“Dr. Jorg Streitferdt, in-house counsel for Degussa, AG, based in Frankfurt, Germany, which owned Leybold at the time, said the companies did sell some equipment that ended up in Iraq's nuclear program, and were later subjected to a series of investigations, including a criminal inquiry by Germany.

He noted that Degussa was exonerated on the charges of selling vacuum furnaces to Iraq, largely because West Germany did not require export licenses at that time for such sales. Though Degussa executives suspected that Iraq might use the equipment for military purposes given the ongoing Iran-Iraq war, he added, they did not know that Iraq wanted it for a nuclear program.

"DeGussa and Leybold did not know what the equipment was for," Streitferdt said. "The whole world did not know what Iraq was about to do. We have learned our lesson and now have very tough internal controls on our exports."

http://www-personal.umich.edu/~sanders/214/other/news/iraqi_defector.html

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"According to the Report of the Thirteenth IAEA On-Site Inspection in Iraq, the inspectors found two oxidation furnaces made by Degussa, and some ancillary equipment, including vacuum pumps and control systems, that were manufactured by Leybold, a German firm. Iraq had used a small oxidation furnace for research and development. A production-size furnace was still in packing crates. The inspectors found a chart at the furnace site that recorded temperatures and time periods consistent with Stemmler's process.

Stemmler told me that he had not contactedDegussa . According to company officials, the contact was made by H and H and Iraqi procurement agents. The sale of the furnaces was arranged by H and H, although H and H personnel did not appear to know what the technical requirements of either the furnace or the ancillary equipment were. During meetings at the two companies, the Iraqis were more informed about the technical specifications than were the H and H people.

Degussa and Leybold officials say they did not realize that the equipment was going to be used to manufacture centrifuges.They said that the personnel involved in filling the original orders from MAN were no longer with their companies, and that the employees who filled the Iraqi order had no experience with centrifuges. Urenco and MAN stopped manufacturing maraging steel rotors several years ago, eliminating their need for large oxidation furnaces."

http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=dec93albrighta>

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Iraq's arms report to the United Nations shows that more than 80 German companies have done business with Baghdad since the 1970s and that some have contravened a UN embargo, according to a German newspaper.

In its Tuesday edition, the daily Tageszeitung said that the companies included public and private research laboratories and firms which supplied whole systems or components for weapons of mass destruction.

Citing what it claimed were parts of the report, the newspaper said some of the 86 companies that had been doing business in Iraq since around 1975 had continued to do so at least up until 2001.
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http://www.exportcontrols.org/centpart3.html


Iraq's Acquisition of Gas Centrifuge Technology

Part III: Treason and Wrap-up

In the early 1990s, Karl Heinz Schaab was investigated for violating export control laws. He was convicted of illegally exporting centrifuge rotors to Iraq in 1993, a minor conviction at the time. In late 1995, after receiving new information about Schaab's activities with Iraq, the German government re-opened its criminal investigation of him.

Following the defection of Hussein Kamel in August 1995, Iraq decided to reveal extensive information about its entire nuclear weapons program. A key new revelation was the extent of assistance by Schaab and his colleagues. When the senior Iraqi gas centrifuge expert, Adel, was asked why Iraq decided to reveal so much new information about Schaab, he explained that he thought Schaab was in jail and already exposed. Some Germans who knew Adel have questioned his reason, believing instead that Adel was ordered by top Iraqi leadership to expose Schaab. Adel and the other members of the Iraqi gas centrifuge program had been highly committed to protecting their German sources of assistance.

In July 1996, Schaab, who had become aware that he was likely to be charged with treason, fled to Brazil. In December 1996, he was arrested in Brazil where he was held pending a decision from the Brazilian courts about his extradition. In March 1998, the Brazilian Supreme Court ruled in Schaab's favor and he was freed.

Despite winning his case, Schaab was unhappy in Brazil and wanted to return to Germany. He retained the services of a new German defense lawyer, Michael Rietz, who recommended that he return to Germany and voluntarily turn himself in with the intention of pleading guilty to at least some of the charges. Rietz believed that he could convince the court to give Schaab a relatively short prison sentence as a result. Schaab returned to Germany on September 24, 1996 and was arrested the same day. After serving a few months in prison, he was freed pending trial.

In February 1999, the government filed treason charges against Schaab. The charges were as follows:


Having disclosed a national secret to a foreign power or one of its middlemen, he caused the threat of a "severe impairment" of the external security of the Federal Republic of Germany. The treason took place in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and Iraq. In many of these acts, the defendant acted together with the now deceased Bruno Stemmler.
Having violated a regulation of the German Foreign Trade Law, the defendant compromised the security of the Federal Republic of Germany, perturbed the peaceful cohabitation of nations, and considerably harmed the international relations of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The prosecutor viewed Schaab as committing a wide range of acts of treason. He believed that the charge of treason applied not only to overtly classified documents but also to a range of classified information and components that Schaab provided.

In June 1999, the court, with the agreement of the prosecutor, limited the charges to Schaab's supply of classified documents to Iraq for the supercritical centrifuge. The court viewed these documents as state secrets whose unauthorized release constitutes treason.

The charges were limited in part because of weaknesses in German law. Schaab had acted solely for financial reasons and did not intend to betray his country such as traditional communist or East German spies. According to Rietz, Schaab's case was the first one of its kind, and the law was not written with this particular situation in mind.

In making its treason case for the supercritical centrifuge documents, the prosecutors faced another problem. Almost all the individual designs and documents of the supercritical centrifuge were marked VS-Nur Fuer Dienstgebrauch (classified-official use only) or unclassified. However, the prosecutors argued successfully in the end that together these documents carried a much higher level of classification, namely VS-Vertraulich (classified-confidential).

The court established that Schaab was fully aware of the classification rules at MAN. He had received authorization to handle secret centrifuge information in 1972, giving him access to all centrifuge information in his department that was stored in a safe. Until 1980, he also managed his department's filing of classified information and accepted the delivery of classified components.

The court ruled that the documents had to be kept secret because they would enable Iraq to develop devices to make weapon-grade uranium, which could be used in nuclear weapons. The delivery of documents for the supercritical gas centrifuge created the real threat that Iraq would succeed in manufacturing weapons-grade uranium. Many of the parts were also directly usable in the subcritical centrifuge that was the main focus of Iraq's program.

The court stated that the development of weapons of mass destruction by a dictatorial regime, such as Iraq, which has made provisions for the manufacture of long-distance ballistic missiles, strengthens this regime's potential threat of attack. The court ruled that in this eventuality, and the resulting shift of the balance of powers, countries such as Germany would be severely impaired in their capability to defend themselves against attacks and disturbances from outside, ruled the court.

Before returning to Germany, Schaab had decided to plead guilty with the goal of receiving minimum time in jail. Because he had served 15 months in a Brazilian jail, he and Rietz reasoned that a guilty plea could lead to a decision by the court not to incarcerate him further beyond his initial three-month imprisonment after he returned from Brazil.

This strategy worked and Schaab did not serve another day in prison. He was sentenced to five years in prison. However, his time was reduced for prior time spent in Brazilian jail, which was weighted at three times that spent in German jail because of the extreme oppressive conditions of his imprisonment. In addition, the German legal tradition of not serving the last one third of a sentence meant that Schaab left the court a free man.

However, he had to pay a total of 80,000 Deutsche Marks (DM) in fines and other fees. He did not have to pay the roughly 100,000 DM the German government spent trying to extradite him from Brazil.

The court decided on such a lenient prison sentence because it determined that this case did not warrant a judgement of severe treason under the law. In principle, the court believed that the high potential risk posed by supplying the treasonous material speaks for the assumption of an exceptionally severe case. For Iraq, the technical value of the material disclosed by the defendant was considerable. This held true, even though the documents themselves delivered by the defendant did not provide adequate knowledge for the development and manufacture of a gas centrifuge for the production of weapon-grade uranium.

Further, Schaab had often assisted the Iraqis in an on-going business endeavor aimed as supporting the Iraqi gas centrifuge project. The court also held this against Schaab.

However, several important circumstances spoke in favor of the defendant. The court accepted that Stemmler, and not Schaab, originated the plan to sell the drawings and documents. In addition, Schaab acted in a period of time when his company was suffering economically, and the defendant had not previously been convicted of a major offense. As mentioned above, his conviction of selling Iraq carbon fiber rotors was viewed as minor.

Also in his favor, Schaab confessed to the deed, which helped the prosecution reconstruct the extent of his assistance to Iraq, and he regretted his actions. He even surrendered himself to the proceedings despite a refusal of extradition. In addition, he was deemed particularly sensitive to confinement in prison because of his age and impaired health.

There was speculation that another reason for the lenient sentence was to save further embarrassment to MAN, other German companies, and ultimately the German government. Rietz had vowed to fight the charges if the sentence was not reduced. The resulting long and public court fight could have revealed substantially more information about weak security procedures at MAN and elsewhere, possibly revealed other embarrassing information, and perhaps led to the release of sensitive or secret information.

Nonetheless, few doubt that Schaab has suffered enormously for his crimes. He experienced financial troubles when his actions became publicly known. His business on the whole has failed. He continues to suffer public humiliation.

Rationalization and Self-Delusion

Because Stemmler and Busse died before Kamel defected, they were never brought to justice. If they had lived, they would likely have been charged, perhaps also with treason.

During numerous interviews in the early 1990s with one of the authors, Stemmler claimed that he broke no laws. He admitted repeatedly that he provided centrifuge assistance but he denied the information was classified. However, it is clear that he certainly did provide classified information and documents. Because Stemmler is dead, he can no longer defend himself from allegations that he broke the law. Nonetheless, his stated justifications for his actions provide insight into his actions.

Stemmler said he felt justified cooperating with Iraq. When he first became involved with Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the United States seemed to be supporting Iraq, and had done so throughout its protracted war with Iran. After the war ended, Iraq, then considered a friend of the West, was involved in a massive rebuilding program. Stemmler said he "never had the impression that Iraq was against the United States."

In addition, the Iraqis told him that their "only desire [was] to make nuclear fuel" for civil purposes. In interviews, Stemmler often said that an Iraqi centrifuge cascade using these centrifuges could have produced only low-enriched uranium, not the highly enriched material needed for an atomic bomb. In reality these centrifuges can produce HEU when hooked in a cascade. When confronted by this seeming inconsistency, Stemmler shrugged.

He often expressed skepticism of Iraq's ability to operate centrifuges or build a centrifuge plant, implying that his assistance did not matter. For example, Stemmler said it is a "long distance from design to a practical machine."

Even in interviews, though, Stemmler was inconsistent in evaluating his own contribution to the Iraqi program. At times he tried to minimize the importance of his assistance. He said that he did not provide the most modern specifications. In some cases, he said, he tried to give them minimal information that was not usable for their specific machine. At other times, he said he believed he had helped to improve the Iraqi centrifuge design.

Stemmler and the other Germans were all successful scientists, technicians, or businessmen. They did not start their cooperation with Iraq intending to break any laws. It is doubtful that they wanted to help Iraq build nuclear weapons.

But they all desperately needed money for themselves or their companies. In addition, Iraq was subtle in its recruitment methods, trying to encourage the Germans to believe that the assistance was somehow legitimate or deserved. Certainly, Iraq never said the assistance was to make highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.

Nonetheless, this group of well-respected Germans did break the law. They lied to their own government about their activities. Several knowingly provided classified information to Iraq, which is now viewed as treason in Germany.

At the same time, several tried to deny knowing what Iraq intended to do with their assistance. But all of them must have realized at some point the true purpose of their assistance. Instead of stopping their assistance, they concocted various arguments to rationalize their actions. The arguments, several mentioned above, included:

The assistance was intended only for a university program involved in research and teaching;
The centrifuges would have been for the production of only low enriched uranium for civil reactors and not for nuclear weapons;
Iraq could never have successfully have built a gas centrifuge, so the assistance did not matter;
The specific centrifuges supplied could not have made weapon-grade uranium;
Iraq was a bulwark against Iranian fundamentalism, even though the Iraqi regime was acknowledged as odious;
The German government knew about the business but did not care. Why should the suppliers?
At some point, these centrifuge experts appear to have lost the ability to reflect honestly about their efforts. Finally, they started to lie to themselves.

The German export control system was so weak in the late 1980s, that lying was easy to do. The official investigation that started in 1989 did little to discourage their activities. In fact, it may have inadvertently made them feel invulnerable or immune to police action. Given the huge financial payments Iraq was providing, they had little incentive to stop. Iraq assisted in their self-delusion by not mentioning the true purpose of the items. The Iraqis tried to create a structure where suppliers would provide what they wanted, but never put the supplier in a position to ask the hard questions about the true purpose of their items.

Another factor that served to insulate these Germans was the resistance of their colleagues to reveal their activities to authorities. Germans, among others, are raised to view tattling as morally objectionable. However, this resistance against tattling is perhaps greater in Germany because of the legacy of the Nazi times and widespread disapproval of the Stasi use of informers.

Still, these mitigating factors do not fully explain their actions. Rietz, Hinze's and Schaab's lawyer, says that certainly some people will simply knowingly violate laws for financial gain. But most will not. He says that Iraq made the first steps toward these illegal actions both easy and lucrative. The weak German, Austrian, and Swiss export control systems eased the Iraqi task considerably.

By the time the participants understood the true purpose of their assistance, they were deeply involved. Retreating at that point would have been difficult and risky for most people. Rietz recommends that the time to reflect and stop would have been early in the process. "Once the train leaves the station," he said, "it is hard to get off."

Risks Ahead

Prior to the Allied bombing campaign in January 1991, Iraq never succeeded in producing significant amounts of enriched uranium in its gas centrifuge program. It did run single machine tests for many months in 1990 and accomplished a considerable amount in creating an infrastructure to build and operate centrifuges. Inspectors believe that in early 1991 the Iraqi centrifuge team was close to the point at which it could build and operate a centrifuge with confidence. For more on the program's accomplishments, click here.

Iraq acquired, and still possesses, a remarkable amount of classified and sensitive information about gas centrifuges. It gained considerable experience in gas centrifuges and has had over a decade to ponder its weaknesses and strengths.

Iraq poses a risk in that its centrifuge information could pass to irresponsible agents or other nations, some of which may be seeking nuclear weapons. Even advanced nations would find Iraq's centrifuge information useful to their civil nuclear programs. Few countries have information about 3-meter Urenco centrifuges.

The most frightening risk is that Iraq will reconstitute its centrifuge program to make highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. It would find reconstitution relatively easy to do, although its chances of success would depend on foreign procurement and international intervention.

This is Part III of Case Studies of Illicit Procurement Networks for Iraq

EMIS Procurement
Matrix Churchill
H+H Metalform
Iraq's Acquisition of Gas Centrifuge Technology
Part I
Part II
Part III
Schaublin
SMB
Karl Otto Brauer
Banca Nationale de Lavoro

Found at http://www.exportcontrols.org/secret.html

The second memo (memo 2) refers to a meeting between Saddam and the Iraqi Atomic Energy Organization that was held months before the MIC asked for the Degussa furnaces, and it was in that early meeting that the Saddam approved the Atomic Energy Organization to use the furnaces and it was given to their “Physics Department” to use it according to the memo 2.

Also the Degussa furnaces were not going to support a major industrial output like melting metals to manufacture hundred if not thousands of shells that Iraqi Army needs. In fact the Iraqis were manufacturing or importing these shells and not depending on any Degussa furnace to be part of the production effort.
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Spring 2000 : (CIA DIRECTOR TENET REPORTS THAT BIN LADEN HAS BEEN TRAINING HIS OPERATIVES IN THE USE OF BIOLOGICAL & CHEMICAL TOXINS) George Tenet, director of the CIA reports to a panel of experts that Osama bin-Laden has been training his operatives in the use of chemical and biological toxins.-- via "Bio-Chemical Weapons & Saddam: A History, " Various Sources , 02-20-03 , by PsyOp

MAY 2000 : (IAEA FINDS IN JORDAN A MACHINE ORDERED BY IRAQ WHICH IS RELATED TO URANIUM ENRICHMENT ) The IAEA said that in May the agency found a filament-winding machine ordered by Iraq that had arrived in Jordan. The agency said the system was part of Baghdad's clandestine uranium enrichment program. The machine and its spare parts were destroyed, the agency said..” - Source : Middle East Newsline 10/18/00

MAY 3, 2000 Wednesday : (CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING : THREE UN OFFICIALS - HANS VON SPONECK, DENIS HALLIDAY & SCOTT RITTER CALL FOR THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ - US REPRESENTATIVES DENNIS KUCINICH, JOHN CONYERS & CYNTHIA MCKINNEY ALSO CALL FOR THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS) Washington, DC - Three former senior UN officials denounced and called for the lifting of economic sanctions against Iraq at a congressional briefing on Wednesday, May 3.
Former UN Humanitarian Coordinators in Iraq, Hans von Sponeck and Denis Halliday, and former weapons inspector Scott Ritter, called on the US government to abandon its policy economic sanctions against Iraq. Despite their diverse backgrounds, all three agreed that economic sanctions are the principle cause of the humanitarian disaster in Iraq, and dismissed claims that American policy is not to blame. US Representatives Dennis Kucinich (D-OH), John Conyers (D-MI) and Cynthia McKinney (D-GA) also called for the lifting of sanctions.
Former UN weapons inspector in Iraq Scott Ritter debunked what he called “the myth” of a threat from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, which typically cited as a reason for maintaining sanctions. Calling himself "an unlikely ally in this matter," Ritter said that "a lot of the blame for this perception can be laid at my doorstep." But, Ritter said, “the reality is that when you judge Iraq’s current weapons of mass destruction capabilities today, they have none.” ------- Former Senior UN Officials Denounce Iraq Sanctions at Congressional Briefing Press Release American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee May 4, 2000

2000 summer : (IRAQ STILL POSSESSES ANTHRAX & MUSTARD GAS AT THIS TIME; UN INSPECTORS ARE NOT PRESENT IN IRAQ; ALSO, IRAQ TRAINED DOZENS OF TERRORISTS INSIDE ITS BORDERS- See CNS Iraqi IIS Memos/Docs) Iraqi intelligence documents, confiscated by U.S. forces and obtained by CNSNews.com [before Oct 4, 2004], show numerous efforts by Saddam Hussein's regime to work with some of the world's most notorious terror organizations, including al Qaeda, to target Americans. They demonstrate that Saddam's government possessed mustard gas and anthrax, both considered weapons of mass destruction, in the summer of 2000, during the period in which United Nations weapons inspectors were not present in Iraq. And the papers show that Iraq trained dozens of terrorists inside its borders. ------- "Exclusive: Saddam Possessed WMD, Had Extensive Terror Ties," by Scott Wheeler, CNSNews, October 4, 2004

JUNE 2000 : (FORMER IRAQI GENERAL RECEIVES VIDEOTAPE OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES RAPING A FEMALE FAMILY MEMBER) A former Iraqi general reportedly received a videotape of security forces raping a female family member. He subsequently received a telephone call from an intelligence agent who stated that another female relative was being held and warned him to stop speaking out against the Iraqi Government.-- via "Bio-Chemical Weapons & Saddam: A History, " Various Sources , 02-20-03 , by PsyOp

JULY 6, 2000 : (THIS IS THE DATE ON A DOCUMENT - A LETTER- FROM IRAQI AMBASSADOR TO THE HOLY SEE / TO NIGER , WISSAM AL ZAHAWIE - CONCERNING A PROPOSED URANIUM TRANSACTION THAT WAS LATER FOUND) Italy had [long after the fact] handed over cables from al-Zahawie to the Niger government announcing the trip, and other documents had pointed to his [Iraqi ambassador to the Holy See, Wissam al Zahawie's] presence in Niger. But the inspectors [in January 2003] were particularly interested in a July 6, 2000, document bearing al-Zahawie's signature, concerning a proposed uranium transaction. The inspectors refused to show him the letter, he says, but al-Zahawie was sure he had never written it.
"If they had such a letter, it had to have been a forgery," he says [in 2003]. The tell-tale signs of the forgery were quite obvious, he stresses. [* How would he know if they refused to show it to him?] Diplomatic procedure typically called for official notes between Iraq and other governments to feature a government seal, but they are typically unsigned; correspondence between an ambassador and other dignitaries would be signed but would have no seal. The letter in question had both, the inspectors admitted. [* according to later interview of Zahawie, who may not have been telling the truth] "I realized the forgery when they asked this," al-Zahawie notes. "And when I left, I thought I had told them all there was to know. ----------"Saddam's Niger Point-man Speaks," By HASSAN FATTAH/LONDON, Time, Wednesday October 5, 2003, via hassanfattah.com , Copyright © 2003 Time Inc. All rights reserved., Reproduction in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

AUGUST 2000 : (REPORTS THAT IRAQ IS FINANCING SCUD MISSILES IN SUDAN, WITH NORTH KOREAN HELP, FOR FUTURE USE BY IRAQ) "……The U.S. intelligence community fears new reports may indicate Iraq is financing construction of a Scud missile assembly plant in Sudan, enlisting North Korea’s help, ABCNEWS has learned. …….. Sources say North Korean personnel would build and run the plant, with the assembled Scuds to be held in Sudan for Iraq’s future use — a prospect that worries U.S. officials. ……The intelligence community has two separate reports that indicate such a deal is in the works. If they prove true, it raises significant concerns that Saddam Hussein is back in business trying to make Scud missiles, although outside Iraq. ….." - ABCNews 8/10/00 Barbara Starr

AUGUST 21, 2000 : (IRAQI GOVERNMENT PURCHASES 5 KG OF MUSTARD GAS, GAS MASKS, FILTERS & RUBBER GLOVES) The purchase order for the mustard gas includes gas masks, filters and rubber gloves. ... The documents [ - See CNSNewsIraqDocs]show that Iraqi intelligence received the mustard gas and anthrax from "Saddam's company," which Tefft said was probably a reference to Saddam General Establishment, "a complex of factories involved with, amongst other things, precision optics, missile, and artillery fabrication." ...The Jaber Ibn Hayan General Company is listed as the supplier of the safety equipment that accompanied the mustard gas order. Tefft described the company as "a 'turn-key' project built by Romania, designed to produce protective CW (conventional warfare) and BW (biological warfare) equipment (gas masks and protective clothing)." ------- "Exclusive: Saddam Possessed WMD, Had Extensive Terror Ties," by Scott Wheeler, CNSNews, October 4, 2004

SEPTEMBER 6, 2000 : (IRAQI GOVERNMENT PURCHASES THREE VIALS OF 'MALIGNANT PUSTULE' aka ANTHRAX, ALSO STERILIZATION & DECONTAMINATION EQUIPMENT) But the documents [ - See CNSNewsIraqDocs]obtained by CNSNews.com [in 2004] shed new light on the controversy. They detail the Iraqi regime's purchase of five kilograms of mustard gas on Aug. 21, 2000 and three vials of malignant pustule, another term for anthrax, on Sept. 6, 2000. The purchase order for the mustard gas includes gas masks, filters and rubber gloves. The order for the anthrax includes sterilization and decontamination equipment. (See Saddam's Possession of Mustard Gas)
The documents show that Iraqi intelligence received the mustard gas and anthrax from "Saddam's company," which Tefft said was probably a reference to Saddam General Establishment, "a complex of factories involved with, amongst other things, precision optics, missile, and artillery fabrication."
"Sa'ad's general company" is listed on the Iraqi documents as the supplier of the sterilization and decontamination equipment that accompanied the anthrax vials. Tefft believes this is a reference to the Salah Al-Din State Establishment, also involved in missile construction. (See Saddam's Possession of Anthrax) ------- "Exclusive: Saddam Possessed WMD, Had Extensive Terror Ties," by Scott Wheeler, CNSNews, October 4, 2004

SEPTEMBER 16, 2000 Saturday () NEW YORK (News Agencies) - The Clinton Administration notified Congress that it intends to grant $4 million to the Iraqi opposition, in hopes of toppling Saddam Hussein. U.S. plans to give $4 million to Iraqi opposition
An American official said that after a meeting between Madeleine Albright and Iraqi dissidents in New York on Thursday [Sept 14, 2000] that the U.S. will contribute to fund a newspaper, radio transmitters and other media operations.
An additional $268,000 was given to the Iraqi National Congress for administration. But none of the funding will be used for military action.
Foes of the Iraqi government asked Albright during the meeting to work on tightening international supervision over an Iraqi indirect account, which is used for oil revenue deposits coming from the Oil For Food program. This account, kept in Banque Nationale De Paris, contains $8 to $9 billion, and although Iraq doesn't have full control over the account, the government decides who gets contracts funded by the money.----- "Clinton Administration Grants $4 Million To Iraqi Opposition," News Agencies, Saturday, September 16, 2000

OCTOBER 2000 : (OIL FOR FOOD PROGRAM SWAPS BANKS, YANKING BILLIONS FROM THE US ECONOMY) ...the trust account where the oil revenues were kept, at a French bank, at Iraq's insistence Billions were yanked from the US economy, I believe in October 2000, and sent to France at "Saddam's" insistence. I could never believe a bigger deal was never made over it.-----13 posted on 02/19/2004 7:24:51 PM PST by VA40

OCTOBER 18, 2000 : (REPORT THAT INSPECTORS HAD DESTROYED A DEVICE WHICH WAS FOUND IN MAY IN JORDAN; IT WAS DESTINED FOR IRAQ'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM ) “… International inspectors have found and destroyed a system ordered by Iraq for its secret nuclear weapons program. The International Atomic Energy Agency said in a report that despite the eviction of United Nations weapons inspectors in December 1998 the agency has managed to foil Iraqi plans to build nuclear weapons. The IAEA said that in May the agency found a filament-winding machine ordered by Iraq that had arrived in Jordan. The agency said the system was part of Baghdad's clandestine uranium enrichment program. The machine and its spare parts were destroyed, the agency said..” - Source : Middle East Newsline 10/18/00

OCTOBER 2000 : (USS COLE BOMBING) The U.S.S. Cole, a modern warship is crippled and nearly sunk by suicide bombers piloting a dinghy packed with explosives. 17 Sailors are killed and scores injured.-- via "Bio-Chemical Weapons & Saddam: A History, " Various Sources , 02-20-03 , by PsyOp

OCTOBER 27, 2000 : (JESSE HELMS & BENJAMIN GILMAN WRITE LETTER TO US SEC OF STATE MADELAINE ALBRIGHT CONCERNING VIOLATIONS OF SANCTIONS ON IRAQ) WASHINGTON (October 27) – U.S. Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman (20th-NY), Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, sent the following letter today to Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright concerning sanctions against Iraq:

October 27, 2000
Dear Madam Secretary:

We suspect that you are extremely concerned, as we certainly are, about the increasing number of sanctions-violating flights into Iraq. Needless to say, it is not surprising that these flights have been initiated by Russia and France, both of which are permanent members of the Security Council.
Following the lead of Russia and France, other countries have likewise flown into Iraq. Among these countries are recipients of significant amounts of U.S. foreign aid. This, Madam Secretary, is outrageous.
Since August, Russia has permitted three direct commercial flights to Baghdad, requesting permission for only two of those flights from the U.N. Sanctions Committee. We understand that Russia does not view these flights as sanctions violations.
In your testimony last month before the Foreign Relations Committee, you emphasized that this is not the U.S. position; specifically, you made clear that the United States believes "that these flights need approval, and . . . I think that absent any new kind of consensus, the [Sanctions Committee] will continue . . . to operate under practices of the last 10 years, that these flights require approval, not just notification."
Sanctions are a vital tool in denying Saddam Hussein the funding and supplies necessary for him to pursue weapons of mass destruction. Vigilance is all the more urgent, given the absence of weapons inspectors in Iraq for nearly two years.
Being fully committed, as we are, to ensuring that this despot does not develop the weapons to threaten the United States, our allies, or our interests, we acknowledge that this will be increasingly difficult if Saddam’s neighbors (and our allies and aid recipients) continue to violate the sanctions intended to protect them.
Madam Secretary, two points:

1) In your view, absent permission from the sanctions committee, do these flights constitute sanctions violations? And

(2) Under the terms of Section 534 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act of 2000, do you agree that no assistance should be provided to nations in violation of U.N. sanctions on Iraq?

Please let us hear from you as to how Section 534 applies to the countries in violation of UN sanctions, and in particular to Russia and Egypt, two flagrant violators who receive billions in U.S. foreign aid.
We urgently need your response, Madam Secretary.

Sincerely,
(signed) (signed)
JESSE HELMS , BENJAMIN A. GILMAN

NOVEMBER 2000 : (DEGUSSA FURNACES RECEIVED BY PHYSICS DEPT...) See CMPC-2003-012331.pdf

DECEMBER 23, 2000 : (IRAQ : WMD : DEFECTOR SAYS IRAQ RESTARTED ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM TWO YEARS AGO, IN AUGUST 1998) "... SADDAM HUSSEIN has ordered his scientists to resume work on a programme aimed at making a nuclear bomb, a defector warned yesterday. The Iraqi dictator, whose efforts to make atomic weapons were thwarted by United Nations inspectors after the Gulf war in 1991, revived the plans two years ago, the defector said. Scientists who had previously worked on the weapons programme were made to return to their duties in August 1998, four months before Saddam expelled the inspectors.... According to Salman Yassin Zweir, a design engineer who was employed by the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission for 13 years, the instruction came in a document marked "top secret" which identified a research centre on Al-Jadriya Street, Baghdad, as the headqarters of the new operation. .....Zweir was arrested and tortured after refusing to go back to the programme. He escaped to Jordan, where he spoke for the first time last week after being reunited with his wife, who was also tortured, and their two sons, aged seven and six...." - Source : Times of London 12/23/00


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