traditions. When he was murdered in 2002, his political movement all but collapsed. But some of his arguments found a new advocate in Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a female Somali immigrant and former Muslim who is now a liberal member of parliament. She urges the Dutch to insist forcefully on the superiority of western liberal values. Ms Hirsi Ali was threatened, along with Mr Van Gogh, after they made a film together that attacked Islamic fundamentalists' treatment of women.

Voters are also turning to a new champion, Geert Wilders, a renegade member of parliament thrown out by the liberals. Polls show that his party-in-the-making might win 7-17 seats if an election were held now, largely thanks to his attacks on Islam. The government urges restraint; but it is tightening immigration controls and cracking down on Islamic extremists.

In France, Nicolas Sarkozy, now finance minister but once interior minister, commented recently that “whether I like it or not, Islam is the second biggest religion in France. So you've got to integrate it by making it more French.” His government has a two-pronged approach to its 5m-strong Muslim population. It has tried to contain the radicalism of Islamists by co-opting them. And it has used a tough security regime to curb troublemakers.

To the first end, Mr Sarkozy last year set up the French Council of the Muslim Faith, an official voice for French Islam. When hardliners won elections to its regional branches and governing council, he said this was no disaster: it was best to bring such groups out of the shadows. Yet his strategy has had mixed results. A power-struggle rages in the council, threatening moderates. But one mark of the council's success was the reaction to the seizure in Iraq of two French journalists whose captors want the repeal of a ban on the headscarf in state schools. All shades of French Islam condemned the capture.

France has a strikingly harsh anti-terrorism policy. It has had no qualms in making the most of laws allowing the detention of terrorist suspects without trial for months on end. All four of its nationals repatriated from Guantánamo Bay were detained on a judge's instruction on their return to France. Dominique de Villepin, Mr Sarkozy's successor as interior minister, has been unyielding in his determination to expel imams guilty of hate crimes. When an expulsion order against Abdelkader Bouziane, an Algerian cleric based near Lyon, was overruled in the courts, Mr de Villepin changed the law—and Mr Bouziane was on the next plane out.

For Mr de Villepin, the trade-off between security and civil liberties is a fine one. But he insists “we must never find ourselves in a position of powerlessness.” The French monitor activity at mosques across the country, reckoning that of 1,500 Muslim prayer places, some 50 preach a radical form of Islam. This need not mean violence, but Mr de Villepin urges vigilance: “radical Islam can be used as a breeding ground for terrorism.” The French are also keen to co-operate with other European countries, fearful that their tough regime might otherwise move the problem to “softer” neighbours. With this in mind, Mr de Villepin has secured agreement with Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain to share intelligence on radical Islamists who attend training camps.

In Germany, home to 3.5m Muslims, over three times as many as the Netherlands, fears of violence and jihad are somewhat smaller. Admittedly, Islamic extremists could hit anywhere, but most Muslims in Germany are from Turkey (2.6m) or Bosnia (170,000), and espouse a more moderate form of Islam. Police have found few links between Islamic groups in Germany and the Netherlands. Yet Germany is not oblivious to the threat. As in France, the government is getting tougher on Islamic fundamentalists, even as it tries to foster integration. This double strategy underpins Germany's new immigration law: it facilitates the expulsion of Islamic radicals, but also makes language classes mandatory for immigrants.

In the same spirit, EU immigration ministers, meeting in the Netherlands, signed up on November 10th to common principles, both tender and tough, for integrating newcomers. They must be helped to take part in peaceful politics; faith must be respected, but not used to curb freedom.

In Germany, as elsewhere, there is now more emphasis on toughness. In October, after four years of legal manoeuvring, Germany ejected Metin Kaplan, the Turkish founder of an illegal Islamic group. There is less tolerance for radical Islamists using legal tricks to stay in Germany. The rule of law must “show its edge”, says Otto Schily, the interior minister.

After the Van Gogh murder, calls for Europe's open societies to be more aggressive towards Islamic radicals can only get louder. “Militant Islamism is only a tiny force in Europe”, wrote the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “yet it is dangerous, because many societies on this continent have elevated their defencelessness into a virtue.” Yet the risk is that, rather than the intolerant learning tolerance, the tolerant become intolerant too.

http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displayStory.cfm?story_id=3379357

Christendom awake!    (Bakground Article # 2)
r's Onward Muslim Soldiers



Twice convicted of inciting racial hatred after she criticized the ritual sacrifice of sheep by Muslims during their Eid el-Kebir holy day, Brigitte Bardot (above) is making news again this year for much the same reason. Two French human rights groups took swift legal action against the provocative French screen siren, charging that her latest book Crî dans le silence is full of racist attacks against Muslims—though, of course, Muslims are of all races.

The evidence of her latest offense: Bardot denounces the "Islamicization" of France and blames the degeneration of French society on her country’s liberal immigration laws. "For twenty years we have submitted to a dangerous and uncontrolled underground infiltration," she writes in her new book that became an instant bestseller in France this summer. "Not only does [Islam] fail to give way to our laws and customs. Quite the contrary, as time goes by it tries to impose its own law on us."

Naked facts would seem to bear out BB’s contentions. For example, practically all of France’s 1,200 mosques are funded by foreign governments, and out of the country’s 230 major imams, none is French. According to journalist Christopher Caldwell, "imams are often chosen by foreign governments for loyalty to their ideological priorities," priorities that are decidedly not those of France. Anyone who has been to Marseilles recently will understand what Bardot means by "Islamicization." The Muslim population of France doubled between 1989 and 1998, and if population trends continue, the eldest daughter of Christendom could have a Muslim majority by 2040 or earlier.

Back in the U.S.A., Robert Spencer has topped the aging sex kitten with a new book of his own. Onward Muslim Soldiers is jam-packed with some of the most politically incorrect statements about Islam (e.g., "Jihad and killing is the head of Islam."), though it is instructive to note that many of these statements, like the example above, are direct quotes from Muslim religious leaders themselves. Such is Spencer’s tack in providing his critical analysis of Islamic writings, history, and current practice.

Irony abounds. While Brigitte Bardot is being sued for the third time by French human rights groups advocating on behalf of Islam, Spencer charges that it is Islam itself, its traditional teachings and modern practice, that not only incites hatred—hatred of non-Muslims (infidels)—but also incites violence. Islamic intolerance, he says, plays no small role in our present clash of civilizations.

Last November, for example, Nigerian journalist Isioma Daniel penned an article for the Lagos daily This Day about the Miss World pageant, which was to be held in Nigeria in December. She asked, "What would Mohamed think? In all honesty, he probably would have chosen a wife from one of them." Muslims were outraged, including the Muslim official in the Nigerian province of Zamfara who called for the journalist to be killed for her "blasphemy." Riots ensued and Muslims set ablaze the offices of This Day. Approximately 500 people were killed in the rampage, and since then Christians have been fleeing the area. Such is what President Bush expediently called a "religion of peace."

Again, Spencer’s thesis that Islam is an intolerant religion is not a politically correct vision, nor one that is widely accepted among scholars—big surprise. Despite the fact that he provides dozens of supportive examples throughout his well-documented book, Onward Muslim Soldiers will undoubtedly come under attack as being filled with "racist attacks" against Muslims. To be sure, if he had published his book in France he would be facing the same sort of legal offensive by hysterical rights groups that make a living out of defending the status quo of European multicultural rot.

The most absorbing point, if not the main point, of Onward Muslim Soldiers is that most Western countries, and especially France, are serving the twin gods of multiculturalism and tolerance to their own demise. The big question with respect to the Muslim immigration to Europe and America: How can a tolerant society (as characterized by the West) survive the presence of an intolerant minority (as characterized by Islam)?

Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn asked exactly that question just before he was assassinated last year on the eve of Holland’s national elections. Fortuyn, a self-professed homosexual and unapologetic libertine (whose kitchen featured portraits of Marx and Lenin) was consistently vilified by Europeans as "far right" despite the fact that in most ways he supported the postmodern, post-Christian Holland of hashish cafes and licensed prostitutes. What set him apart? Fortuyn believed that traditional Islamic values are incompatible with the liberal, secular societies of the West and warned that immigration from Islamic countries threatens to change Dutch values inalterably. He once called Islam "a backward religion," arguing that while Christianity and Judaism have gone through the laundromat of humanism and enlightenment, as much cannot be said of Islam.

Spencer claims it was partly Fortuyn’s flamboyant homosexuality that led him to espouse such a controversial position. The Dutch politician pointed out that in the Netherlands homosexuality is treated on par with heterosexuality. In Islam, not so. Tired of being insulted by Muslims who called him "lower than a pig" for being a gay man, Fortuyn proposed curbs on Muslim immigration to Holland and called for the assimilation of the Muslims already there into the secular, multiethnic, multicultural, tolerant framework of modern Dutch society. "We need to integrate these people; they need to accept that, in Holland, gender equality and tolerance of different lifestyles is very, very important to us."

Fortuyn’s assassin, Volkert van der Graaf, believing that Dutch Muslims are an oppressed minority, felt that the rise of Fortuyn on the national political scene signaled the advent of fascism. He explained that he shot the Dutch renegade in order to save the Netherlands from such a neo-Hitlerian mentality.

Fortuyn, however, was able to vocalize what his Dutch brethren are unwilling to accept, that most Muslims commonly believe that the only legitimate basis for a society—and that would apply to Dutch society as well as anywhere—is the Sharia, the Islamic law that the Taliban was so strictly enforcing. Spencer quotes an imam in Holland: "The Sharia does not have to adopt to the modern world because these are divine laws. People have to bend to the Sharia." Defense of the Sharia includes, among other things, the defense of stoning—not only for the sins of Sodom, but also for adultery, a staple of modern Dutch life. Moreover, Muslim cultural features such as arranged marriages, revenge killings, and female circumcision (including sewing up the woman’s vagina from top to bottom) are diametrically opposed to Western values. Fortuyn’s fatal mistake was to warn Holland against the Trojan horse of intolerance it is inviting into its society in the name of tolerance and multiculturalism.

Tensions between Islam and European secularism are also apparent in the realm of women’s rights. If the principles of classic Islamic law hold sway, women will be reduced to second-class citizens.

Ayaan Hirsi Ali, elected to the Dutch parliament in January, has criticized Islam precisely on this point. Hirsi Ali, a young Somali immigrant who considers herself an "ex-Muslim," charges that it is Islam at its core (not simply so-called "radical Islam") that is oppressive to women. She refers both to verses in the Qur’an as well as modern-day Muslim practices. For example, Sura 4:34 of the Qur’an says women should obey the male members of their families—even if, say, they are forbidden to leave their homes—and if they do not obey then the husband may beat his wife: "As for those [women] from whom ye fear rebellion, admonish them and banish them to beds apart, and scourge them." According to Hirsi Ali, there are millions of Muslim men who carry out that simple verse, beating and oppressing their women in the name of Islam. For daring to voice such a scandalous testimony, the young Somali was forced to flee her country under threat of death, becoming a latter-day Salman Rushdie.

To be sure, Spencer duly recognizes that some Muslims willfully secularize, but he takes great pains to point out that many other Muslims not only reject the idea of assimilating with the prevailing secular cultures of the West, but see as their goal nothing less than the establishment of Islamic states in Europe. If the mounds of evidence piled up in Onward are to be believed, the groundwork is already being laid in more ways than one.

Turkey’s Catholic Archbishop Giuseppe Bernardini warns, for example, that millions of Saudi petro-dollars have been used not to create work in the poor Islamic nations of North African or the Middle East, but to build mosques and cultural centers in the heart of Christian countries with Islamic immigration, even including Rome, at the very heart of Christendom.

How can we ignore this blatant Muslim program of "expansion and reconquest," asks the archbishop, especially when radical Muslims have been so forthright about their intentions? Bernardini recounted a conversation he had with a Muslim leader who said to him: "Thanks to your democratic laws, we will invade you. Thanks to our religious laws, we will dominate you."

In London, Sheikh Omar Bakri openly declared his intention to transform the West into Dar Al-Islam and to establish Sharia on British soil. "I want to see the black flag of Islam flying over Downing Street," he has said. In fact, his al-Muhajiroun group is dedicated to this goal. Likewise, Abu Hamza, widely quoted as saying there’s nothing wrong with Osama bin Laden or his beliefs, headed up a similar organization called Supporters of Sharia, dedicated to the Islamicization of Britain.

Muslim clerics like Bakri and Hamza (both immigrant British citizens, by the way), have not exactly been shy about their modus operandi: to exploit the Western system which guarantees them free speech, well-being, and respect for religious rights in order to ultimately impose their intolerant (and in many cases barbaric) laws on that same Western society.

This clever brand of jihad confirms Bardot’s contention that "Not only does [Islam] fail to give way to our laws and customs. Quite the contrary, as time goes by it tries to impose its own law on us."

Thus Spencer devotes a good deal of his book to an in-depth look at the Islamic concept of jihad as it is preached today in mosques around the world. He carefully examines traditional Islamic teachings to reveal the advocacy of violence justified by religion. In his analysis, jihad is a violent doctrine of theology, a tradition, and a legal system within Islam. He answers critics who hold that jihad is not holy war by saying that they are unwilling to face uncomfortable facts of Islamic history and theology. For example, Muhammad himself taught—and he was very clear about this—that jihad is about making war (not peace), about fighting unbelievers in order to establish the supremacy and hegemony of the Islamic political and social system, not just the religion.

It’s clear from Onward Muslim Soldiers that there are more than enough radical Muslim clerics out there to dispel the myth of a tolerant Islam (in fact, Sheik Muhammad Hisham Kabbani toured the American mosques in 1999 and estimated that 80 percent of them are under control of radical extremist Muslims who teach violent jihad). Rather than being "a religion of peace," Spencer presents a pretty convincing argument that Islam is intolerant and violent at its core, as much in its traditional doctrine as in its modern-day practice. In the words of Ibn Warraq, "unless a reformed, tolerant, liberal kind of Islam emerges soon, perhaps the final battle will be between Islam and Western democracy." Says Spencer: This is the war we’re in now.

Michael S. Rose
17 December 2003
http://www.cruxnews.com/rose/onward.html



May 7, 2002 12:40 p.m.
Murder in Holland (Background Article #3)


e will not be able to gauge the full impact of Pim Fortuyn's murder on European politics until we know who killed him, and why. Dutch police have arrested a Dutch-born white male in connection with the crime, but he's not talking. Whoever he turns out to be, the fact that a popular anti-immigration politician was assassinated during a campaign in one of Europe's most civil and tolerant nations is seismic on its own.

Fortuyn's legion of enemies denounced him as a fascist and a racist, partly for his tough-on-crime policies, but mostly for his belief that immigration should stop, and that immigrants — particularly Muslims, whose views on women and gays he considered barbaric — should be pressed harder to assimilate into Dutch life. Immigration and assimilation of Third World immigrants: These are and will continue to be tremendously important issues for Europe, particularly as its population ages with the native birth rate remaining below replacement level. Whether Fortuyn's murderer turns out to have Islamic connections or is part of the extreme Left, the sobering truth is that Europe — democratic, gun-controlling Europe — is a place where questioning the immigration status quo will not only get you branded a fascist by the news media, it will get you shot dead.

It is hard to overestimate the psychological impact the killing is having in Holland, a bourgeois and orderly country that prides itself on tolerance.

"We were a quiet, normal country, where we never had any big criminal things happening," says Marnix Kort, 36, of Haarlem. "This changes everything. We have become a banana republic in an instant."

"Things like this don't happen in Holland. It's like the 11th of September for us. Everybody thought this couldn't be, but we see that it is possible. I feel very insecure," said Miriam Jeurissen, 34, who lives in a suburb of Amsterdam.

A woman who answered the phone at Fortuyn campaign headquarters [http://www.pim-fortuyn.nl] last night said things were too chaotic there, and that no one would be able to speak to the foreign press until today. Through her tears, she said, "It's unbelievable that someone gets killed only for saying what they believe."

What Fortuyn said and believed rocked the normally staid world of Dutch politics, which has for many decades been built around coalitions of parties representing traditional Dutch constituencies — Catholics, Protestants, Socialists, and smaller parties. In practice, this has resulted in an increasingly ossified statist government overseen by elitist political class which, as in France and other European democracies, a growing number of voters see as unresponsive to its desires.

"Pim Fortuyn was reacting strongly against a highly organized communal politics," says Erik Jones, a Netherlands expert at the University of Nottingham. "What he was arguing for was more of a sense of individualism, but within the context of a strong monoculturalism. He argued that the Dutch needed to do away with all this consensus, and just voice their opinions — but to do so within the general framework of Dutch culture."

To do that, Fortuyn challenged one of the fundamental principles of liberal Dutch culture: Thou shalt not be seen as intolerant. Immigration and immigration-related crime are not new problems in the Netherlands, but the ability to speak openly about it is. For years, the ruling elite, which includes the media, has made discussion of the growing immigration problem taboo, on pain of being branded a crypto-Nazi.

As recently as last week, Fortuyn denounced this paralyzing political correctness, telling an interviewer that "everywhere in Europe, socialists and the extreme left have forbidden the discussion of the problems of multicultural society."

"Professor Pim," a 54-year-old, openly gay, ex-Marxist professor turned newspaper columnist, emerged as an unlikely spokesman for anti-immigration sentiment in the Netherlands, where immigrants, many of them Muslims from Turkey and North Africa, make up 10 percent of the densely populated nation of 16 million.

Unlike France's Jean-Marie Le Pen, to whom he was often unfairly likened, Fortuyn was a free-marketeer who preached lower taxes and deregulation. He promised to get tough on crime, return the police to local control, and impose stricter standards on the educational system. Fortuyn, who frequented gay bars in his hometown of Rotterdam, was an unapologetic libertine who stood firmly behind Dutch beliefs in a liberal, tolerant society, but he maintained that Muslims and other immigrants who refused to accommodate themselves to Dutch values were a threat to liberty.

Kicked out of his original party for anti-Islamic statements — he once called Islam a "backward religion" for its treatment of women and gays, and authored a best-seller, "Against the Islamicization of our Culture — Fortuyn founded his own political party, List Pim Fortuyn, and shocked political observers by taking a third of the seats in Rotterdam municipal elections — this in a city where 45 percent of the electorate are not ethnically Dutch.

"If you look at his electoral list [of candidates], it was a case study in ethnic diversity," Jones says. "He sounded right-wing, but at the end of the day he was more about individual responsibility versus collective responsibility, as opposed to 'we hate foreigners.'"

Indeed, Fortuyn polled surprisingly well among ethnic voters, particularly small businessmen worried about crime brought by newer immigrants. Twenty percent of the votes at one Rotterdam mosque that served as a polling place went for Fortuyn. Said Kort, "We had black people on TV saying they will vote for him because he's doing something for black people who work for a living. He was against freeloaders."

"If anything, he was a libertarian, and that flew in the face of 50 years of collectivist tradition in the Netherlands," says analyst John Huslman of the Heritage Foundation.

The telegenic Fortuyn's media skills ("Imagine a gay Pat Buchanan," says Jones) sometimes slipped into demagogy, but were effective. In a recent televised debate with an imam, Fortuyn baited the Muslim cleric by flaunting his homosexuality. Finally the imam exploded, denouncing Fortuyn in strongly anti-homosexual terms. Fortuyn calmly turned to the camera and, addressing viewers directly, told them that this is the kind of Trojan horse of intolerance the Dutch are inviting into their society in the name of multiculturalism.

"They effect was galvanizing," says Jones. The September 11 attacks in America also made voters more open to Fortuyn's warning about the danger Islam poses to the open society.

"I'm not anti-Muslim, I'm not anti-immigration; I'm saying we've got big problems in our cities," Fortuyn said last month. "It's not very smart to make the problem bigger by letting in millions more immigrants from rural Muslim cultures that don't assimilate."

Though Muslim extremists seem the natural suspects in the killing, Fortuyn had many enemies. The Dutch press demonized him as "the Dutch Haider," even though Fortuyn distanced himself from the controversial Austrian rightist, denouncing anti-Semitism and vowing strong support for Israel.

To some on the left, the rise of Fortuyn in the polls — some analysts expected him to emerge from the May 15 elections as a major player in the next coalition government — signaled the advent of fascism. To understand how hysterical this view is in an American context, you have to realize that Fortuyn is to the left of most Democrats here.

In his obituaries, Fortuyn is being described as a "far right" or "hard right" politician, which is nonsense. Fortuyn routinely made the point that it was inaccurate and foolish to put all anti-establishment politicians in Europe into the same "far-right" camp.

He was right, but it's in the interest of the political establishment in Europe to demonize challengers like Fortuyn as neo-fascist, thus delegitimating their ideas without having to engage these ideas democratically. A Belgian government official reacted to the Fortuyn murder by cautioning politicians to be more careful about how they campaign — implicitly blaming Fortuyn for his own assassination. This will not last, particularly when the average voters believe people like Fortuyn are a liberating presence in the stultified, statist world of European politics.

"I wouldn't have voted for him, but he was a fresh breeze through the whole political scene," says Jeurissen, a stay-at-home mom. "If somebody has a different view, and makes people aware that there's a different way to think about things, that's okay."

The fact that that anodyne opinion — that freedom of speech is an acceptable part of democratic society — is enough to get a man killed in today's Europe should shock the conscience of the continent. Fortuyn may or may not be a martyr in the war against fundamentalist Islam, but he is almost certainly a martyr in the war on political correctness. European populations are aging, and cannot maintain their welfare states without massive immigration; immigration from Islamic countries threatens to change European values inalterably. Fortuyn said Europe cannot avoid confronting these realities. He may be a more powerful force for change by the way he died than he would have been had he lived.

"The clock is ticking in Europe, and is ticking in a democratic way," says Hulsman. "Maybe now is the time to begin real dialogue about immigration, crime and culture, because if a real one isn't begun, these impulses that can't be processed through democratic institutions are going to have ugly manifestations. This is the problem in Europe: nothing of real significance is ever discussed by the political elites."

Murder in Holland

by Rod Dreher
http://www.nationalreview.com/dreher/dreher050702.asp


May 9, 2002 8:45 a.m.       (ackground Article # 4)
Exreme?
Pim Fortuyn was not who they say he was.

Associated Press: "In the first assassination in modern Dutch history, a gunman fatally shot far-right leader Pim Fortuyn on Monday..."

Agence France-Presse: "Dutch far-right leader Pim Fortuyn was shot dead today..."

BBC:"The killing of Dutch far-right politician Pim Fortuyn, only days before the country's general election, has stunned the European political world."

Supporters of murdered Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn have long been accusing the media and the Dutch political establishment of character assassination for their exiling the maverick libertarian to the racist fringe. Placing Fortuyn on the "far right" or "extreme right" was a ridiculous smear, entirely typical of the Left (one is reminded of the abuse Rudolph Giuliani, another common-sense reformist, routinely endured from the Left in New York City during all but the last few months of his mayoralty). But it was effective.

How "extreme" was Fortuyn, really? Read his platform for yourself. But if you don't have the time or the patience to parse the slightly wonky verbiage, here it is in plain English. Does this sound like neo-Hitlerism to you?

IN HIS OWN WORDS
Europe is a bureaucracy that barely interests its citizens, let alone inspires them. The Dutch ruling coalition has meant high crime rates and massive problems with the healthcare and education systems. Its twin policies of generous immigration and tolerance of extreme multiculturalism are dividing the country. The country can't absorb all these newcomers, and the government gives them no incentive to assimilate and become a part of Dutch society. This has to stop.

1. Health: The healthcare system is overregulated, and people have to wait absurdly long for treatment, even for life-threatening illnesses. The heavy hand of the state must be lifted, and market-based reforms must be introduced.

2. Education: Teachers must be paid a market salary, and the education system should be deregulated to get rid of the excessive red tape discouraging educational experimentation and freedom of choice for teachers. Smaller schools are preferable, and each child must be within cycling distance of a primary school.

3. Social affairs: The abuse of the disability-claims system is costing too much, and must end. [Note: One out of seven Dutch workers is on full disability] Workers can only get disability benefits if they are injured on the job. Private insurance should cover other situations.

4. Public order and safety: Cops need to leave their desks and get out onto the streets. Disorder in public places must not be tolerated. Authorities must cease prosecuting citizens who defend themselves, and redouble their efforts to punish criminals. Control of the police should devolve to local officials, and chief constables should be replaced if they don't deliver results. If we have to build more prisons, fine. To beef up security forces, the military police will be given the same powers as the standard police.

5. Finances: The Dutch pay unnecessary taxes [Note: The top personal-income-tax rate in Holland is 60 percent; the average Dutch worker pays 50 percent of his income in tax.], and there must be a thorough accounting for tax policy at all levels. Some taxes, such as the capital-gains tax, cannot be justified. If it cannot be explained why the tax is charged, and it is not clear what is done with the tax collected, then eliminating it should be considered.

6. Emancipation and integration: Dutch society can't function with large groups of people from countries that did not experience centuries of Judeo-Christian-humanist developments, as Europe has had for centuries. [Note: He's talking mostly about immigrants from Islamic nations.] We've got to do something about it. The government should redouble its efforts on housing, schools, and cultural education for these groups, but it should also require these groups to make maximum effort themselves. Cultural developments which are diametrically opposed to Dutch values — such as arranged marriages, revenge killings, and female circumcision — must be fought. Discrimination against women in fundamentalist Islamic circles is unacceptable. In a democratic society like ours, all citizens have the same rights and obligations. Our hard-fought freedoms are worth protecting against increasing fundamentalism.

7. Immigration: Holland is not an immigrant country. We have one of the densest populations in the world. [Note: 16 million people in a place roughly the size of Rhode Island] We have to get our own society in order before we can accept more immigrants. Bringing in more poorly educated people with no income is a burden we can no longer bear.

8. Mobility and spatial planning: The government must stop spending money on prestige transportation projects, and instead improve local transport. Get tough on crime and vandalism in public transport to encourage people to use it more. End crime and restore social order in the cities, and people will quit leaving for the suburbs.

9. Culture: Subsidizing cultural development should take place only with the greatest of restraint. This will have to be based on the profit principle, with the primary focus on scholarship.

10. Defense: Reduce Dutch participation in NATO peacekeeping operations. Emphasize dialogue as well as military operations in the war on terrorism. Restructure the armed forces to eliminate bureaucratic overlap.

11. Agriculture: Deregulate Dutch agriculture to free up farmers to be more competitive in the marketplace. End onerous regulations in the areas of food safety, animal welfare, and the environment.

12. Domestic government: Citizens should take more responsibility for running their own lives. As a general principle, local control is preferable to centralized bureaucracy, which has proven that it's not responsive to the needs of the average citizen.

13. Europe: The EU is a good thing, but Holland should retain its own identity and, where possible, sovereignty. New member states will only be permitted to join after the Dutch people have been given their say in a politically binding referendum on the matter. This will keep politicians accountable to the voters for EU decisions.

FAR RIGHT?
That's it. That's the political platform of Pim Fortuyn. If mild free-market libertarianism like this is "far right," what on earth do we call true fascists? Of course, what accounted for Fortuyn's "extreme right" reputation was not his tax or agricultural policies, but his views on immigration and acculturation, which were easily caricatured by malicious opponents.

For example, Fortuyn, who was openly gay and a self-confessed libertine, came out in favor of repealing Article 1 of the Dutch constitution, which forbids the government and individuals from discriminating on "religion, belief, political opinion, race or sex, or on any other grounds whatsoever." That makes him a racist, sexist, anti-religious bigot, right?

Wrong. He was a civil libertarian who believed in free speech. As written, this constitutional clause potentially forbids frank and open discussion of the crime problem in Holland, which is largely one of predominantly Arab youth gangs. As NRO's Dave Kopel has observed, "In other words, Fortuyn [was] proposing that free speech protection in Holland be expanded to the levels of the American First Amendment."

DUTCH LIFE
About those youth gangs. Did you know that swimming pools, libraries, and other public places across Holland have been closed by police because of harassment and trouble caused by these young men, chiefly from Turkey, Morocco, and Tunisia, who are often armed? The police there find it easier to shut down the facilities than face the politically correct uproar that would ensue if they enforced the law.

Years of tolerating this abuse has produced a nation of voters like this Dutch woman wrote to NRO yesterday, relating common Dutch experiences and views:

Everybody in Holland has had culture-clash experiences such as these. I can honestly say, that I know of no one in my circle of friends who is racist. But every single person I know gets their prejudices and stereotypes justified just about every day when confronted with such situations; they just do not assimilate.

Here we are, conservative, normal, sober, Dutch people, quietly living our lives, proudly earning our money, keeping up with the Jones's but certainly not standing out from the rest, and gladly paying our taxes for the better good. And while bicycling to our work, we see the "foreign" youth, hanging out on the street, skipping school, up to no good, and we avoid them for our own safety.

We see "foreign" adults and elderly, hanging out on park benches, doing nothing, shooting the breeze, all day! And we say nothing, for the neighbors might think us intolerant and critical. And we bicycle off to our eight-hour workday, so we get our paycheck and can pay our bills and taxes. And they close our pools because we might not be safe there, and our police don't dare to deal with them, and they live off of the state (our collective money), never making much of themselves or putting in their two cents' worth — and some never being able to speak Dutch, while the Dutch government offers free (long-term) Dutch lessons for all immigrants to help assimilate.

And Pim Fortuyn is said to be a racist because he talks about this in public? This is why the Dutch are awaiting these elections with much anticipation. How are the government elite going to deal with the things Fortuyn finally said out loud?

May 9, 2003
http://www.nationalreview.com/script/printpage.p?ref=/dreher/dreher050902.asp

Email ItEmail It | Print ItPrint It | CommentsComments (0) | TrackbacksTrackbacks (0) | Flag as offensiveFlag as Offensive

No St Nick In Austria: A Victim Of Kowtowing To Political Correctness And Growing Muslim Population.

"I think it's for ethnic and cultural reasons," said Seiler, suggesting it was in deference to Vienna's Muslim population - 400,000 and growing."

  photo
  Saint Nicholas, right, and his companion Krampus participate in a parade on in this Saturday, Nov. 24, 2001 file photo, in St. Johann in the Austrian province of Tyrol. Opposition to visits by St. Nick to Vienna's kindergartens by City Hall officials is creating an uproar in Austria. (AP Photo/Kerstin Joensson, file)

VIENNA, Austria (AP - St. Nick, nein! A ban on St. Nicholas at Vienna's kindergartens is taking some of the ho-ho-ho out of the holidays for tens of thousands of tots this year. And it's creating a political ruckus, with opposition parties accusing City Hall of kowtowing to a growing Muslim population by showing Europe's Santa the kindergarten door.

Municipal officials insist their decision is prompted more by psychology than political correctness. Instead of joy, the sight of a strange bearded figure at the door evokes fear in most kids, they argue. And they point out that the policy on St. Nicholas is more than a decade old - though they concede it is being enforced more rigorously than in the past.

While Santa rules in the far north, the jolly elf has little tradition in Austria and surrounding countries. As in past years, some booths at Vienna's main Christmas market are again plastered with stickers depicting Santa with a diagonal red bar across his fluffy white beard - the work of a group in Austria, Switzerland and Germany that sees Santa as a symbol of the commercialization of Christmas and a threat to local traditions.

Instead, kids grow up with traditional Dec. 6 visits from St. Nicholas or Nikolo - a bearded, mitered figure in bishop's garb dating back to the 4th century who hands out sweets to good girls and boys. Christmas is reserved for the "Christkind" or Christ Child, who sneaks into homes and deposits presents under the tree and sometimes brings the tree itself.

As for naughty kids, there is St. Nick's sidekick, who in Austria goes under the name of "Krampus" - a hairy behorned figure who gives them lumps of coal and threatens them with a swipe of his switch unless they mend their ways.

But suggesting St. Nick is as scary as Krampus is just plain dumb, argue opponents of the "No to St. Nick" policy.

For child psychiatrist Max Friedrich, the ban is "total nonsense." He described Nicholas as a "positive figure who encourages and rewards children," in comments Wednesday to the daily Oesterreich.

In the United States, battles over Christmas focus on religious symbols in public schools and on government property, not on Santa Claus. Displaying a creche, retelling the story of Jesus' birth and singing Christmas carols have all been the subject of court fights over whether they violate the constitutional prohibition against mixing government and religion.

advertising
Officials in several Austrian provinces said they had no plans to banish St. Nick from their kindergartens.

Grete Laska, the councilwoman who holds Vienna's youth portfolio, says both Krampus and St. Nick "create fear (and) have no place" in city kindergartens, particularly when parents and schools encourage children not to accept gifts from strangers. The kindergartens can hold Christmas parties - but without St. Nick.

Such arguments don't hold with people like Anna Seiler, with two grandchildren in kindergarten.

"One of them was all sad recently, saying that Santa won't be visiting this year," she said. "I think the parents should get together and complain."

A pediatric nurse, Seiler dismisses arguments that children fear St. Nick. A surgeon dressed as St. Nick "comes every year to the kids on our ward," she said. "They love it."

"I think it's for ethnic and cultural reasons," said Seiler, suggesting it was in deference to Vienna's Muslim population - 400,000 and growing.

Mouddar Khouja of the Official Religious Islamic Community in Austria said his group has no problems with St. Nick in kindergartens - or anywhere else in Austria.

"We accept the Christian orientation of this country," he said. "We don't want to ban Nikolo."

Most schools in Vienna do not celebrate Muslim holidays, although those with large Muslim student populations may opt to observe them.

Markus Kroiher, head of the youth wing of the centrist People's Party declared his party "would not allow the dismantling of Christian traditions out of a falsely interpreted 'political correctness.'"

Heinz-Christian Strache, whose far-right anti-foreign Freedom Party showed strongly in Oct. 1 elections, called the assertion that St. Nick frightens kids a "cover ... bordering on absurdity."

"Whoever comes to Austria must realize it's a Christian country. Christian traditions are part of the equation," said Strache aide Hans-Joerg Jenewein.

St. Nick ban causes stir in Vienna  By GEORGE JAHN  ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER
Wednesday, November 29, 2006 · Last updated 5:38 p.m. PThttp://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/1103AP_No_St_Nick.html

Email ItEmail It | Print ItPrint It | CommentsComments (0) | TrackbacksTrackbacks (0) | Flag as offensiveFlag as Offensive
« Previous1234Next »